
















The Dissertation Committee for Han Ming Daniel Chng certifies that this is the 
approved version of the following dissertation: 
 
 
THE EFFECTS OF INTERESTS AND INSTITUTIONAL 
INFLUENCES ON ORGANIZATIONAL ADOPTIONS OVER TIME 








Pamela R. Haunschild, Co-Supervisor 
Alison Davis-Blake, Co-Supervisor 
James D. Westphal 
Melissa E. Graebner 
Marc-David L. Seidel 
THE EFFECTS OF INTERESTS AND INSTITUTIONAL 
INFLUENCES ON ORGANIZATIONAL ADOPTIONS OVER TIME 
AND ACROSS PRACTICES 
 
by 





Faculty of the McCombs School of Business 
The University of Texas at Austin 
in Partial Fulfillment  
of the Requirements 
for the Degree of  
 
Doctor of Philosophy 
 
 








This dissertation is dedicated to my beloved wife, Belinda Lee Ming Tan, who has 
supported me throughout this endeavor with kindness, patience, and love. And, to my 
mother, Bee Geok Tan, who never questioned my decisions and always supported my 
every action. And to my little boy, Cayden Shao Han Chng, who just cracks me up.  
 
 v
THE EFFECTS OF INTERESTS AND INSTITUTIONAL 
INFLUENCES ON ORGANIZATIONAL ADOPTIONS OVER TIME 





Han Ming Daniel Chng, Ph.D. 
The University of Texas at Austin, 2006 
 
Supervisors:  Pamela R. Haunschild and Alison Davis-Blake 
 
The purpose of my dissertation is to examine the effects of interests and carriers 
of institutional influences on the adoption of three organizational practices that have 
become varyingly diffused and socially accepted over time.  Drawing on theories of 
agency, power, social networks, and institutions, I argue that the effects of actors’ 
interests and carriers of institutional influences on adoption will be moderated by 
evolving degrees of social acceptance of a practice.  This is because as social acceptance 
for a practice changes over time, it will not only influence actors’ interests and their 
ability to enact them but also determine the effectiveness of different carriers of social 
influences, and consequently, determine how these factors will affect adoption.  For 
actors’ interests, I examine the effects of managerial power, managerial incentives, and 
institutional shareholders’ influence on adoption over time.  For carriers of institutional 
influences, I examine the effects of social ties and prestigious endorsement on adoption 
over time.  To test my hypotheses, I examine the adoptions of tender offer takeovers, 
 vi
poison pill takeover defenses, and executive stock option repricing using separate 
samples of companies listed on the Fortune 500 Largest U.S. Industrials (F500) between 
1980 and 2004.  I collect longitudinal data and conduct event history analysis to test my 
hypotheses.  The results of this study offer some support for changing effects of actors’ 
interests and carriers of institutional influences on adoption as the degree of social 
acceptance for a practice evolves.  In sum, this study provides a more nuanced 
understanding of the relative roles of interests and institutional influences on adoption as 
the social environment changes. 
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CHAPTER ONE:  PURPOSE, KEY DEFINITIONS, AND 
CONTRIBUTIONS 
The adoption and progressive diffusion of practices across a population of 
organizations have garnered much attention in organizational research.  Scholars have 
been particularly interested in understanding the determinants of adoption because of 
their implications on organizational and societal change.  Within an organization, 
adoptions represent an organization’s ability to change and adapt and has important 
effects on its functioning and survival.  Within a population, aggregate adoptions 
represent important changes within a social system, highlighting how social norms and 
institutions are created, maintained, and transformed.  The importance of organizational 
adoption has led researchers to develop several productive streams of research.  These 
include studies that emphasize efficiency and adaptation (Lawrence & Lorsch, 1967a, b; 
Rosner, 1968; Williamson, 1975; Woodward, 1965), organizational power and politics 
(Hickson, Hinings, Lee, Schneck, & Pennings, 1971; Perrow, 1970, 1972; Pfeffer & 
Salancik, 1978), and the isomorphic processes of institutions (DiMaggio & Powell, 1983; 
Meyer & Rowan, 1977; Scott, 2001; Strang & Soule, 1998). 
However, an unfortunate outcome of such broad interest is that explanations for 
the adoption and diffusion of practices are as varied as the perspectives that exist in the 
field of organizational theory (Strang & Soule, 1998; Tolbert & Zucker, 1983, 1996).  
Key assertions made under the different perspectives are often fragmented and seldom 
integrated.  In particular, researchers have debated over the relative role of instrumental, 
strategic choice of organizational actors, on one hand, and the social influence of 
institutions, on the other  (Pfeffer, 1997; Scott, 2001).  Persistent debates about this issue 
have made the accumulation of knowledge on adoption difficult (Scott, 1998, 2001; 
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Strang & Soule, 1998; Tolbert & Zucker, 1996).  To improve our understanding of how 
organizations may adapt and change, researchers have called for more comprehensive, 
integrative, and dynamic models of organizational adoption (Strang & Soule, 1998; 
Tolbert & Zucker, 1996).  
Recently, researchers have started to integrate the different theoretical 
perspectives in order to provide a better understanding of how organizational actors may 
or may not act to further their interests in the face of social and institutional pressures 
(Barley & Tolbert, 1997; Giddens, 1979; Ingram & Clay, 2000; Oliver, 1991; Scott, 
1995; Tolbert & Zucker, 1996).  In particular, Tolbert and Zucker (1996) propose that 
potential integration of the role of interests, institutions, and efficiency concerns in 
adoption may be found in the careful conceptualization of the processes by which 
practices diffuse and become progressively institutionalized (Barley & Tolbert, 1997; 
Dacin, Goodstein, & Scott, 2002; Scott, 2001).  Emphasizing that institutions exist both 
as a property as well as a process (DiMaggio & Powell, 1983; Zucker, 1977), Tolbert and 
Zucker (1996) observed that practices can become varyingly diffused and 
institutionalized as the result of the actions taken by social actors (Barley & Tolbert, 
1997; Giddens, 1979).  Further, as institutional conditions “change in character and 
potency over time” (Dacin et al., 2002, p.45), they will drive and shape the actions of 
social actors (Meyer, Ramirez, & Soysal, 1992; Tolbert & Zucker, 1983; Westphal & 
Zajac, 1994).  Tolbert and Zucker (1983; 1996) proposed the process of 
institutionalization to explain the relative role of interests, institutions, and efficiency 
concerns on adoption.  They argued that interests and efficiency concerns will predict 
early adoptions of a practice.  However, as the practice becomes progressively 
institutionalized, the effects of interests and efficiency concerns on adoption will 
decrease.  At the same time, institutional carriers of social norms and legitimacy will 
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become more important determinants of adoption.  However, if a practice fails to become 
institutionalized, then interest and efficiency concerns will continue to predict late 
adoptions.  
This temporal reconciliation of the role of interests, institutions, and efficiency 
concerns in organizational adoption has received mixed support in prior studies on the 
adoption of civil service reforms (Knoke, 1982; Tolbert & Zucker, 1983), multidivisional 
(M-form) organization structure (Fligstein, 1985), matrix management (Burns & Wholey, 
1993), CEO long-term incentive plans (Westphal & Zajac, 1994), total quality 
management (TQM) (Young, Charns, & Shortell, 2001), curricula reforms (Kraatz & 
Zajac, 1996), and organizational downsizing (Ahmadjian & Robinson, 2001; Budros, 
2004).  For example, in studies that focused on contexts that are argued to have become 
institutionalized (Tolbert & Zucker, 1983; Westphal & Zajac, 1994), researchers have 
observed that the effects of interests and efficiency concerns on adoption decrease over 
time.  However, these studies do not explicitly examine the effects of institutional factors 
on adoption over time.  Further, contrary to Tolbert and Zucker’s (1983, 1996) assertion 
that interests and efficiency concerns are not likely to influence adoptions once a practice 
has become institutionalized, Palmer and his colleagues (1993) found that several 
economic and political factors remain highly predictive of multidivisional form (M-form) 
adoptions, even in the late 1960s when the practice has become institutionalized.  Also, 
Kraatz and Zajac (1996) found that the effects of local market conditions on college 
curricula reforms persist over time.  In other studies that have examined the effect of 
institutional influences on adoption over time, Burns and Wholey (1993) observed that 
institutional isomorphism did not increase over time in matrix management adoption.  
Also, Budros (2004) observed that form prevalence, an important institutional indicator 
of isomorphism (Hannan & Freeman, 1977), was influential in the adoption of 
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downsizing in both early and late stages of the diffusion process.  One reason for these 
inconsistent effects of interests, institutions, and efficiency concerns on adoption may be 
due to the fact that many practices do not become either fully institutionalized or not.  
Instead, they tend to acquire varying degrees of social acceptance or appropriateness over 
time without becoming necessary, legitimating, or taken-for-granted.  Because these 
practices acquire varying degrees of social acceptance over time, the effects of interests, 
institutions, and efficiency concerns on adoption are likely to correspondingly change 
over time.  In these situations, how actors’ interests and carriers of institutional influences 
will continue to affect adoption as social attitude changes remain unclear in current 
literature. 
PURPOSE OF RESEARCH 
The purpose of my dissertation is to examine how the effects of different 
organizational actors’ interests and carriers of institutional influences on adoption will 
change over time for three practices that have become varyingly diffused and socially 
accepted.  My central proposition argues that the effects of different actors’ interests and 
different carriers of institutional influences on adoption will change over time depending 
on how the degree of social acceptance for a practice evolves.  This is because as the 
degree of social acceptance for a practice changes, it will have two important moderating 
effects.  First, it will influence actors’ interests and their ability to enact these interests.  
Second, it will also determine the effectiveness of different carriers of social influence.  
Specifically, I investigate the following determinants of adoption of tender offer 
takeovers, poison pills takeover defense, and executive stock option repricing. 
(1) Interests – To uncover the effects of interests on adoption over time, it is 
important to identify and recognize the interests of key organizational actors (Strang & 
Soule, 1998).  In organizational research, the interests of top managers, shareholders, and 
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employees have featured prominently in prior studies (e.g., Baron, Dobbin, & Jennings, 
1986; Davis & Thompson, 1994; Jensen & Meckling, 1976).  In this study, I focus on the 
competing interests that may exist between top managers and shareholders.  This tension 
is well articulated in the literature on agency theory (Fama & Jensen, 1983; Jensen & 
Meckling, 1976) as well as theories of power and politics (Perrow, 1970, 1972).  In this 
study, I will focus on the interests and power of top managers, specifically the chief 
executive officer (CEO), and key shareholders, specifically institutional shareholders.  I 
explore in this study the advocacy for and resistance to adoption that top managers’ and 
institutional shareholders’ interests may present over time as the degree of social 
acceptance of a practice evolves.  Given my focus on potential competing interests 
between organizational actors, I am not examining the interests of employees in this 
study.  This is because the interests of employees, with regards to the three organizational 
practices, are not clearly articulated a-priori.  Further, employees have limited ability to 
influence the adoption of the three practices that I am studying (i.e., tender offer 
takeovers, poison pills takeover defense, and executive stock option repricing).   
(2) Carriers of Institutional Influences – In the study of institutions, Scott (2001; 
2003) has highlighted the importance of identifying and investigating the effects of 
different institutional carriers of social norms and legitimacy on organizational actions.  
In this study, I am interested in the relational and symbolic carriers of social influences 
among organizations (Scott, 2001, 2003).  Specifically, I investigate the effects of 
relational carriers of social influence, represented by social ties in board interlock 
networks; as well as symbolic carriers, represented by prestigious endorsement.  I 
emphasize these institutional carriers because they are generally recognized as key 
carriers of societal norms and legitimacy (e.g., Burns & Wholey, 1993; Castellucci & 
Haunschild, 2004; Davis, 1991).  While normative influences carried by professionals 
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and their associations and coercive pressures carried by governments and regulatory 
agencies have featured in prior research, I have not theorized or directly examined their 
effects in this study.  This is because the role of professionals and their associations on 
adoption tend to apply to certain context-specific practices.  For example, human 
resource professionals are found to influence the adoption of personnel practices 
(Dobbin, Edelman, Meyer, Scott, & Swidler, 1988), while hospital accreditation bodies 
are likely to influence the adoption of new hospital services (D'Aunno, Succi, & 
Alexander, 2000).  While finance professionals are likely to influence acquisition 
activities (Fligstein, 1990), how they will do so is not clear.  As such, their influences are 
difficult to measure accurately and their effects often cannot be directly examined.  Prior 
studies have often inferred the normative influence of professionals from the 
correspondence between increasing numbers of professionals in a field and the increasing 
prevalence of a practice.  Given that the role of professionals in the adoption of the 
practices examined in this study is not clear and difficult to measure correctly, the 
normative influence of professionals will not be examined in this study.  In the case of 
coercive isomorphism, Tolbert and Zucker (1996) observed that arguments of 
institutional coercion are often confounded with arguments of power and dependence 
(e.g., Perrow, 1972; Pfeffer & Salancik, 1978).  In particular, the social pressure exerted 
by the popular media is often highly correlated with the coercive pressures exerted by 
regulatory agencies (Deephouse, 1996).  This obscures the unique theoretical ideas of 
interests and institutions.  Hence, I do not examine the coercive pressures of regulatory 
agencies.    
In the next section, I define the key terms used throughout this study.  Wherever 
possible, I offer formal definitions of these key terms.  However, several terms in my 
study are fairly general, and while they are commonly used in organizational research, 
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they are seldom formally defined.  For these terms, I define them and provide 
explanations on how I will use them in this study. 
DEFINITIONS OF KEY TERMS 
 Organizational Practice.  The term organizational practice is used widely in 
organizational research and refers to any behavior, strategy, technology, or structure that 
an organization may adopt or undertake (Strang & Soule, 1998).  Examples of 
organizational practices will include diversification strategy (Fligstein, 1991; Palmer & 
Barber, 2001), matrix management structure (Burns & Wholey, 1993), acquisition 
strategy (Haunschild, 1993, 1994),  joint-venture and strategic alliance (Gulati, 1995; 
Stuart, 1998), corporate restructuring or downsizing (Ahmadjian & Robinson, 2001; 
Budros, 2004; McKinley, Zhao, & Rust, 2000), and total quality management practices 
(Westphal, Gulati, & Shortell, 1997; Young et al., 2001). They include practices that may 
be adopted only once (e.g., M-form and poison pills) as well as those that may be adopted 
multiple times (e.g., corporate acquisitions and strategic alliances).  
In this study, I use the term organizational practices to refer to high-level 
organizational strategies or practices.  The decisions to adopt these practices are made by 
an organization’s top decision-makers, including the top management team and/or the 
board of directors.  In this study, I select three organizational practices that have become 
varyingly diffused and socially accepted across the population of the largest U.S. 
companies.  Specifically, the three practices are: (1) tender offer takeovers; (2) poison 
pills takeover defense; and (3) executive stock option repricing.  In the following 
paragraph, I briefly explain each practice.  A more detailed description of the practices 
and their evolution over time will be presented in Chapter Three. 
 A tender offer takeover is a public offer by an acquiring firm to shareholders of a 
target company to purchase a controlling percentage of the target’s shares at a premium 
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over the current market price for a limited period of time (Fowler and Schmidt, 1988; 
Securities Exchange Commission, 2004).  It represents an unsolicited and unfriendly 
attempt to acquire another company.  Poison pills, or shareholder rights plans, are 
contingent securities issued by a company’s board of directors to their shareholders that 
will substantively increase the cost of acquisition should the company become a target of 
hostile takeovers.  They are designed to prevent unsolicited, hostile takeover attempts 
(Davis, 1991; Mallette & Fowler, 1992).  Executive stock option repricing occurs when 
the board of directors elects to either adjust the “exercise” price of an executive’s existing 
options and/or cancel existing options and reissue new options on more favorable terms, 
often in response to a steep decline in stock prices (Chance, Kumar, & Todd, 2000; 
Pollock, Fischer, & Wade, 2002).  They represent compensation strategies to align 
managerial incentives and retain executives.  
 Interests.  The term interest is used frequently in organizational studies but 
seldom formally defined.  It is generally used to refer to a regard for one’s self-interests 
and can be applied to individuals as well as collectives.  The types of interests examined 
in prior studies include the individual interests of the top corporate executives (e.g. 
Boeker, 1992; Haleblian & Finkelstein, 1993; Wade, O'Reilly, & Chandratat, 1990; 
Westphal & Zajac, 1994), as well as the collective interests of internal and external 
stakeholders such as employees, shareholders, professionals, governmental agencies, as 
well as other public interest groups (e.g., Baron et al., 1986; Dobbin et al., 1988; Rao & 
Sivakumar, 1999).  The use of the term also often includes an ability to influence or enact 
one’s self-interest (DiMaggio, 1988; Scott, 2001).   
 In my study, I use the term interests to refer to both a regard for one’s self-
interests as well as the ability to influence or enact these interests.  I focus on the interests 
of two important organizational actors, namely top executives, specifically the CEO; as 
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well as shareholders, specifically institutional shareholders.  Consistent with concepts of 
managerial interests presented in agency theory (Fama & Jensen, 1983; Jensen & 
Meckling, 1976) and theory of “managerialism” (Berle & Means, 1932; Davis, 1991; 
Williamson, 1964), top managers’ interests include preferences for employment security 
as well as personal wealth and prestige (Amihud & Lev, 1981; Baumol, 1959).  The 
interests of shareholders are consistent with the notion of relatively short-term 
shareholder wealth maximization frequently discussed in both economic and financial 
literatures (Fama & Jensen, 1983; Jensen & Meckling, 1976).   
 Institutional Carriers.  In this study, the term institutional carriers refers to 
socio-structural and cultural mechanisms that transmit social norms and legitimacy that 
enable as well as constrain organizational actions (Scott, 2001, 2003; Strang & Meyer, 
1993; Strang & Soule, 1998).  As Scott (2001, p.77; 2003) explained, institutions are 
embedded in various types of “repositories or carriers” (Jepperson, 1991). These carriers 
significantly influence the nature of institutional pressures and consequently, affect the 
behaviors of social actors.  Institutional carriers can be classified into four types: 
symbolic systems, relational systems, routines, and artifacts (Scott, 2001, 2003).  In this 
study, I focus on relational and symbolic carriers that facilitate the transmission of social 
norms and influences across organizations (Scott, 2001, 2003).  Specifically, I investigate 
the influence of relational carrier, represented by social ties in board interlocks network; 
and symbolic carrier, represented by prestigious endorsement (DiMaggio & Powell, 
1983; Scott, 2001; Strang & Meyer, 1993; Strang & Soule, 1998).   
Organizational Adoption.  Rogers (2003, p. 21) defines adoption as a “decision 
to make full use of an innovation as the best course of action available”.  In this study, I 
focus on the adoption of three organizational practices.  While these practices may be 
adopted either once only (e.g., poison pills) or multiple times (e.g., tender offer takeovers 
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and executive stock option repricing), organizational adoption, in this study, will refer to 
the first decision to use a practice by a focal firm within the period of observation.  This 
is because I am primarily interested in the determinants that cause an organization to 
make a distinct transition from one state (i.e., non-adopter) into another (i.e., adopter).  
This transition is best represented by the first decision to adopt a practice.  After an 
organization has adopted the practice, subsequent re-adoptions by the organization do not 
represent such a distinct transition of states and are therefore not included. 
Degree of Social Acceptance.  In this study, the term degree of social acceptance 
refers to the level of general social consensus among key stakeholders (including 
managers, shareholders, and the general business community) that a practice is seen as an 
appropriate organizational behavior.  The degree of social acceptance for a practice can 
change over time, either increasing (i.e., becoming more socially accepted), decreasing 
(i.e., becoming less socially accepted or more socially unacceptable), or remain relatively 
stable (i.e., no change in social acceptance).  A practice that has become socially accepted 
is widely regarded as an appropriate organizational action.  Its adoption will not be 
resisted by key stakeholders.  However, high social acceptance does not need to imply 
that a practice is necessary, taken-for-granted, or even legitimating; conditions that are 
more closely relate to the concept of becoming institutionalized (Tolbert & Zucker, 1983, 
1996).  When a practice becomes less socially accepted (or, more socially unacceptable) 
over time, then it becomes widely regarded as an inappropriate organizational action and 
is likely to be resisted by key stakeholders.  As for a practice whose social acceptance 
remains unchanged, key stakeholders’ attitude regarding its appropriateness (or 
inappropriateness) remains relatively stable over time. 
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BOUNDARY CONDITIONS 
 There are three boundary conditions in this study.  First, this research focuses 
exclusively on the adoption behaviors of large U.S. companies listed on the Fortune 500 
Largest U.S. Industrials (F500).  These companies are the largest in terms of their sales 
revenue and many of them operate in several different industries and have business 
activities in multiple countries.  Being the largest and most prominent companies in the 
U.S., these companies are often under intense scrutiny by various stakeholder groups 
including regulatory agencies, professional associations, shareholders, customers, 
employees, mass media, and other private and public interest groups.  As such, 
researchers have argued that these large companies are often under greater social 
pressures than small and medium companies (Goodstein, 1994; Hirsch, 1986; Ingram & 
Simons, 1995; Leblebici, Salancik, Copay, & King, 1991; Palmer & Barber, 2001; Scott, 
1998).  At the same time, these large companies tend to have tremendous resources that 
may make them less dependent on external constituents and even allow them to influence 
their external environments (DiMaggio & Powell, 1983; Oliver, 1991; Pfeffer & 
Salancik, 1978; Thompson, 1967).  Further, researchers have argued that larger 
companies are likely to exhibit greater “managerialism” (Berle & Means, 1932; Herman, 
1981) and more agency problems (Fama & Jensen, 1983; Jensen & Meckling, 1976).  
Top executives in these large companies are usually very powerful because of the 
companies’ huge resource base and the degree of managerial discretion they enjoy as a 
result of the separation of control and ownership (Berle & Means, 1932; Fama & Jensen, 
1983; Jensen & Meckling, 1976).  Taken together, the proposed effects of actors’ 
interests and carriers of institutional influences on adoption over time may not generalize 
to small and medium-sized companies.  However, F500 companies do exhibit a lot of 
variance in terms of size, industries, markets, and performance.  This variability allows 
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me to examine the important impacts of different determinants of adoption for the 
population of the largest U.S. companies.     
 Second, I do not focus on any single industry or organizational field.  As 
mentioned earlier, many companies in the F500 operate in multiple industries.  As such, 
the concept of social influences invoked herein relates to a broader conceptualization than 
would normally be understood within an organizational field or industry (DiMaggio & 
Powell, 1983).  However, companies listed on the F500 are “similar” in many aspects. 
They are regulated by the same governmental agencies like the Security and Exchange 
Commission (SEC), scrutinized by the same financial institutions (Rao & Sivakumar, 
1999) and popular-business media like Fortune, Forbes, and Business Week, and 
typically exhibit similar governance and organizational structures (e.g., Palmer, Barber, 
Zhou, & Soysal, 1995; Palmer, Friedland, Jennings, & Powers, 1987; Palmer, Jennings, 
& Zhou, 1993).  As such, F500 companies are likely to be exposed to the same social 
norms and pressures and they do constitute a meaningful social category (Strang & Soule, 
1998).  Further, the different practices selected for this study are general strategies that 
are relevant to organizations across different industries.  This study therefore stands in 
contrast to more narrowly-defined research that focuses on a specific industry or 
organizational field, such as the education or healthcare sectors (e.g., Burns & Wholey, 
1993; Kraatz & Zajac, 1996; Meyer, Scott, & Strang, 1987; Scott, Ruef, Mendel, & 
Caronna, 2000), or on industry-specific practices, like accounting standards or curriculum 
reforms (e.g., Kraatz & Zajac, 1996; Mezias, 1990).  I will therefore caution against 
generalizing the results in this study to more unique practices that apply only in highly 
specialized industries. 
 Third, I do not investigate adoption from the very onset of each organizational 
practice.  By focusing on the adoption behaviors of F500 companies, my study examines 
 13
the diffusion of each practice from the point they are introduced into the population of the 
largest U.S. companies.  As researchers have noted, the introduction of many innovations 
usually occurs in small, marginal firms located at the periphery of an organizational field 
(Leblebici et al., 1991; Rogers, 2003).  Over time, these innovations diffused and are 
eventually adopted by large, dominant firms located at the center of the organizational 
field (DiMaggio & Powell, 1983; Leblebici et al., 1991; Meyer & Rowan, 1977; Tolbert 
& Zucker, 1996).  While it may be interesting to examine adoptions from the very 
beginning, it is very difficult to do so.  Information on early adoptions is usually not 
systematically available.  Further, studies of early adoptions have observed that these 
behaviors are often driven by highly idiosyncratic factors that are not likely to generalize 
(Rogers, 2003; Strang & Meyer, 1993; Tolbert & Zucker, 1996).  The research design in 
this study is consistent with many prior studies, including Davis’ (1991) investigation of 
poison pills and Rao and Sivakumar’s (1999) examination of investor relations 
departments.  Even so, I caution against generalizing the results from this study to 
diffusion processes that began from the initial onset, like those generally investigated in 
studies of diffusion of innovations (Rogers, 2003; Romanelli & Tushman, 1994).  
However, even with the boundary conditions highlighted above, the features of 
this research design—a population of organizations that exhibits separation of ownership 
and control and having powerful top managers, as well as substantial institutional 
shareholder; an external context that presents both extant and evolving social norms and 
pressures; a set of distinctive organizational practices that have become varyingly 
diffused and socially accepted over time, and extended windows of observation—present 
an appropriate framework to investigate the research questions raised. 
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CONTRIBUTIONS 
 This study makes several important theoretical and practical contributions.  By 
examining how the effects of interests and carriers of institutional influences on adoption 
will change over time depending on the degree to which a practice becomes socially 
accepted, this study offers a more nuanced and dynamic model of adoption than what 
exists in current literature.  Further, by developing and empirically testing the temporal 
effects of interests and carriers of institutional influences on adoption, this study offers 
important insights to our current understanding of agency, power, social networks, and 
institutions.  Current literature has been relatively static, even though these concepts are 
recognized to change over time  (e.g., Pfeffer & Salancik, 1978; Tolbert & Zucker, 1983, 
1996).  Lastly, as Strang and Soule (1998) have urged, the comparative research design in 
this study allows us to not only test the generalizability of key theoretical assertions but 
also provide more precise specifications about the determinants of adoption across 
different practices.   
In the next chapter, I review the pertinent literature on organizational adoption as 
well as the literatures on the process of institutionalization and the diffusion of innovation 
that are related to this study. 
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CHAPTER TWO:  LITERATURE REVIEW 
In this chapter, I review several streams of research that have examined adoption 
and the diffusion of organizational practices.  Given that there has been a long and 
diverse history of research on adoption and diffusion, I organize my review of prior 
literature as follows.  First, I review the literature on organizational adoption under each 
of the following perspectives:   
1. Interests Perspective.  In this section, I review studies that emphasize the role 
of self-interests in adoption, including agency theory (Fama & Jensen, 1983; 
Jensen & Meckling, 1976) and theories of power and politics (Perrow, 1970, 
1972; Pfeffer & Salancik, 1978).  I focus my review on the interests of top 
managers and institutional shareholders.  
2. Institutional Perspective.  In this section, I review studies that emphasize the 
role of institutions in adoption and organize them under the three institutional 
mechanism of coercive, normative, and mimetic isomorphism (DiMaggio & 
Powell, 1983). 
Second, I review two streams of literature that emphasize a process orientation of 
adoption: the process of institutionalization (Tolbert & Zucker, 1996) and the diffusion of 
innovation (Rogers, 2003).  These studies examine the determinants of adoptions over 
time and have important implications on the dynamic modeling of the effects of interests 
and carriers of institutional influences on adoption behaviors of organizations. 
INTERESTS AND ORGANIZATIONAL ADOPTION 
Organizational researchers have long emphasized the role of social actors’ 
interests on adoption. Theories that draw on the notion of interests include: (1) agency 
theory (Fama & Jensen, 1983; Jensen & Meckling, 1976; Ross, 1973) and the related 
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concept of managerialism (Herman, 1981; Marris, 1964; Williamson, 1964), which 
emphasize the self-interests and influence of top managers; and (2) theories of power and 
politics (e.g., Cyert & March, 1963; March & Simon, 1958; Perrow, 1970, 1972), which 
focus on the interests and influence of powerful organizational actors and constituents, 
including shareholders.  The central proposition in these literatures is that the powerful 
actors can influence organizational behaviors, including adoption.  In this section, I focus 
my review on studies that examined the interests and influence of top managers and 
institutional shareholders on adoption. 
Agency Theory and Managerialism on Organizational Adoption 
 The self-interests of top managers have featured prominently in several streams of 
research, the most articulated being agency theory (Fama & Jensen, 1983; Jensen & 
Meckling, 1976; Ross, 1973).  Attention to managerial interests was sparked by the 
seminal work of Berle and Means (1932), in which they described how the diffusion of 
ownership into the hands of many small, individual shareholders has caused the 
separation of ownership and control in many firms.  They observed that individual 
shareholders, who can diversify their individual investment risk by investing in multiple 
companies, have little incentive to actively control the activities of the firm.  Instead, they 
delegate the duties of active management to top managers who, consequently, enjoy high 
degrees of discretion over the resources and actions of their organizations.  This situation 
can be problematic when the interests of owners and top managers are not aligned.  
Building on this general thesis, Jensen and his colleagues (Fama & Jensen, 1983; Jensen 
& Meckling, 1976) developed the central ideas of agency theory (also see Ross, 1973).  
They linked the concept of separation of ownership and control to the agency problem 
that arises when cooperating parties (i.e. the principal and the agent) have different 
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interests and share different responsibilities (Eisenhardt, 1989; Fama & Jensen, 1983; 
Jensen & Meckling, 1976).   
 According to agency theorists, the organization can be viewed as a nexus of 
contracts in which the principals, owners of the firm, contract the management of the firm 
to agents, top managers.  However, because contracts governing the duties and 
responsibilities of the contracting parties cannot be completely specified a-priori, agency 
problems will arise.  As Eisenhardt (1989) elaborated, the agency relationship presents 
two problems.  First, when the interests of the principal and the agent are not aligned and 
it is difficult or expensive for the principal to monitor the agent’s work, the principal 
cannot be assured that the agent will act appropriately in the pursuit of the principal’s 
interest.  Second, when the principal and the agent have different attitudes towards risk, 
the principal and the agent are likely to prefer different courses of actions.  Prior 
literatures have observed that shareholders are primarily interested in the maximization of 
relatively short-term shareholders’ wealth and value (Fama & Jensen, 1983; Jensen & 
Meckling, 1976).  On the other hand, top managers are more interested in enhancing their 
employment security and personal wealth and prestige (Amihud & Lev, 1981; Baumol, 
1959).  Further, because of ownership dispersion, shareholders cannot effectively or 
efficiently monitor the actions of top managers.  This situation presents top managers 
with high levels of managerial discretion and the opportunity to make choices and 
decisions regarding the use of the firm’s resources that may be personally beneficial but 
at the expense of owners of the firm.   
This proposition is closely related to the ideas attributed to the managerialist 
school in organizational studies (e.g., Herman, 1981; Marris, 1964; Williamson, 1964).  
Managerialists proposed that self-interested top managers with substantial managerial 
discretion are likely to pursue their personal goals, such as increasing personal wealth, 
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prestige, and job security, instead of maximizing the returns of shareholders (Davis, 
1991; Westphal & Zajac, 1994; Zajac & Westphal, 2002).  Hence, it is argued that when 
agency problems are present, top managers are likely to pursue actions that will further 
their self-interests, unless they are closely monitored by shareholders (or their 
representatives) and/or their interests are realigned with those of shareholders 
(Eisenhardt, 1989; Jensen & Meckling, 1976). 
Managerial Power 
 To demonstrate the underlying agency problem in organizations, researchers have 
studied the effect of managerial power on the adoption of practices, including acquisition 
and diversification strategies (Amihud & Lev, 1981), asset capitalization (Jensen, 1989), 
executive compensation schemes (Westphal & Zajac, 1994), poison pills (Davis, 1991; 
Malatesta & Walkling, 1988; Mallette & Fowler, 1992; Sundaramurthy, 1996), and stock 
option repricing (Brenner, Sundaram, & Yermack, 2000; Carter & Lynch, 2001; Chance 
et al., 2000; Pollock et al., 2002).  In one study, Amihud and Lev (1981) examined the 
“managerial” motives for conglomerate (diversifying) mergers and acquisitions.  They 
observed that while diversification is likely to reduce the business risk of the entire 
organization, there are no potential benefits to shareholders, who can better manage their 
own preferred risk by organizing their individual portfolios of investments in efficient 
capital markets.  Instead, they argued and found support that management-controlled 
firms are more likely to adopt diversifying acquisitions in order to mitigate top managers’ 
employment risk, given that diversification is likely to produce less varied organizational 
performance, and consequently, reduces their chance of being fired.  In another example 
of agency problem, Jensen (1989) observed that top managers prefer to use slack 
resources on asset capitalization instead of distributing them to shareholders because 
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increased capitalization of the firm can enhance their social prominence and political 
power (Baumol, 1959).   
Studies on agency problems have also explicitly examined the exercise of 
managerial power vis-à-vis those of shareholders and/or their representatives (i.e., the 
board of directors) on adoption (Chance et al., 2000; Davis, 1991; Malatesta & Walkling, 
1988; Mallette & Fowler, 1992; Wade et al., 1990; Westphal & Zajac, 1994, 1995).  As 
political theorists have highlighted, managerial power enables the pursuit of managerial 
self-interests (Perrow, 1970; Pfeffer, 1981; Pfeffer & Salancik, 1978).  In these studies, 
powerful managers are observed to adopt or influence the adoption of practices that will 
further their self-interests and personal goals.  For example, Westphal and Zajac (1994) 
observed that firms with powerful CEOs are more likely to adopt long-term incentive 
plans (LTIP).  They argued that powerful CEOs are motivated to encourage LTIP 
adoption as a mean to enhance their legitimacy with external stakeholders by aligning 
with collectively valued expectations.  The pursuit of managerial self-interests is evident 
when they subsequently found that these influential CEOs are also less likely to 
implement the LTIP or to use it in a smaller magnitude.  In another study, Westphal and 
Zajac (1995) found that powerful CEOs are more likely to appoint board members who 
are similar to themselves so as to create a board of directors that is more sympathetic to 
their concerns.  They found that powerful CEOs appoint new directors who are 
demographically similar to themselves and that this similarity subsequently leads to 
higher CEO compensation.   
Wade and his colleagues (1990) also examined the influence of the CEOs on the 
adoption of golden parachutes and found that CEOs who appointed more outside 
directors to the board are more likely to have golden parachutes granted to them.  
However, agency issues have produced mixed results on the adoption of executive stock 
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option repricing.  Chance and his colleagues (2000) found that corporate boards with 
many inside directors are more likely to reprice their “underwater” or “out-of-the-money” 
stock options (i.e., when the current market value of the company’s shares is below the 
“exercise” price of executives’ options).  However, Brenner (2000) found the opposite 
effect for CEO/Chair duality, an indicator of managerial power, and no evidence for the 
other major indicators of managerial power.  In their study on executive stock option 
repricing, Pollock and his colleagues (2002) also found no main effect for power on 
repricing.  However, they did find that the effects of power on repricing strengthened 
when the negative spread between an option's exercise price and the market value of a 
stock increased.  Specifically, they observed that the likelihood of repricing increased 
when the negative spread is wide and CEOs are more powerful (measured by CEO/Chair 
duality).  Thus, in those situations that most affect managerial self-interests, their relative 
power matters.  Further, prior studies on poison pills also produced mixed results.  Some 
indicators of managerial power have been found to be positively related to poison pills 
adoption, while others are not significant (Davis, 1991; Davis & Greve, 1997; Dowen, 
Johnson, & Jensen, 1994; Malatesta & Walkling, 1988; Mallette & Fowler, 1992; 
Sundaramurthy, 1996).  For example, Mallette and Fowler (1992) found that powerful 
CEOs who serve as both CEO and chair of the board of directors are more likely to adopt 
poison pills.  However, in another study, Sundaramurthy (1996) observed that powerful 
CEOs were not more likely to adopt poison pills. 
Managerial Incentives 
Agency theorists have identified managerial incentives as an important 
governance mechanism that will help to resolve agency problems (Eisenhardt, 1989; 
Fama, 1980; Fama & Jensen, 1983).  Managerial incentives allow shareholders to realign 
managerial interests and ensure that top managers will act in the interests of shareholders.  
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Prior studies have examined the alignment of managerial interests through managerial 
stock ownership (e.g., Davis, 1991; Palmer & Barber, 2001; Sundaramurthy, 1996).  
Davis’ (1991) study on poison pill adoption provides a good example of this.  As Davis 
(1991) explained,  
 
The adoption of a poison pill is an exemplar of an agency problem, in which the interests 
of shareholders (i.e., in retaining an unfettered ability to receive takeover offers) conflict with 
those of managers (i.e., in protecting themselves and their organization from unwanted 
takeovers).  The ability to effect this change both indicates and enhances managerial discretion: 
the apparent harmfulness to shareholders of poison pills implies that managers who are able to get 
them adopted already have substantial discretion, and once in place they buffer managers and 
their organization from the market for corporate control by raising the barriers to takeover. 
(Davis, 1991, p. 585) 
 
Emphasizing managerial interest alignment, Davis (1991) found that greater 
levels of insider ownership decrease the likelihood that an organization will adopt poison 
pills (also see Davis & Greve, 1997; Malatesta & Walkling, 1988; Sundaramurthy, 1996).  
His results suggest that when managerial interests are aligned with those of shareholders 
through proper incentives, top managers are less likely to pursue self-serving actions 
(Eisenhardt, 1989; Jensen & Meckling, 1976).  Stock ownership of top managers and 
directors has also been found to be negatively related to the likelihood of greenmail 
payment (Kosnik, 1987, 1990) and diversifying acquisitions (Palmer & Barber, 2001), 
practices that are generally perceived to be against the interests of shareholders.  
However, in other studies, the influence of managerial stock ownership is not supported.  
In their study on the adoption of golden parachutes, an executive compensation practice 
that benefits top managers, Davis and Greve (1997) did not find any significant effects 
for managerial stock ownership on its adoption.  Further, Sundaramurthy (1996) found 
that managerial stock ownership did not influence the adoption of anti-takeover 
provisions that requires shareholders approval.  Finally, greater CEO stock ownership did 
not reduce the likelihood of executive stock option repricing (Brenner et al., 2000; Carter 
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& Lynch, 2001; Chance et al., 2000), a practice frowned upon by shareholders who see 
the practice as attempts by top managers to reward themselves even though their 
companies have performed poorly (Byrne, 1998; Martinez, 1998).  However, while 
Pollock and his colleagues (2002) also found no main negative effect for CEO ownership 
on repricing, they did find that the effect strengthened significantly when the negative 
spread of an option increased.  Thus, proper incentives become more important when 
managerial self-interests diverge from those of shareholders.  Overall, prior studies 
offered mixed results for the ability of managerial stock ownership to provide proper 
managerial incentives, realign the interests of top managers with those of shareholders, 
and resolve underlying agency problems. 
In sum, theories of agency and managerialism argue that unless managerial power 
is adequately controlled by shareholders or their representatives and/or managerial 
interests are aligned with those of shareholders through proper managerial incentives, top 
managers are likely to adopt practices that will further their self-interests rather than 
those of shareholders. 
Power and Politics on Organizational Adoption 
The role of interests has also featured prominently in theories of power and 
politics.  March and his colleagues (Cyert & March, 1963; March & Simon, 1958) 
observed that formal organizations are composed of competing coalitions that have 
different interests and goals as well as varying degrees of power and influence.  Political 
theories emphasize the continual struggles between competing coalitions for resources 
and dominance and predict that powerful actors will adopt practices that will bolster their 
power (Perrow, 1970; Pfeffer, 1981; Pfeffer & Salancik, 1978).  Adoption can therefore 
be understood as the exercise of power by dominant actors in their attempt to further their 
self-interests.  Prior research has emphasized the interests and power of internal 
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constituents, particularly top managers (described above), as well as institutional 
shareholders (David, Kochar, & Levitas, 1998; Davis & Thompson, 1994; Porac, Wade, 
& Pollock, 1999).  Excellent reviews of power and politics can be found in extant 
literature and will not be duplicated here (e.g., Mizruchi & Yoo, 2002; Ocasio, 2002).  
Instead, I focus on the role of institutional shareholders and their influence on adoption. 
Institutional Shareholders 
The interests of shareholders have garnered much attention in the wake of the 1980s 
takeover wave and the subsequent transformation of the market for corporate control 
(Davis & Stout, 1992; Fligstein, 1990, 1991; Useem, 1996).  As Davis and Thompson 
(1994) explained,   
 
More recently, a parallel shift has occurred as ownership of the corporation has become 
concentrated in the hands of institutional investors rather than individual stockholders.  
Where corporate managers once faced a dispersed and relatively powerless set of 
stockholders, they now confront an increasingly organized social movement of fund 
trustees and advisors that share a common ideology of shareholder activism as well as the 
power to vote a substantial chunk of the largest firm’s equity. Moreover, activist 
shareholders have expanded their demands from the circumscribed realms of shareholder 
rights to issues of how successors to the chief executive officer (CEO) are chosen, how 
much executives are paid, and even which compensation consultants is used, and they have 
influenced sympathetic regulators in Washington to increase the legitimate scope of their 
authority in corporate governance. Where shareholders were once disenfranchised outsides 
in corporate governance, institutional investors are now member of the polity, and their 
concerns are routinely taken into account in decision-making processes in firms and in 
governmental policy making. (Davis & Thompson, 1994, p. 141)   
 
Davis and Thompson (1994, p. 143) reported that “[o]n average, half of the ownership of 
large corporations is held by institutional shareholders rather than individuals or families, 
and most of this is in the hands of private and public pension funds such as the College 
Retirement Equities Fund (CREF) and the California Public Employees Retirement 
System (CalPERS)” (O'Barr & Conley, 1992; Useem, 1996).  With substantive 
investments in many of the largest U.S. companies, institutional shareholders are 
motivated to monitor managerial actions and take necessary actions to safeguard their 
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interests.  As David and his colleagues (1998) explained, institutional shareholders are 
more likely to be actively involved in corporate governance than individual shareholders 
because: (1) institutions are essentially investing the money of their constituents and 
therefore have a fiduciary duty to protect their investments; (2) their investments in 
absolute monetary terms are very high and this makes it very difficult to divest their 
investment in response to poor management in the firms they have invested; (3) there are 
few alternate investment opportunities for institutions.  The motivation of institutional 
shareholders to actively monitor and govern managerial actions is coupled by their ability 
to carry out efficient corporate governance.  Institutional shareholders, who manage large 
investment funds and invest in a large number of companies, typically have the resources 
and experience to carry out efficient monitoring of managerial actions.  Further, their 
substantial ownership positions in companies, either individually or as a coalition of 
shareholders, enable them to organize and exert their influence on managerial actions 
(David et al., 1998; Sundaramurthy, 1996).  Lastly, with the formation of shareholder 
organizations, like the Council of Institutional Investors and the Institutional Shareholder 
Services, institutional shareholders are in a strong position to exert their influence on 
organization actions.   
The impact of institutional shareholders’ influence, proxied by the level of 
institutional ownership, on important organizational actions has been examined in prior 
research, including the adoption of corporate governance structures (Davis & Thompson, 
1994), executive compensation practices (David et al., 1998; Porac et al., 1999), poison 
pills and other anti-takeover provisions (Davis, 1991; Davis & Greve, 1997; Mallette & 
Fowler, 1992; Sundaramurthy, 2000), and executive stock option repricing (Pollock et al., 
2002).  The central proposition in these studies is that institutional ownership is 
negatively related to the adoption of practices that are likely to compromise shareholders’ 
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interests.  The level of institutional ownership therefore represents the motivation as well 
as the ability of shareholders to exert their influence on top managers.  However, prior 
studies have produced mixed results.  For example, David and his colleagues (1998) 
found that institutional shareholders with only an investment and no transactional 
relationship with the firm are able to exert their influence and affect CEO compensation, 
such that compensation levels are lower and the proportion of long-term incentives is 
higher, features of executive compensation favored by shareholders.  Further, Porac and 
his colleagues (1999) observed that while corporate boards tend to selectively define 
peers when they try to explain their compensation policy, a questionable practice given 
that the board is entrusted by shareholders to create appropriate and equitable executive 
compensation schemes, powerful institutional shareholders are able to enforce constraints 
on this practice and ensure that the organization accurately represent its executive 
compensation policy.  In the case of anti-takeover provisions, Sundaramurthy (2000) 
observed that higher levels of institutional ownership decrease the likelihood that an 
organization will adopt anti-takeover provisions, particularly those that require 
shareholders’ approval.   
However, in studies on executive stock option repricing, a context that presents 
agency problems, institutional ownership was found to have no significant effect on the 
likelihood of stock option repricing in several studies (Carter & Lynch, 2001; 
Chidambaran & Prabhala, 2003).  While Pollock and his colleagues (2002) also found no 
main effects for institutional ownership on repricing, they did find support that the 
negative effects of institutional ownership on repricing strengthened significantly when 
the negative spread of an option increased.  Thus, institutional shareholders’ influence 
becomes more important when managerial self-interests diverge from those of 
shareholders.  Further, for anti-takeover provision that does not require shareholders’ 
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approval such as poison pills, higher levels of institutional ownership actually increase 
the likelihood of adoption (Davis, 1991; Mallette & Fowler, 1992; Sundaramurthy, 
1996).  This result runs contrary to the central thesis of institutional ownership.  
Researchers have explained that the level of institutional ownership may also be an 
indicator of the degree of separation of ownership and control in large publicly-traded 
companies and reflects the underlying agency problem within the firm (Davis, 1991; 
Mallette & Fowler, 1992).  Top managers in firms with high institutional ownerships are 
aware of their weak basis of power and may be motivated to actively engage in 
management entrenchment activities wherever possible.  This post-hoc explanation is not 
strong and no other plausible explanations have been offered for this contradictory result.  
Overall, prior research has produced mixed results with regards to the ability of 
institutional shareholders to influence adoption.  
By emphasizing power and politics among organizational actors, the interests 
perspective attends to the role of self-interests in adoption.  However, critics have noted 
that the interests perspective overemphasizes the instrumental behavior of human 
actors—self-interest seeking with guile (Ghoshal & Moran, 1996; Granovetter, 1992).  
As Granovetter (1985; 1992) explained, social actors are embedded in structures of social 
relationships and it is unrealistic to assume that social actors can pursue their self-
interests relatively unencumbered by social commitments and obligations.  Further, many 
existing models of power and politics remain relatively static,  even though researchers 
have acknowledged that managerial power is likely to change over time (Pfeffer & 
Salancik, 1978).  In most studies, powerful managers are assumed to be able and willing 
to exercise their power and pursue their self-interests any time.  This assumption is not 
reasonable given that managerial interests and their power to pursue them are jointly 
determined by managerial, organizational, as well as environmental characteristics that 
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are likely to change over time (Hambrick & Finkelstein, 1987; Pfeffer & Salancik, 1978).  
Similarly, with regards to managerial incentives, once aligned, incentives are assumed to 
be effective over time.  This assumption again does not recognize the fact that interests 
may evolve and the alignment of managerial incentives can change over time.  The static 
nature of current conceptualization offers an inadequate account of how interests will 
affect adoption and this is likely to be a key explanation for the mixed results observed in 
prior studies.  The interests perspective’s emphasis on instrumental, strategic choice has 
duly prompted organizational scholars to develop and explore institutional models of 
organizational actions that emphasized the role of socio-structural and cultural constraints 
on organizational actions (DiMaggio & Powell, 1983; Meyer & Rowan, 1977; Zucker, 
1977).  Drawing on the concept of institutionalization (Tolbert & Zucker, 1983, 1996), 
Westphal and Zajac (1994) argued and found support that the effects of managerial 
power on the adoption of long-term incentive plans (LTIP) decreased over time as the 
practice is argued to become progressively institutionalized as a valued corporate 
governance reform.  Given the mixed results and the lack of empirical research on the 
temporal effects of different actors’ interests on adoption, further theoretical development 
and investigation is needed. 
INSTITUTIONS AND ORGANIZATIONAL ADOPTION 
 The role of institutions on organizational behaviors has gained much attention in 
recent years.  In particular, researchers are interested in how institutions influence 
adoption and how they contribute to the diffusion as well as persistence of organizational 
structure and practices across a social system (DiMaggio & Powell, 1983; Meyer & 
Rowan, 1977; Zucker, 1977).  Scott (2001) offers an excellent review of institutional 
theory and no attempt will be made here to duplicate his comprehensive review.  Instead, 
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I focus on research that examines the impact of carriers of institutional influences on 
adoption.   
Scott (2001; 2003) provides a broad conception of institution, describing them as 
enduring social structures that are relatively resistant to change and tend to be maintained 
and reproduced because of three distinctive institutional elements: regulative, normative, 
and cultural-cognitive, or as DiMaggio and Powell (1983) described, coercive, normative, 
and mimetic (DiMaggio & Powell, 1983; Jepperson, 1991; Scott, 2001, 2003).  Early 
research on institutions focused on the elaboration of these processes (DiMaggio & 
Powell, 1983; Meyer & Rowan, 1977; Zucker, 1977) and their impact on organizational 
actions (e.g., Tolbert, 1985; Tolbert & Zucker, 1983).  These studies emphasized the 
ability of institutions to constrain the behaviors of social actors through coercive, 
normative, and mimetic pressures, transmitted through a variety of institutional carriers 
including symbolic systems, relational systems, routines, and artifacts (Scott, 2001, 2003; 
Strang & Meyer, 1993).  As Scott (2003, p. 882) elaborated, symbolic carriers include 
“various types of symbolic schemata into which meaningful information is coded and 
conveyed”; relational carriers include “both interpersonal and interorganizational 
linkages”; routines include “habitualized behaviors; patterned actions reflecting tacit 
knowledge held and conveyed by actors”; and artifacts include “material culture created 
by human ingenuity to assist in the performance of task”.  By transmitting social norms 
and legitimacy, these institutional carriers will impose restrictions on social actions by 
defining the legal, moral, and cultural boundaries that differentiate legitimate from 
illegitimate activities.  When an organizational field becomes institutionalized, 
isomorphic pressures will drive organizations to adopt institutional forms that are deemed 
socially legitimate or taken-for-granted (DiMaggio & Powell, 1983).  In many early 
studies, institutions are treated as a qualitative state or property—that is, social structures 
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are either institutionalized or not (Scott, 2001; Tolbert & Zucker, 1996).  Prior studies on 
the effects of institutional influences on adoption are described below with particular 
emphasis on both normative and mimetic isomorphic pressures carried by various 
institutional carriers. 
Normative and Mimetic Isomorphism on Organizational Adoption 
 Prior research has examined the impact of normative and mimetic isomorphism on 
adoption.  The normative mechanism “involves the creation of expectations that 
introduce a prescriptive, evaluative and obligatory dimension into social life” (Scott, 
2001; 2003, p. 880).  As Scott (2001, p.54-55) elaborated, normative elements include 
both values, “conception of the preferred or the desirable, … standards to which existing 
structure or behavior can be compared and assessed”, as well as norms that “specify how 
things should be done”. They define valued objectives and the appropriate ways to pursue 
them.  While the normative aspects of institutions constrain and limit social behaviors by 
installing social obligations, they also empower and enable socially-approved behaviors.  
Researchers have also observed that the adoption of a practice is likely in situations 
where mimetic pressures are strong, especially when uncertainty is high and alternate 
behaviors are inconceivable because a practice has become taken-for-granted as the 
routine way to do things (DiMaggio & Powell, 1983; Scott, 2001).  As DiMaggio and 
Powell (1983) explained, when an organization is confronted by organizational and/or 
environmental uncertainties, it will turn to the actions of other organizations and model 
themselves after these organizations (Scott, 2001).   
Normative and/or mimetic isomorphic pressures are often transmitted through 
various institutional carriers, including social ties among managerial elites and board 
interlocks (e.g., Davis, 1991; Galaskiewicz, 1985; Haunschild, 1993; Westphal et al., 
1997) and the prior actions of others.  Normative and mimetic isomorphism has been 
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demonstrated in the adoption of medical innovations (Burt, 1987; Coleman, Katz, & 
Menzel, 1966), M-form structure (Fligstein, 1985; Palmer et al., 1993), corporate 
acquisitions and acquisition premiums (Haunschild, 1993, 1994; Haunschild & Miner, 
1997; Palmer & Barber, 2001), total quality management (TQM) (Westphal et al., 1997), 
poison pill (Davis, 1991), charitable contribution (Galaskiewicz & Burt, 1991), and 
market positions (Greve, 1998; Greve, 2000; Haveman, 1993a). 
Social Ties 
Normative expectations and mimetic pressures often arise within a social system 
from social ties among actors.  In the context of organizations, normative and mimetic 
pressures can result from both formal and informal social ties among organizations’ top 
executives.  Through the process of social contagion, adoption decisions are likely to be 
influenced by the behavior of others who are inter-connected.  As Strang and Meyer 
(1993) explained, information about how organizational practices can help organizations 
pursue their objectives is an important condition for their diffusion across a social system.  
While there may be multiple sources of such information, it is frequently the information 
offered by direct, strong, or embedded ties that is most likely to be received and trusted 
(Uzzi, 1997).  Cohesion through social ties therefore focuses on the socialization that 
occurs between actors through frequent and empathic communication.  By engaging in 
social interactions, actors come to a “normative understanding of adoption’s costs and 
benefits” (Burt, 1987, p. 1289).  Further, as Coleman and his colleagues (1966, p. 118-
119) explained in their study on the adoption and diffusion of medical innovations, 
“[c]onfronted with the need to make a decision in an ambiguous situation—a situation 
that does not speak for itself—people turn to each other for cues as to the structure of the 
situation. When a new drug appears, doctors who are in close interaction with their 
colleagues will similarly interpret for one another the new stimulus that has presented 
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itself, and will arrive at some shared way of looking at it.”  Prior research that examined 
the normative and mimetic pressures carried by managerial elites and board interlocks 
will be reviewed below. 
 Managerial Elites.  Prior research has explored the role of values and norms of 
managerial elites on adoption (Galaskiewicz, 1985, 1997; Haunschild & Beckman, 1998; 
Palmer & Barber, 2001; Palmer et al., 1987; Palmer et al., 1993).  As Palmer and Barber 
(2001) explained, managerial elites are situated in a multidimensional social class 
structure characterized by ownership of wealth and resources, social and family status, 
educational credentials, and social ties to other elite members.  They elaborated that “[a] 
corporate elite member’s position in the class structure determines his or her interests and 
capacities with respect to different corporate strategies and structures, contingent on the 
historical context” (Palmer & Barber, 2001, p. 89).  Examples of normative pressures 
carried through elite networks is provided by Galaskiewicz and his colleagues’ 
(Galaskiewicz, 1985, 1997; Galaskiewicz & Wasserman, 1989) examinations of the 
impact of elite networks on charitable contributions in the twin cities of Minneapolis and 
St. Paul.  In these studies, top executives’ social ties to philanthropy leaders within the 
cities’ elite networks significantly affect the amount of charitable contributions made by 
an organization. His interviews revealed that such philanthropic leaders exert significant 
social pressures on top managers and strongly influence their charitable contributions.  In 
another example, Palmer and Barber (2001) elaborated and tested a class theory of 
corporate acquisitions to illustrate normative as well as mimetic isomorphic pressures.  
They found that “firms pursued acquisitions in this period when they were commanded 
by well-networked challengers who were central in elite social networks but relatively 
marginal with respect to social status, isolated from the resistance of established elites, 
and free from control of owning families” (Palmer & Barber, 2001, p. 87).  Hence, 
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managerial elite’s values and norms can be observed to guide, facilitate, as well as 
constrain the actions of top managers and the organizations they lead.  Normative and 
mimetic isomorphism is also likely to be carried by informal relational ties among 
corporate elites.  Haunschild and Beckman (1998) observed that CEO’s membership in 
the elite Business Council or Business Roundtable is likely to influence their firm’s 
acquisitions strategy.  These associations represent the interests of managerial elites and 
are powerful sources of social influence on top managers.   
 Board Interlocks.  Prior studies have also paid particular attention to interlocking  
directorates as a contributing factor to the cohesive “inner circle” of managerial elites 
(Davis, 1991; Mizruchi, 1996; Useem, 1982; Westphal & Zajac, 1997).  As Westphal and 
Zajac (1997, p. 161) summarized, “overlapping board memberships provide a 
communication network for managerial elites that helps to preserve their corporate 
power” (Useem, 1982).  Normative and mimetic isomorphism carried through relational 
ties has featured prominently in prior studies.  In particular, researchers have focused on 
the formal ties among top executives established through corporate board interlocks 
among the largest U.S. firms (Davis, 1991; Davis & Greve, 1997; Greve, 1995, 1996; 
Haunschild, 1993, 1994; Haunschild & Beckman, 1998; Palmer et al., 1993; Westphal et 
al., 1997).  For example, Haunschild (1993) found that organizations are likely to imitate 
the acquisition activities of tied-to firms in their board interlocks network.  As she 
explained, top managers who sit on the board of other firms that have made acquisitions 
are likely to look at these acquisition activities as potential models for imitation in their 
own firms.  Similarly, Davis and his colleague (Davis, 1991; Davis & Greve, 1997) 
observed that firms are more likely to adopt poison pills and golden parachutes if they are 
tied to other firms that have already done so.  Corporate interlocking directorates 
therefore serves as a “community of practice” with a shared understanding of what counts 
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as appropriate and legitimate behaviors (Davis & Greve, 1997, p. 8).  Prior studies have 
also demonstrated the influence of social cohesion through relational ties on adoption of 
multidivisional form (Palmer et al., 1993). 
Prestigious Endorsement 
 Normative and mimetic isomorphism has also been shown to be carried by 
prestigious endorsement that occurs when high-status, well-respected, and successful 
organizations adopt new organizational practices.  DiMaggio and Powell (1983) argued 
that in situations of uncertainty, organizations are more likely to imitate the behaviors of 
organizations that they perceived to be more prestigious, legitimate, or successful (Burns 
& Wholey, 1993; Davis & Greve, 1997).  The adoption of a practice by a prestigious firm 
can offer a “legitimating account” or “endorsement” of the practice and this will likely 
contribute to its diffusion within a social system (Coleman et al., 1966; Loh & 
Venkatraman, 1992; Strang & Meyer, 1993).  Adoptions by prestigious firms reduce the 
level of uncertainty that other firms may have about the practice and this will encourage 
other firms to adopt the same practice (Burns & Wholey, 1993; Davis & Greve, 1997; 
Greve, 1996).  As Burns and Wholey (1993) explained, prestigious firms may actively 
endorse a practice which they have adopted as part of their effort to manage impressions 
and enhance their social status.  Further, less prestigious firms are also susceptible to the 
influence of prestigious firms given that they may aspire to achieve the same level of 
prestige as these firms (Fombrun & Shanley, 1990).  Hence, they are likely to attend to 
and emulate the adoption behaviors of these prestigious firms.  The impact of prestigious 
endorsement on adoption is well illustrated in the study presented by Loh and 
Venkatraman (1992).  They observed that the much-publicized information-system (IS) 
outsourcing arrangement between two prestigious firms, Kodak and IBM, in the late 
1980s, legitimated the practice of IS outsourcing among Fortune 500 firms and 
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stimulated subsequent adoptions of IS outsourcing.  Haunschild and Miner (1997) also 
observed that organizations are more likely to select investment bankers who have been 
previously engaged by prestigious and successful firms.  Further, in her study on the 
market entry activities of savings and loans (S&L) firms, Haveman (1993a) found that 
S&L firms are likely to imitate the market entry decisions of other large and profitable 
firms.  In sum, when prestigious firms have adopted a given practice, other firms will 
come to perceive the practice as important, useful, favorable, and they will be more likely 
to adopt the same practice for themselves. 
 In reviewing the literature on normative and mimetic isomorphism, most studies 
have ignored the temporal effects of social influences on adoption (for exceptions, see 
Castellucci & Haunschild, 2004; Young et al., 2001).  Studies that are identified within 
network theory implicitly assume that social information and influences communicated 
through social ties will have important effects on organizational adoption all the time 
(e.g., Davis, 1991; Galaskiewicz, 1997; Haunschild, 1993).  This stability is predicated 
on the idea that in the early stages of diffusion, when uncertainty about a practice is high, 
organizational decision-makers are likely to turn to those who they trust for information 
and advice (Uzzi, 1997).  In the later stages, relational ties are likely to be effective 
carriers of normative as well as mimetic isomorphism (DiMaggio & Powell, 1983).  
Empirical results however have been mixed.  While some studies have found the 
influence of social ties to be stable over time (Galaskiewicz, 1997), others have found 
that the effects of social ties tend to strengthen over time (Castellucci & Haunschild, 
2004; Young et al., 2001).  Further investigation of the temporal effects of social ties on 
adoption will be needed. 
 The temporal effects of prestigious endorsement on adoption are also not well 
articulated.  Most studies that have examined the influence of prestigious endorsement on 
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adoption do not examine its effects over time (for an exception, see Burns & Wholey, 
1993) and implicitly assume that isomorphism pressures carried by prestigious 
endorsement will have important effects on adoption all the time (Haunschild & Miner, 
1997; Haveman, 1993a).  On the other hand, Tolbert and Zucker’s  (1996) 
conceptualization of the institutionalization process suggests that institutional carriers of 
social norms and legitimacy, such as prestigious endorsement, are more likely to 
influence adoption in the later stages of the institutionalization process when normative 
and mimetic pressures are well-established and the actions of prestigious others serve as 
salient and useful reference for other firms (Tolbert & Zucker, 1996).  However, this 
temporal assertion is not supported in the single study that has examined the temporal 
impact of prestigious endorsement on the adoption of matrix management (Burns & 
Wholey, 1993).  Burns and Wholey (1993) observed that while prior adoptions of matrix 
management by prestigious hospitals encourage other less prestigious hospitals to 
subsequently adopt the same practice, the influence of prestigious endorsement was only 
significant in the early stages of adoption.  Burns and Wholey (1993) offered no 
explanation for this result.  However, a plausible explanation may be that the social 
influence carried by prestigious endorsement is important in the early stages of diffusion 
when uncertainty is at its highest.  Over time, other sources of information will become 
available and the influence of prestigious endorsement will become less important.    
In sum, the institutional perspective has made significant contributions to our 
understanding of organizational adoption by emphasizing the role of socio-structural and 
cultural influences.  However, prior literature presents one major weakness.  Institutions 
have often been treated as a state or property that either exist or do not.  The central 
question in these studies examines whether institutions matters in organizational actions, 
and if they do, through which mechanisms (Scott, 2001).  The result of this emphasis is 
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that institutional theory overlooks the role of actors’ interests and choice and their 
contribution to the establishment of institutions.  Further, it has lead to the relative 
neglect of the study of institutions as a process–whereby new social structures and 
practices are first introduced, then diffused, and progressively become institutionalized.  
As DiMaggio (1988) explained, by emphasizing institutions as a property or state, 
institutional theory situates explanations for organizational structures and practices 
beyond the scope of interests and politics.  Yet, if we look at institutions are the outcome 
of the process of institutionalization, we can see that institutions are highly political and 
reflect the relative power of organized interests and the social actors who mobilize 
around them.  Hence, critics argue that individuals and organizations are not passive 
captives of institutional pressures and that they can and do response strategically, 
exercising active agency and interests (Covaleski & Dirsmith, 1988; DiMaggio, 1988; 
DiMaggio & Powell, 1991; Oliver, 1991; Perrow, 1985; Powell, 1985).  To adequately 
model organizational action, institutional theory must accommodate the role of 
organizational self-interests and active agency (Oliver, 1991; Perrow, 1985; Powell, 
1985).  Recently, research has began to integrate the respective roles of interests, 
institutions, and efficiency in organizational actions, as well as develop more a process-
oriented perspective of institutions that emphasized an iterative model in which 
institutions, in various stages, affect both actors’ interests and their actions, and are in 
turn, affected by these actions over time (Barley & Tolbert, 1997; Giddens, 1979; Tolbert 
& Zucker, 1983, 1996).  In the next section, I review the limited literature on 
institutionalization and also summarize key ideas from the diffusion of innovation 
literature. 
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PROCESS OF INSTITUTIONALIZATION  
Tolbert and Zucker (1996) observed that despite the large body of research 
defined within the institutional perspective, there has been surprisingly little attention 
given to conceptualization and examination of the process of institutionalization.  Zucker 
and her colleagues (Barley & Tolbert, 1997; Tolbert & Zucker, 1983, 1996; Zucker, 
1977, 1983) noted that institutions exist both as a property as well as a process (also, see 
DiMaggio & Powell, 1983) and that while institutions drive and shape the nature of 
social actions across levels and context, these same institutions are changing in character 
and potency over time (also see Barley & Tolbert, 1997; Dacin et al., 2002).  Yet, in spite 
of these important insights, the processes of institutionalization have not been 
emphasized until very recently (e.g., Barley & Tolbert, 1997; Burns & Wholey, 1993; 
Tolbert & Zucker, 1983, 1996; Westphal & Zajac, 1994).  Barley and Tolbert (1997, p. 
94) assert that for “institutional theory to fulfill its promise for organizational studies, 
researchers must develop dynamic models of institutions (see Whittington, 1992) and 
devise methodologies for investigating how actions and institutions are recursively 
related”.  Advances in longitudinal data analysis, especially in event history analysis, 
have given researchers greater ability to simultaneously examine institutions as both as a 
qualitative state or property as well as a process (Scott, 2001).  To reconcile the relative 
effects of interests, institutions, and efficiency concerns on adoption, Tolbert and Zucker 
(1983; 1996) proposed the process through which practices become institutionalized.  
Tolbert and Zucker (1996) define institutionalization as “the process through 
which components of formal structure become widely accepted, as both appropriate and 
necessary, and serve to legitimate organizations” (Tolbert & Zucker, 1983, p. 25).  
Through this process, social expectation of appropriate organizational forms and 
behaviors come to take on rule-like status in social thought and action and 
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institutionalization is therefore a core process in the creation and perpetuation of enduring 
social structures (Berger & Luckmann, 1967; Tolbert & Zucker, 1996).  The outcome of 
the institutionalization process is an institution.  In their elaboration of the process of 
institutionalization, Tolbert and Zucker (1996) proposed that institutions are formed 
through three distinct and sequential processes: (1) habitualization, (2) objectification, 
and (3) sedimentation.  These sequential processes correspond to three phases of 
institutionalization: pre-institutionalization, semi-institutionalization, and full-
institutionalization (Tolbert & Zucker, 1996).   
Institutionalization begins with the process of habitualization in which new 
structural arrangements are created in response to specific problems that confront a set of 
organizations.  These new arrangements are adopted and formalized into the policies and 
procedures of an organization or an initial group of organizations so as to resolve the 
problems encountered. Habitualization is therefore the process that leads to “the 
development of patterned problem-solving behaviors and the association of such 
behaviors with particular stimuli” (Tolbert & Zucker, 1996, p. 181).  This phase is 
described as the pre-institutionalization stage.  An important feature of this phase is that 
the adoption of new organizational practices is largely the result of independent activities 
undertaken by separate organizations who may share a common knowledge-base that 
makes an innovation feasible and attractive.  Hence, they argued that early adoption 
should largely be explained by the characteristics of an organization that make the 
proposed change technically and economically feasible for a given organization 
(Anderson & Tushman, 1990; Leblebici et al., 1991) and by internal political forces that 
make organizations more or less open to the proposed change (March & Simon, 1958; 
Palmer et al., 1987).   
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Tolbert and Zucker (1996) further argued that while these initial adoptions may be 
the results of imitation among organizations facing similar problems (DiMaggio & 
Powell, 1983; Nelson & Winter, 1982), they do not think that this is likely for two 
reasons.  First, the knowledge of the new organizational practice among non-adopters 
without direct and strong ties to prior adopters is likely to be very limited (Nelson & 
Winter, 1982; Tolbert & Zucker, 1996). Second, given that there is no consensus on the 
general utility of the innovation, there is little sense of the necessity of imitation this at 
this stage.   Given the infancy of the institutionalization process, institutional pressures 
are likely to be weak or even absent and institutional carriers of societal norms and 
legitimacy are not likely to influence the adoption behaviors of organizations.  In sum, at 
the pre-institutionalization stage, adoptions are likely to be primarily driven by concerns 
for efficiency or by the relative interests and influence of organizational actors.  
Objectification occurs next in institutionalization process.  As Tolbert and Zucker 
(1996, p. 182) explained, it “involves the development of some degree of social 
consensus among organizational decision-makers concerning the value of a structure, and 
the increasing adoption by organizations on the basis of that consensus” and it is the 
crucial process in which new social structures either become established or they 
disappeared.  This phase is described as the semi-institutionalization stage.  Two 
important mechanisms are responsible for the emergent consensus and social legitimacy 
that facilitates adoptions.  First, organizations draw on information provided from a 
variety of sources to evaluate the potential risk and returns from adopting the new 
practice, including reports in the mass media and direct observations of prior adopters.  
Monitoring the experience of prior adopters offers a low-cost change strategy for an 
organization, as these adopters would have tested the new practice.  Further, 
organizations are particularly likely to pay attention to the behaviors of similar others, in 
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particular, their competitors, as they strive to enhance their own competitiveness; or 
prestigious others, whom they respect and hope to emulate.  The prevalence of prior 
adoptions will also generally persuade organizations to adopt the practice.  As Tolbert 
and Zucker (1996) argued, the more organizations that have adopted a practice, the more 
likely other organizations will perceive it as favorable and therefore, the more likely they 
are to adopt the practice themselves (Tolbert, 1985).  Hence, interorganizational 
monitoring and imitation are important activities that occur during the objectification 
process.   
Second, objectification may also be driven by “institutional entrepreneurs” 
(DiMaggio, 1988, p.14) or “champions” (Rogers, 2003, p. 414), social actors with an 
interest in promoting a given practice.  These champions may include managerial elites, 
professions, consultants, special interest groups, and even certain organizations or 
groupings (e.g., Baron et al., 1986; Covaleski & Dirsmith, 1988; DiMaggio, 1991; 
Palmer & Barber, 2001; Palmer et al., 1993; Tolbert & Zucker, 1983). For example, 
Baron and his colleagues (1986)  observed how the emerging profession of personnel 
managers after the Second World War led to the adoption and diffusion of human 
resource practices.  What is most important about “champions” or “institutional 
entrepreneurs” is the critical role they play in the task of theorization (Strang & Meyer, 
1993, p. 492), the “self-conscious development and specification of abstract categories 
and the formulation of patterned relationships such as chains of cause and effect”.  By 
offering a definition of the generic problem, the category of social actors characterized by 
the problem, and the justification for a particular structural solution to the problem, 
theorization enables diffusion to become more rapid and more universal, and less 
dependent on social relationships and organizational differences (Strang & Meyer, 1993; 
Tolbert & Zucker, 1996).  As Tolbert and Zucker (1996, p, 183) explained, 
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By identifying the set of organizations that face a defined problem and providing a 
positive evaluation of a structure as an appropriate solution, theorizing invests the structure with 
both general cognitive and normative legitimacy. To be persuasive and effective, theorizing 
efforts must also provide evidence that the change is actually successful in at least some cases 
that can be examined by others considering the adoption of new structure. On the basis of such 
theorizing, and the accompanying evidence, champions encourage the diffusion of structures 
throughout a set of organizations that are not otherwise directly connected. (1996, p. 183) 
 
Prior research offers some evidence of this.  In studies that looked at the prior 
adoptions of prestigious firms (or industry leaders), researchers found that prior adoptions 
by these firms are likely to influence the subsequent adoption decisions of others (Burns 
& Wholey, 1993; Haveman, 1993a).  For example, in their study on the adoption of 
matrix-management structure in hospitals, Burns and Wholey (1993) argued and found 
support that less prestigious hospitals are more likely to adopt the practice after more 
prestigious hospitals have already done so.  Further, Haveman (1993a) found that savings 
and loans firms are likely to follow the market entry decisions of their industry leaders.  
At the semi-institutionalization stage, structures and practices would have become 
objectified and begin to diffuse across a set of heterogeneous adopters.  Consequently, 
Tolbert and Zucker (1996, p. 183) argued that “specific characteristics of organizations 
that were previously identified with adoption will have relatively limited predictive 
power” and the “impetus for diffusion shifts from simple imitation to a more normative 
base, reflecting implicit or explicit theorization of structures” (Tolbert and Zucker 1983).  
This is because as institutions begin to take form, the progressive establishment of social 
norms and legitimacy will cause the practice to become regarded as an appropriate or 
even necessary component of “efficient” organization (Tolbert & Zucker, 1983).  
Correspondingly, social actors are less likely to engage in independent judgment of 
efficiency and/or consideration of self-interests.  In sum, the influence of interests and 
efficiency concerns on adoption is likely to decrease, while the influence of institutional 
carriers of social norms and legitimacy is likely to become more important.  However, 
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even though a practice has become fairly diffused at the semi-institutionalization stage, 
its longer term persistence is still uncertain.  Tolbert and Zucker (1996) explained that 
due to their relatively short history, prior adopters as well as potential adopters will 
continue to monitor and evaluate the perceived effectiveness of the practice.  It is 
necessary for the practice to undergo the next process of sedimentation before the 
“actors’ propensity to engage in independent evaluation of the structures significantly 
declines” (Tolbert & Zucker, 1996, p. 184). 
The third and final process of institutionalization is sedimentation.  This phase is 
described as the full-institutionalization stage and is “characterized both by the virtually 
complete spread of practices across the group of actors theorized as appropriate adopters, 
and by the perpetuation of structures over a lengthy period of time” (Tolbert & Zucker, 
1996, p. 184).  Factors that contributed to the long-term persistence of a practice include 
the presence of active advocacy as well as the absence of active resistance.  The evidence 
of positive outcomes associated with the practice is also important for its continual 
spread.  However, the causal link between structure and effect is often quite distant and 
difficult to demonstrate.  Still, as Tolbert and Zucker (1996, p. 184) argued, “full-
institutionalization of a structure is likely to depend on the conjoint effects of relatively 
low resistance by opposing groups, continued cultural support and promotion by 
advocacy groups, and positive correlation with desired outcomes”.  The sedimentation of 
a structure or practice therefore results in the establishment of an institution, the end state 
of the institutionalization process.  As Berger and Luckmann (1967, p. 54) defined, an 
institution is “a reciprocal typification of habitualized actions by types of actors”, 
whereby actions that become habitualized are “evoked with minimal decision-making 
effort by actors in response to particular stimuli” because of the “development of shared 
definitions or meanings that are linked to these habitualized behaviors” (Tolbert & 
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Zucker, 1996, p. 180).  At this stage, Tolbert and Zucker (1983; 1996) argued that 
adoption will no longer be explained by actors’ interests or efficiency concerns but by the 
institutional influences carried through various carriers of social norms and legitimacy.  It 
is important to note that the sequential processes of habitualization, objectification, and 
sedimentation, suggest variability in levels of institutionalization over time; that is, 
institutions can “vary in terms of the degree to which they are deeply embedded in a 
social system (more objective, more exterior), and thus vary in terms of their stability and 
their power to determine behavior” over time (Tolbert & Zucker, 1996, p. 181). 
In summary, Tolbert and Zucker’s (1983; 1996) conceptualization of the process 
of institutionalization argues that efficiency concerns, proxied by organizational 
attributes, and interests of actors, indicated by the relative power and influence of 
competing actors, will be the primary determinants of adoption in the early stages of 
diffusion.  However, as practices become progressively adopted and institutionalized, the 
effects of interest and efficiency concerns on adoption will decrease over time.  At the 
same time, institutional carriers of social influences will become increasingly important 
determinants of adoption.  On the other hand, if a practice fails to become 
institutionalized over time, then interests and efficiency concerns that determined early 
adoption will continue to predict adoption over time.  As Scott (2001, p. 164) 
summarized, 
 
In the early stages of an institutionalization process, adoption of the practice by 
organizations represents a choice on their part, which can reflect their varying specific needs or 
interests. As the institutionalization process proceeds, normative and cultural pressures mount to 
the point where adoption becomes less of a choice and more of a requirement. (2001, p. 164) 
 
This temporal reconciliation of the effects of interests, institutions, and efficiency 
concerns on adoption has become generally accepted even though empirical studies have 
provided mixed results.  Prior studies have examined this temporal model in the adoption 
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of civil service reforms (Knoke, 1982; Tolbert & Zucker, 1983), multidivisional (M-
form) organization structure (Fligstein, 1985), matrix management (Burns & Wholey, 
1993), CEO long-term incentive plans (Westphal & Zajac, 1994), total quality 
management (TQM) (Young et al., 2001), curricula reforms (Kraatz & Zajac, 1996), and 
organizational downsizing (Budros, 2004).   
A major problem in several of these studies is that institutional influences on 
adoption are not explicitly specified or tested (Tolbert & Zucker, 1983; Westphal & 
Zajac, 1994).  In these studies, the influence of institutions is assumed to be increasing 
over time, given that the effects of interests and efficiency concerns on adoption are 
observed to decline over time.  For example, in their study on the diffusion of civil 
service reforms from 1885 to 1935, Tolbert and Zucker (1983) observed that in states 
where reforms were not mandated, adoption of reforms during the early time periods 
were related to the characteristics of the cities such as their size and proportion of 
immigrants and blue-collar workers.  Tolbert and Zucker (1983) interpreted the declining 
impact of city characteristics on adoption to indicate a corresponding development of an 
institutional logic that encourages reforms among cities regardless of their requirements 
or conditions.  They concluded that the underlying rationale for the adoption of reforms 
changed over time, whereby early adoptions were driven by internal organizational 
requirements, while late adoptions were driven by institutional definition of legitimate 
structure.  Similarly, Westphal and Zajac (1994) found that the influence of the chief 
executive officer (CEO) and the performance of the organization were important 
predictors of long-term incentive plans (LTIP) adoption among the largest U.S. 
companies but that these influences weaken over time.  However, because these studies 
did not explicitly identify and examine the impact of carriers of institutional influences 
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on adoption over time, they provide little information about how institutions may be 
influencing adoption. 
Further, in the few studies that do examine the influence of institutional carriers 
on adoption over time, only a limited set of carriers have been examined and no 
consistent temporal trend has been observed (Budros, 2004; Burns & Wholey, 1993; 
Young et al., 2001).  For example, contrary to Tolbert and Zucker’s (1983; 1996) 
assertion for increasing institutional influence over time, Burns and Wholey (1993) found 
that while economic predictors of adoption did decline in their influence over time, they 
did not find a corresponding increase in institutional influence when they used time at 
risk of adoption as an indicator of increasing institutional isomorphism.  Also, in 
Fligstein’s (1985) study of M-form adoptions over five decades, efficiency concerns, 
proxied by organizational strategies, remained significant even at the latter stages of the 
diffusion process.  Further, in direct contrast to Tolbert and Zucker’s (1983; 1996) 
assertion of a decreasing impact of efficiency concerns on adoption over time, the 
influence of unrelated-diversification and merger strategies on adoption actually 
increased over time.  Lastly, institutional influence carried by the prevalence of the M-
form structure in the industry, an important indicator of societal norms and legitimacy 
(Hannan & Freeman, 1977), was found to be important even at relatively early stages of 
the diffusion cycle.  Similarly, Budros (2004) observed that the prevalence of downsizing 
influence adoption during early as well as late stages of diffusion.  One reason for these 
inconsistent results is that many practices do not become fully institutionalized or not.  
Instead, they tend to acquire varying degrees of social acceptance or appropriateness over 
time without becoming necessary, legitimating, or taken-for-granted as full-
institutionalization will suggest (Tolbert & Zucker, 1996).  
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Other studies have also put this temporal reconciliation of the role of interests, 
institutions, and efficiency concerns on adoption into question (Kraatz & Zajac, 1996; 
Palmer et al., 1993; Strang, 1990; Swanson & Ramiller, 1997). For example, contrary to 
Tolbert and Zucker’s (1983; 1996) assertion that interests and efficiency concerns are not 
likely to influence late adoptions, Palmer and his colleagues (1993) found that several 
economic and political factors remain highly predictive of multidivisional form (M-form) 
adoptions, even after the form has become institutionalized in the late 1960s.  Also, 
Kraatz and Zajac (1996) found that the effects of local market conditions on curricula 
reforms persist over time.  Similarly, in his historical study of decolonization among 
Western dependencies, Strang (1990) observed that certain institutional conditions do not 
merely contribute to the adoption at the latter stages of the diffusion process but may 
actually trigger initial adoptions.  Similarly, Swanson and Ramiller (1997) argued that 
institutional processes that contribute to the development of an organizing vision are 
central to both early and late adoption of an IS innovation. 
Hence, while the process of institutionalization offered by Tolbert and Zucker 
(1983; 1996) contributes to the development of an integrative and dynamic model of 
adoption, the general model in which interests and efficiency concerns are primary 
predictors of early adoption, and institutional influences are primary predictors of late 
adoption, may be overgeneralized.  Results from prior studies suggest that this temporal 
model may apply more to practices that have become fully institutionalized—“become 
widely accepted, as both appropriate and necessary, and serve to legitimate 
organizations” (Tolbert & Zucker, 1983, p.25)—or have clearly failed to do so.  
However, given that most practices do not go through such a distinct process of 
institutionalization, how different actors’ interests and various institutional influences 
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will affect adoption over time as a practice becomes varyingly diffused and socially 
accepted remains unclear.  Addressing this gap is the central objective of this study. 
DIFFUSION OF INNOVATIONS 
The literature on the diffusion of innovation offers several insights about the 
dynamic nature of adoption within a social system.  Wejnert (2002, p. 297) defines 
diffusion of innovation as the “spread of abstract ideas and concepts, technical 
information, and actual practices within a social system, where the spread denotes flow or 
movement from a source to an adopter, typically via communication and influence”.  
Given that research on diffusion of innovation is diverse, I confine my review to the 
central concepts of diffusion and summarize results that emphasize adoption over time. 
The most prominent concept from the diffusion of innovations literature is the S-
shaped curve of adoption.  The S-shaped curve records the cumulative frequency of 
adoption over time and is derived from the normally-distributed adoption frequency 
distribution over time (see Figure 1).  In the S-shaped adoption curve, adoption frequency 
is low at the onset of the innovation.  Subsequent counts of adoption rise slowly over the 
initial time periods.  After these initial periods, the number of adoption begins to increase 
and the cumulative adoption increases rapidly until about half the pool of potential 
adopters have adopted.  Thereafter, the cumulative adoptions continue to increase but at a 
decreasing rate as fewer of the remaining potential adopters adopt (Rogers, 2003; Ryan & 
Gross, 1943).   
While the S-shaped curve of adoption has been shown to be fairly robust in prior 
studies, Rogers (2003) argued that it most appropriately describe cases of successful 
innovations, whereby an innovation spreads to a vast majority of the potential pool of 
adopters in a social system.  Further, the S-shaped curve offers a better description of the 
diffusion of technological innovations or other innovations that exhibit distinctive 
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lifecycles in which one innovation is replaced by other subsequent innovations.  A 
classical example of this is the case of disk drive technology in which the 14-inch drive 
was replaced by the 8-inch drive, which was in turn replaced by the 5¼-inch drive, and 
later the 3½-inch drive (Christensen & Bower, 1996).  For other types of innovations, 
especially organizational and administrative innovations, the shape of the cumulative S-
shape adoption curve is less precise as their frequency distributions are often not 
normally distributed (Davis, 1991).  For example, Davis (1991) observed that the 
distribution of poison pills adoptions within a sample of the largest U.S. companies was 
not normally distributed over his window of observation.  Rogers (2003, p. 6) asserts that 
the diffusion of innovation is fundamentally a process of social change in which 
“alteration occurs in the structure and function of a social system” through the 
communication of new ideas and the progressive adoptions of the innovation among 
members of the social system.  Because an innovation is perceived as new by an 
individual or other unit of adoption, the adoption decision is shrouded in uncertainty.  
Individuals are motivated to seek and process information that will reduce uncertainty 
about the relative advantages and disadvantages of an innovation and help them to decide 
on whether to adopt or reject an innovation.   
Research that focuses on the characteristics of adopters to discover what predicts 
the relative innovativeness of members in a social system is relevant to this study.  
Rogers (2003, p. 22) explains that innovativeness refers to the “degree to which an 
individual or other unit of adoption is relatively earlier in adopting new ideas than the 
other members of a social system”.  Building on the normal distribution of adoptions, 
Rogers (1958) developed five categories to describe adopters based on their relative 
innovativeness: innovators, early adopters, early majority, late majority, and laggards 
(Rogers, 2003, p. 280).   
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The first set of adopters is the innovators.  Being the first to adopt an innovation, 
innovators are likely to maintain relationships to outside networks where innovations are 
likely to be found.  They are also likely to have greater absorptive capacity to deal with 
new and complex ideas as well as greater tolerance for uncertainty and risk.  More 
importantly, innovators need to have control over sufficient financial resources that will 
allow them to experiment and sustain losses should the innovation fail.  Being 
“venturesome”, innovators may not enjoy much respect from members of the social 
system who consider them as being too radical (Rogers, 2003, p. 280).  Early adopters 
are the next to adopt an innovation.  They are often an integral part of the social system 
and enjoy high degree of opinion leadership and respect from other members.  Early 
adopters are often looked upon as role models and other members are likely to turn to 
them for advice and information about an innovation.  Early adopters are critical to the 
diffusion process as they help to disseminate information within a social system, offer 
their subjective evaluations to others, and provide endorsement for an innovation.  Early 
majority forms the next group of adopters.  They are a central part of the social system 
but seldom hold positions of leadership.  Early majority are deliberate adopters who are 
willing to try out an innovation after it has been tested by others.  Accounting for a 
substantive portion of the early adopters, early majority forms the interconnectedness 
within the social system that facilitates the rapid spread of the innovation.  The late 
majority is the next set of adopters.  They are often skeptical of new ideas and will only 
adopt under economic or social pressures.  A major reason for their late adoption is that 
the late majority tends to have relatively fewer resources and can only adopt an 
innovation after most of the uncertainty has been resolved.  Finally, the last set of 
adopters is the laggards.  They are the most parochial in their outlook and many are near 
isolates in the social system.  Laggards prefer traditions over innovations.  However, 
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many laggards may also have very rational reasons for not adopting earlier.  They often 
suffer from limited resources and will adopt an innovation only after it has proven to be 
useful. 
In studies that emphasize the organization as the unit of adoption, Rogers (2003) 
observed that innovativeness (i.e., early adoption) is positively associated with leader’s 
attitude towards change; members’ knowledge and expertise, as well as 
interconnectedness; slack resources and size; and the degree of system openness (also see 
Attewell, 1992).  For example, Mahler and Rogers (1999) found that large German banks 
were more likely to adopt a set of communication technology innovations.  These 
characteristics encourage adoption because they facilitate the flow of new ideas into the 
organization as well as within the organization so that new ideas may be effectively 
analyzed and utilized.  Organizational innovativeness is negatively related with the 
degree of centralization and formalization in the organization because these structural 
arrangements inhibit the flow of new ideas and prevent them from being effectively 
utilized.   
Even though these generalizations have been observed in prior studies, Rogers 
(2003) noted that the correlations between the characteristics of the adoption unit and 
innovativeness have been relatively low.  He posited that the reason for this is because 
these organizational characteristics “may be related to innovation in one direction during 
the initiation phases of the innovation process, and in the opposite direction during the 
implementation phases” (Rogers, 2003, p. 413).  It is therefore important for researchers 
to develop more complete models of adoption over time so as to provide a more accurate 
understanding of how different factors influence adoption over time.  
The review of the roles of actors’ interests and carriers of institutional influences 
on organizational adoption, as well as the process of institutionalization and the diffusion 
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of innovations provides the theoretical foundation of this study.  In the next chapter, I 
draw on the above theoretical foundations to develop testable hypotheses about the 
evolving effects of interests and carriers of institutional influences on the adoption of 
three practices that have become varyingly diffused and socially accepted over time, 
while controlling for the effects of efficiency concerns. 
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CHAPTER THREE:  THEORY DEVELOPMENT AND 
HYPOTHESES 
 The central thesis of my dissertation argues that the effects of actors’ 
interests and carriers of institutional influences on adoption will change over time 
depending on the degree to which a practice becomes socially accepted.  This is because 
as the degree of social acceptance for a practice changes over time, it will not only 
influence actors’ interests and their ability to further them but also determine the 
effectiveness of different carriers of social influences, and consequently, determine how 
these factors will affect adoption.  I argue that to acquire a better understanding of how 
organizations may change and adapt, we must develop a more dynamic model of 
adoption that takes into account how changing degrees of social acceptance of a practice 
over time will moderate the effects of interests and carriers of institutional influences on 
adoption.   
In the following sections, I draw on prior literature to develop my hypotheses.  I 
organize my chapter as follows.  First, because the research setting is critical to any study 
on adoption, I provide a detailed description of each practice, including how they diffuse, 
and how they achieve different degrees of social acceptance over time.  Second, I propose 
hypotheses about the main effects of actors’ interests and carriers of institutional 
influences on adoption as suggested by prior research.  I further develop dynamic 
hypotheses about how changing degrees of social acceptance over time will moderate 
these effects.  To summarize, I present a summary of the hypotheses in Table 1. 
THREE ORGANIZATIONAL PRACTICES 
In this study, I select three practices that have undergone varying processes of 
diffusion and achieve different degrees of social acceptance over time.  The three 
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practices are: (1) tender offer takeovers; (2) poison pills takeover defense; and (3) 
executive stock option repricing.  These practices are interesting for several reasons.  
First, all three practices are somewhat contentious in that they present ambiguous costs 
and offer questionable benefits to different stakeholders.  This presents potential agency 
problems among top managers, who are likely to prefer them, and shareholders, who are 
likely to frown upon them.  Second, and more importantly, the practices exhibit different 
trends in terms of their degrees of social acceptance over time among key stakeholders 
including top managers, shareholders, and the business community at large.  Hence, these 
practices offer a unique opportunity to examine how evolving degrees of social 
acceptance over time will moderate the effects of interests and carriers of institutional 
influences on adoption.  Detailed accounts of each organizational practice are presented 
next.  
Tender Offer Takeovers 
During the 1960s and the 1980s, the U.S. economy experienced the two largest 
waves of corporate acquisitions in history.  Between the start of the first wave and the 
end of the second wave, the fundamental nature of corporate acquisitions underwent a 
major transformation.  In the 1960s, acquisitions typically involved friendly mergers, in 
which larger firms took over smaller firms, frequently in unrelated industries, and 
completed through stock payments.  The underlying motivation for corporate acquisitions 
in the 1960s was the pursuit of corporate diversification (Palmer et al., 1995; Shleifer & 
Vishny, 1991).  In the 1980s, acquisitions frequently involved hostile tender offer 
takeovers, in which large firms or entrepreneurial individuals, also known as “corporate 
raiders”, took over other large firms through cash payments (Bhagat, Shleifer, & Vishny, 
1990; Shleifer & Vishny, 1991).  The hostile approach to acquisitions was thereby 
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introduced into the population of the largest U.S companies in the late 1970s, diffused 
across the population throughout the 1980s, and persisted to date.  
A tender offer takeover is a public offer by an acquirer to the shareholders of the 
target company to purchase a substantial, controlling percentage of target’s shares at a 
premium over the current market price for a limited period of time (Fowler and Schmidt, 
1988; Securities Exchange Commission, 2004).  By making a public offer directly to 
shareholders, tender offer takeovers seek to acquire a target company without engaging 
its top management and board of directors in negotiations.  Tender offer takeovers, 
therefore, represent unsolicited and unfriendly attempts to acquire another company1.  
Such corporate acquisitions were largely driven by the competition for corporate control 
and frequently resulted in the divestiture of the target firm’s various holdings.  This type 
of corporate acquisitions is also known as “bust-up” takeovers (Bhagat et al., 1990; 
Hirsch, 1986; Shleifer & Vishny, 1991).  As Shleifer and Vishny (1991) observed, 
approximately twenty-eight percent of the 1980 Fortune 500 companies were acquired 
between 1980 and 1990 (also see Davis & Stout, 1992).   
While tender offer takeovers, as a means of acquiring ownership and control of 
another firm, did take place in earlier time periods (from 1950s to 1960s), they were 
relatively few in number (Hirsch, 1986).  These hostile takeovers were largely adopted by 
small firms that took over other small firms, or by conglomerate firms that were pursuing 
a growth strategy through diversifying acquisitions (Hirsch, 1986; Palmer et al., 1995).  
These early tender offer takeovers did not threaten or affect large, established 
corporations, and attracted little attention among the established business community.  
                                                 
1 It is possible that a tender offer takeover is made even though the acquisition is a friendly 
merger. There is no publicly available information to identify such transactions. It is only possible 
to identify if a tender offer is friendly (i.e., accepted by the target firm) or hostile (i.e., rejected by 
the target firm) after it has been made. 
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Throughout the 1970s, tender offer takeovers remained a deviant innovation that was 
generally regarded “as illegitimate and not widely adopted as an institutional innovation” 
(Hirsch, 1986, p. 808).   
Between 1969 and 1972, takeover activities declined sharply due to regulatory 
changes regarding hostile tender offer takeovers.  These regulatory changes did not 
prohibit hostile takeovers but instead redefined the rules for their utilization by requiring 
that: (1) acquirers must be able to pay the premium offer price and have secured funding 
prior to making a tender offer; and (2) targets are provided with more time to pursue 
alternative options, such as finding merger partners that are more acceptable or to seeking 
shareholders’ rejection (Hirsch, 1986).  With the regulatory changes and evolving 
business climate, larger and more established companies begin to adopt tender offer 
takeovers from the mid-1970s onwards.  As the established business community “came to 
participate in the revision of the rules, procedures, and normative framing of the 
transaction, the hostile takeover achieved more wide-spread adoption” and came to be 
“included in the portfolio of investment and growth strategies pursued by major 
American corporations” (Hirsch, 1986, p. 813).  Records of tender offers reported in the 
Austin Tender Offer Statistics from 1971 to 1979 revealed that while the number tender 
offers increased over this period, it was not until the late 1970s that tender offer takeovers 
began to diffuse across the largest U.S. companies.  Companies in the oil and tobacco 
industries were the first to break the social norm in which established companies 
recognized the rights of each other to exist as independent entities and not to engage in 
hostile takeovers of other large, established firms.  Throughout the 1980s, increasing 
numbers of large and established companies began to adopt tender offer takeovers as a 
corporate acquisition strategy (Hirsch, 1986).  In their evaluation of the legitimacy of 
hostile takeovers, Castellucci and Haunschild (2004) performed content analysis of key 
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business periodicals and reviewed the behaviors of legislatures relating to hostile 
takeovers.  They observed that while anti-takeover regulatory actions were frequent in the 
early 1980s, they decreased over time.  Further, consistent with Hirsch’s (1986) 
assertions, they found that the tone of popular business media changed from generally 
negative in the early 1980s to more positive in the late 1980s.  They concluded that 
hostile takeovers became more legitimated over time and that by the late 1980s the 
practice was generally regarded as a legitimated and socially accepted strategy for 
corporate acquisitions by the population of the largest U.S. companies.  The social 
acceptance of tender offer takeovers is affirmed by its persistence throughout the 1990s 
and 2000s.  The SDC database on mergers and acquisitions revealed that tender offer 
takeovers continued to be adopted throughout the last two decades.  Between 1980 and 
2004, 513 F500 companies (i.e., approximately thirty-one percent of all F500 companies 
listed on Fortune from 1980 to 2004) have engaged in at least one tender offer takeover.  
Recent examples of unsolicited tender offers include Comcast Corp. $54.1 billion bid for 
Walt Disney Co. (9 February, 2004), Oracle Corp. $5.1 billion bid for PeopleSoft Inc. (18 
July, 2002), and Wells Fargo & Company $11 billion bid for First Interstate Bancorp (19 
October, 1995).  These evidences illustrate how the degree of social acceptance for tender 
offer takeovers progressively increased over time.  Figures 2a and 2b illustrate the 
frequency of tender offer takeovers among F500 firms from 1980-2004 and the 
cumulative percentage of adoption by F500 companies listed between 1980 and 2004 
respectively. 
The rationale for tender offer takeovers differs significantly from those of friendly 
mergers.  When compared to friendly mergers, tender offer takeovers are often more 
expensive, usually take longer to complete, are more likely to be resisted by the target 
firm, and are less likely to be successfully completed (Schnitzer, 1996).  While synergy is 
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the main rationale for friendly mergers, extracting unrealized gains is the main driving 
motive behind tender offer takeovers.  Consistent arguments in the financial literature, 
Schnitzer (1996) argued that an acquirer, motivated by the potential of unrealized gains in 
a target firm, would prefer a hostile tender offer takeover to a friendly merger because the 
acquirer can retain greater potential gains by negotiating directly with uninformed 
shareholders, rather than with informed top executives of the target firm, who can 
otherwise appropriate much of the potential unrealized gains.  The hostile approach to 
corporate acquisition is therefore predicated on the basis of extracting maximum 
unrealized gains from the target firm.  While this explanation is prevalent and 
compelling, there is little empirically evidence for this in prior research.  
A less rational explanation for tender offer takeovers is also offered by Austin and 
Fishman (1970) and is echoed in popular business media accounts of hostile takeovers 
(Hirsch, 1986).  They noted that tender offer takeovers are highly glamorous and 
intriguing corporate competitions that tend to attract intense media attention.  Hostile 
takeovers, therefore, have important implications for top managers who engaged in such 
contests for corporate control.  Successful hostile takeovers can potentially raise the 
personal prestige and social status of top managers in the acquiring firm. At the same 
time, top managers in the acquired firms are not only likely to lose personal prestige but 
also their jobs.  These arguments suggest that top managers may prefer the hostile 
approach for personal reasons even if other alternative approaches are available to them.  
While anecdotal evidence for this can be observed in some prior accounts of hostile 
takeovers, there is again little empirical data to support this political explanation of tender 
offer takeovers.     
The preference of shareholders of an acquiring firm for tender offer takeover is 
less clear because of its uncertainty in advancing shareholders’ interests.  Given that 
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potential takeovers are often described as being motivated by potential synergistic gains 
and that hostile takeovers promise an opportunity to extract maximum potential value 
from the target firm (Schnitzer, 1996), shareholders hoping to maximize their wealth 
should prefer tender offer takeovers to friendly mergers.  On the other hand, hostile 
takeovers are more expensive and less likely to be successful.  As such, shareholders of 
an acquiring firm may prefer friendly mergers to tender offer takeovers.  Given that 
shareholders of the acquiring firm, like shareholders of the target firm, are not likely to be 
fully informed about the potential of an acquisition, we can reasonably expect them to 
object to the more expensive and riskier approach of corporate acquisition.  However, 
there is again no empirical evidence for both propositions about shareholders’ preference 
for tender offer takeovers in prior research. 
Given that so little is known about why organizations engage in tender offer 
takeovers, this context provides an intriguing opportunity to examine how the interests of 
different actors and the social influences carried by different institutional carriers may 
influence adoption over time as its degree of social acceptance changes.  In this study, I 
examine the adoption of tender offer takeovers from 1980 to 2004.  Preliminary data 
from the Securities Data Corporation (SDC) database shows that for this period, over 510 
companies of all listed F500 attempted an estimated 926 tender offer takeovers.  By 
extending the observation window beyond those covered in prior studies, this study 
evaluates the effects of actors’ interests and carriers of institutional influences on 
adoption from its early introduction into the population of the largest U.S. companies, 
through its gradual diffusion, and its perpetuation to date. 
Poison Pills Takeover Defense 
The 1980s ushered the largest wave of corporate acquisitions in U.S. history.  As 
researchers have observed, this takeover wave was fueled by the availability of large 
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amount of loan capital, changes in tax laws, innovative financial instruments, and a 
favorable regulatory climate (Davis, 1991; Davis & Stout, 1992; Lee & Pawlukiewicz, 
2000).  Davis and Stout (1992) reported, between 1980 and 1990, 29 percent of the 1980 
Fortune 500 companies experienced at least one takeover or buyout attempt.  Many of 
these attempts were unsolicited and hostile in nature.  The increase in the number of 
hostile takeovers during the early 1980s led to the introduction and rapid diffusion of an 
innovative takeover defense mechanism known as “shareholder rights plan” or poison 
pills.  
Poison pills are contingent securities that are designed to make hostile takeovers 
more difficult (Davis, 1991; Dowen et al., 1994; Mallette & Fowler, 1992).  They are 
adopted by the board of directors, generally without shareholders’ approval, and are 
implemented through the issue of stock purchase rights to existing shareholders.  Poison 
pills can be fairly complicated and while they do vary in their specifics, they generally 
have the following characteristics:  (1) they are triggered by an acquisition of 10-20% of 
outstanding stocks by a single entity; (2) they give target’s shareholders the right to buy 
shares in the target and/or acquiring firm at a steep discount; (3) they can be redeemed by 
the board of directors for a nominal fee to allow a friendly merger to take place.  Poison 
pills are essentially worthless unless they are triggered by a hostile takeover attempt.  
When triggered, poison pills will result in the dilution of the acquirer's equity holdings in 
the target company, a loss of the acquirer's voting interests in the target company, or the 
assumption of unwanted financial obligation by an acquirer in the post-merger company 
(Mallette & Fowler, 1992).  The net effect of poison pills is to make a hostile takeover 
attempt prohibitively expensive.  Poison pills are recognized as the most restrictive 
takeover defense that a firm can adopt, and past studies have found them to be highly 
effective in preventing any takeover attempts (Malatesta & Walkling, 1988).  
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When poison pills were introduced into the population of the largest U.S. 
companies in 1984, the practice was quite controversial and its legality and legitimacy 
were aggressively challenged by shareholders and potential corporate acquirers (Davis, 
1991; Lee & Pawlukiewicz, 2000).  Opponents of poison pills believe that poison pills 
led to management entrenchment and discouraged legitimate takeover attempts (Davis, 
1991; Malatesta & Walkling, 1988; Sundaramurthy, 2000).  Shareholders, in particular 
institutional shareholders, argued that poison pills infringe on their rights as owners to 
sell their shares under conditions of their own choice.  Further, agency theorists argued 
that the adoption of poison pills would shield top managers from the disciplinary power 
of external market for corporate control (Fama, 1980; Fama & Jensen, 1983; Jensen & 
Meckling, 1976), thereby giving top managers greater balance of power vis-à-vis 
shareholders.  Critics also recognized the private motivation that top managers might 
have in adopting poison pills, given that executive turnover is likely in acquired firm 
following a hostile takeover.  Shareholders’ objections to poison pills were evident in that 
a firm’s stock price tends to suffer a decline after adopting poison pills (Malatesta & 
Walkling, 1988; Ryngaert, 1988).  Further, institutional shareholders, like the College 
Retirement Equity Fund, and shareholder organizations, like the Council of Institutional 
Investors, had actively opposed the adoption of poison pills (Davis, 1991).  On the other 
hand, advocates of poison pills, in particular top managers, argued that poison pills 
protect the interest of shareholders by forcing potential acquirers to negotiate with the 
target’s board of directors and top managers who are in the best position to safeguard 
shareholders’ interest (Sundaramurthy, 2000).  By increasing the bargaining power of the 
target firm, poison pills will allow shareholders to extract higher premiums from potential 
acquirers in the event of a takeover.    
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The legality of poison pills was established on November 19, 1985, when the 
Chancery Court in Delaware, in the case of Moran v. Household International, Inc, 
upheld a firm’s right to adopt poison pills without shareholder approval when the firm 
was not threatened by a takeover at the time of adoption.  Prior to this ruling, only 
seventeen F500 companies had adopted poison pills, with the first being Crown 
Zellerbach, who adopted on July 19, 1984 (Davis, 1991).  Subsequent to the ruling, the 
number of adoptions among F500 firms increased rapidly.  By the end of 1989, the 
practice has become widely diffused with approximately sixty percent of the publicly 
traded firms listed on the 1986 F500 having adopted some form of poison pills takeover 
defense (Davis, 1991).   
While poison pills did establish some degree of diffusion within the population of 
the largest U.S. companies over time (Castellucci & Haunschild, 2004; Davis, 1991) it is 
important to note that the practice was not considered legitimate by shareholders, who 
continued to actively resist the adoption of new poison pills and the ratification of 
existing plans (McGurn, 2001; Velasco, 2002).  Over time, as new firms enter the F500 
population, the percentages of F500 companies adopting poison pills decreased from 
nearly sixty percent in 1990 to a little over forty-six percent in 2004.  Even as more firms 
enter the Fortune 500 list, fewer new arrivals are adopting poison pills.  Further, some 
early adopters also abandon their poison pills when their initial plan lapsed.  Hence, even 
as poison pills continue to be adopted today, existing plans are abandoned, and the 
advocacy for and the resistance to the practice continue to persist over time.   Given the 
continual tension for and against the practice over time, it is reasonable to conclude that 
the degree of social acceptance of poison pills have remained relatively unchanged over 
time.  Figures 3a and 3b illustrate the frequency of poison pills adoption among F500 
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firms from 1984-2004 and the cumulative percentage of adoption by F500 firms listed 
between 1980 and 2004 respectively. 
The continuing tension between proponents and opponents of poison pills and its 
diffusion among the largest U.S. companies provides a unique opportunity to examine 
how potentially competing interests of top managers and shareholders and the social 
influences carried by institutions may influence adoption over time.  In this study, I 
examine the adoption of poison pills from its inception in 1984 to 2004.  This extends the 
observation window beyond those covered in prior studies and allows the evaluation of 
the effects of different interests and carriers of institutional influences on adoption over 
time even as its social acceptance remains essentially unchanged. 
Executive Stock Option Repricing 
The advent of corporate governance reforms in the U.S. in the last two decades 
has seen to the increased use of stock options as a key component of executive 
compensation.  Drawing on agency theory, advocates posit that executive options create a 
direct link between executive compensation and the performance of the firm, thereby 
aligning managerial interests with those of shareholders (e.g., Fama & Jensen, 1983; 
Jensen & Meckling, 1976).  In his comprehensive study of executive compensation, 
Murphy (1999) noted that the use of executive stock options exploded in the 1980s and 
1990s and is today used by most of the largest U.S. firms.  Daily and her colleagues 
(2000) reported that as many as 98 percent of the largest U.S. companies awarded stock 
options to their top managers and directors by the late 1990s.  The importance of stock 
options is further reflected by the fact that they frequently represent the largest 
component of executive compensation (Murphy, 1999), and can be as high as 55 percent 
of CEO’s compensation today (Daily, Certo, & Dalton, 2002).  While the features of 
stock options may differ in their specifics, they usually have the following characteristics: 
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(1) the terms of executive stock options are fixed at the time the options are granted, 
including the vesting schedule, the “exercise” or “strike” price, and the term of maturity; 
(2) the typical executive stock options have a vesting schedule that range from three to 
four years and they usually mature in five to ten years; and (3) the “exercise” or “strike” 
price of the stock options is frequently set at the firm’s share price on the day the options 
are granted.   
Although the terms of executive stock options are fixed on the day they are 
granted, they are sometimes changed by the firm before they mature.  This practice is 
known as stock option repricing and occurs when: (1) the exercise or strike price and/or 
the maturity term of existing option contracts are changed, such that “exercise” or 
“strike” price is lowered and maturity term is increased; or (2) existing option contracts 
are cancelled and new options with more favorable terms are reissued.  Both events are 
recognized by the Financial Accounting Standards Board (FASB) as stock option 
repricings.  Firms typically reprice their options when their share price has suffered a 
major decline such that the current market price of their shares is below the “exercise” or 
“strike” price of the executive stock options, a situation commonly described as being 
“underwater” or “out-of-the-money”.  These “underwater” or “out-of-the-money” options 
are essentially worthless.  
While firms may reprice any type of stock options they have granted, I am 
interested in the repricing of executive stock options.  Proponents of executive stock 
options repricing offer two rationales.  First, organizations, particularly young, high-
technology firms, argue that repricing is necessary to retain talented top managers.  
“Underwater” or “out-of-the-money” executive stock options will substantively affect 
executive compensation and top managers who are not adequately compensated are likely 
to leave their firms (Chidambaran & Prabhala, 2003; Daily et al., 2002; Pollock et al., 
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2002).  Second, proponent have also argue that executive stock options that are 
substantively “underwater” or “out-of-the-money” cannot continue to offer managerial 
incentives and properly align managerial interests with those of shareholders.  To realign 
managerial interests, organizations with “underwater” or “out-of-the-money” executive 
stock options must reprice them (Chidambaran & Prabhala, 2003; Daily et al., 2002; 
Pollock et al., 2002).  This rationale was offered for repricings in the late 1980s as a 
result of difficult economic conditions, epitomized by stock market crash of October 
1987.  Early repricings were therefore represented as an appropriate response to the 
agency situation brought about by sudden and severe business declines that cannot be 
attributed to top managers.    
However, executive stock option repricing has also come under severe criticism 
by shareholders, private and public interest groups, academics, and popular business 
media (Byrne, 1998; Martinez, 1998).  Critics have recognized that the managerial 
incentive rationale for repricing is weak.  They argue that by allowing executive stock 
options to be repriced, organizations essentially undermine the ability of stock option to 
function as a mechanism of managerial incentive and interest alignment (Acharya, John, 
& Sundaram, 2000; Martinez, 1998).  With executive stock option repricing, top 
managers’ down-side risk is removed, and they will profit from both positive as well as 
negative share performance.  Further, critics argue that repricing after a period of poor 
share price performance and decline in firm value is simply rewarding top managers for 
performing poorly (Byrne, 1998).  These critics argue that top managers who presided 
over their firm’s decline should be fired instead of being rewarded for their companies’ 
poor performance.  Institutional shareholders and shareholders’ interest groups, in 
particular, are very critical of this practice and regard it as a blatant example of 
managerial entrenchment and the failure of prevailing corporate governance mechanisms 
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to address the inherent agency problems.  Institutional shareholders, such as the State of 
Wisconsin Investment Board, have actively undertaken initiatives to ensure that 
executive stock option repricings do not occur without prior shareholder approval (Byrne, 
France, & Zellner, 2002).  
Preliminary data from the S&P’s EXECUCOMP database shows that executive 
stock option repricings proliferated in the 1990s.  While there are no clear accounts of 
when the practice began, executive stock option repricing is generally recognized to have 
started in the late 1980s, in response to the difficult economic conditions mentioned 
earlier.  Early versions of the practice typically involve the award of additional stock 
option grants and, to a lesser degree, the lowering of the exercise price for existing stock 
options (Gilson & Vetsuypens, 1993; Saly, 1994).  However, repricing of stock options 
was not a common executive compensation practice in the late 1980s.  The practice was 
mostly limited to extraordinary circumstances such as when firms are in financial distress 
(Gilson & Vetsuypens, 1993) or immediately after the stock market crash of October 
1987 (Saly, 1994).  The practice was initially accepted (or at least tolerated) as a 
managerial incentive strategy to retain talented top managers, especially in situations 
where any shape declines in stock prices were due to broad macroeconomic changes and 
not because of poor management.  Their applications in the late 1980s brought the 
practice to the attention of the business community who began to incorporate the practice 
into their repertoire of executive compensation practices under normal business 
conditions in the 1990s (i.e., in economic conditions where there are not huge market 
movements).  Executive stock option repricing proliferated in the early 1990s among 
small, young, and high-technology firms (Brenner et al., 2000) and continued until 1999 
when it experienced a sharp decline following changes to the FASB accounting policies 
governing executive stock option repricing.  While executive stock option repricing 
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diffused across many smaller, younger, and high-technology companies in the 1990s 
(Brenner et al., 2000; Carter & Lynch, 2001), the practice failed to diffuse among the 
population of the largest U.S. companies.  By 2000, slightly over four percent of the all 
F500 companies listed between 1980 and 2004 (i.e., only 50 unique firms adopting 63 
repricing events from over 1600 companies listed on Fortune) have done at least one 
executive stock option repricing.   
Initial assessment of executive stock option repricing shows that the practice 
failed to establish a basis of social legitimacy and acceptance among the largest U.S. 
companies over time.  Following a simplified version of Castellucci and Haunschild’s 
(2004) approach to evaluating the legitimacy of organizational practices, I conducted a 
content analysis of articles about stock option repricing in popular business media and 
reviewed actions of institutional shareholders and regulatory agencies.  Assessment of 
articles on executive stock option repricing showed that critiques of the practice increased 
steadily from the mid-1990s, with numerous articles published in popular business media 
criticizing the practice (Byrne, 1998; Byrne et al., 2002; Martinez, 1998).  These accounts 
not only highlighted criticisms from shareholders (especially institutional shareholders 
and their interest groups), but also harsh criticism by business academics (Byrne, 1998).  
Reviews of institutional shareholders’ actions also revealed that major institutional 
shareholders, like the State of Wisconsin Investment Board, have taken active initiatives 
to prevent the adoption of executive stock option repricing, including pressing companies 
to put proposals for stock option repricing up for a shareholder vote (Byrne, 1998).  
These criticisms eventually led the Financial Accounting Standards Board (FASB) to 
enact new accounting standards for stock options repricing that require organizations to 
be more responsible and accountable when they choose to reprice their options.  Further, 
throughout this period, the practice was not embrace by the established business 
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community and only a very small proportion of F500 actually adopted the practice before 
policy changes led to a shape decline in adoption after 1999.  These evidences, together 
with the few cases of repricing among F500 companies, show that while executive stock 
option repricing was accepted (or at least tolerated) as a managerial incentive strategy in 
the late 1980s, it became less socially accepted (or rather, more socially unacceptable) 
over time.  Figures 4a and 4b illustrate the frequency of executive stock option repricing 
among F500 firms from 1992-2000 and the cumulative percentage of adoption by F500 
firms listed between 1992 and 2000, respectively. 
Executive stock option repricing therefore provides a unique opportunity to 
examine how the interests of different organizational actors and the social influences 
carried by different institutional carriers will affect organizational adoption over time 
when a practice becomes more socially unacceptable.  In this study, I examine the 
adoption of executive stock option repricing from 1992 to 2000.  This period of 
observation covers the time when the practice started to proliferate until it was curtailed 
by accounting policy changes by the FASB.   
In the following sections, I present hypotheses on the main effects of interests and 
carriers of institutional influences on adoption, followed by their dynamic effects on 
adoption as the degree of social acceptance of each practice changes over time. 
EVOLVING EFFECTS OF INTERESTS ON ADOPTION  
Theories of agency (Fama & Jensen, 1983; Jensen & Meckling, 1976; Ross, 
1973), managerialism (Herman, 1981; Williamson, 1964), as well as power and politics 
(e.g., Cyert & March, 1963; March & Simon, 1958; Perrow, 1970, 1972) have argued 
that the interests of organizational actors and constituents are important determinants of 
adoption.  In particular, the role of top managers have featured prominently in prior 
research (e.g., Wade et al., 1990; Westphal & Zajac, 1994).  More recently, with the 
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growth of shareholders activism, researchers have turned their attention to the interests 
and influence of key shareholders, specifically institutional shareholders (e.g., Davis & 
Thompson, 1994; Sundaramurthy, 1996; Useem, 1996).  Drawing on prevailing theories 
on agency and power, as well as ideas on the process of institutionalization, I develop 
hypotheses about how evolving degrees of social acceptance over time will moderate the 
effects of managerial and shareholders interests on the adoption of tender offer takeovers, 
poison pills, and executive stock option repricing. 
Effects of Managerial Interests on Adoption  
Literatures on power and politics have argued that powerful top managers are 
more likely to adopt practices that will further their self-interests rather than those of 
shareholders’, unless they are properly governed by shareholders and their 
representatives or when managerial interests are properly aligned with those of 
shareholders (Eisenhardt, 1989; Fama & Jensen, 1983; Jensen & Meckling, 1976; Palmer 
et al., 1987).  Prior research has examined the relative power of top managers (e.g., 
Mallette & Fowler, 1992; Wade et al., 1990; Westphal & Zajac, 1994) and managerial 
incentive structures (e.g., Davis, 1991; Dowen et al., 1994; Sundaramurthy, 1996) on the 
adoption of different practices.  In the following sections, I develop hypotheses about the 
effects of managerial power and managerial incentives, proxied by managerial stock 
ownership, on the adoption the three practices over time. 
Managerial Power 
 Researchers who emphasize the role of power and politics in organizational 
actions recognize the important influence of powerful top managers on adoption (e.g., 
Chance et al., 2000; Malatesta & Walkling, 1988; Wade et al., 1990; Westphal & Zajac, 
1994, 1995).  Political theorists regard the organization as a competitive arena in which 
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organizational actors continually struggle for resources and dominance (Perrow, 1970; 
Pfeffer, 1981; Pfeffer & Salancik, 1978).  Adoption can therefore be understood as the 
exercise of power by dominant actors to further their self-interests (Palmer et al., 1993).  
Hence, political theorists predict that powerful top managers will be able to exploit their 
relative power and overcome any potential political and institutional barriers to adoption.  
Consequently, they are more likely to adopt practices that will bolster their power and 
further their self-interests (Perrow, 1970; Pfeffer, 1981; Pfeffer & Salancik, 1978).   
 In the case of tender offer takeovers, the relationship between managerial power 
and adoption has not been clearly identified or tested in prior studies.  Prior accounts of 
hostile takeovers, however, suggest that powerful top managers may be more likely to 
adopt tender offer takeovers (Austin & Fishman, 1970; Hirsch, 1986; Palmer et al., 
1995).  Austin and Fishman (1970) observed that tender offer takeovers may be seen as 
glamorous and intriguing corporate competitions that could potentially enhance the 
prestige and status of top managers who are successful in taking over other organizations.  
Further, by taking charge of a larger, merged organization, top managers are likely to 
gain greater employment security and also enhance their personal wealth and prestige 
(Amihud & Lev, 1981; Baumol, 1959).  Instances of hostile takeovers perpetuated by 
entrepreneurial individuals (e.g., corporate raiders like Saul Steinberg, Carl Icahn, and 
Boone Pickens) offer some anecdotal support for this observation (Hirsch, 1986; Palmer 
& Barber, 2001).  Further, in their study of hostile corporate acquisitions in the 1960s, 
Palmer and his colleagues (2001) noted that firms that engage in hostile takeovers were 
typically commanded by powerful corporate leaders.  Hence, powerful top managers may 
be more likely to adopt tender offer takeovers.        
 As for poison pills, it is argued that managerial power will be positively related to 
adoption (Davis, 1991).  Poison pills are highly effective takeover defenses and their 
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adoption will allow top managers to effectively discourage takeover attempts, strengthen 
their positions, and secure their continual employments (Davis, 1991; Dowen et al., 1994; 
Malatesta & Walkling, 1988; Mallette & Fowler, 1992; Sundaramurthy, 1996).  Given 
shareholders’ opposition to the practice, top managers may need to rely on their relative 
power to surmount any potential resistance to adoption.  Powerful top managers may 
therefore be more likely to adopt poison pills. 
 In the case of executive stock option repricing, it is also argued that managerial 
power will be positively related to adoption.  Given that stock options make up a 
substantive portion of executive compensation, “underwater” or “out-of-the-money” 
stock options (which are essentially worthless) will drastically reduce an executive’s 
compensation (Daily et al., 2002; Murphy, 1999).  It is therefore in top managers’ self-
interests to reprice their stock options should these become “underwater” or “out-of-the-
money” (Pollock et al., 2002).  Given the active opposition to executive stock option 
repricing by shareholders and their interest groups (Byrne, 1998; Martinez, 1998), it is 
argued that powerful top managers are more likely to overcome opposition and reprice 
their stock options.  Hence, I hypothesize that, 
Hypothesis 1a / b / c (H1a/b/c): The greater the level of managerial power, the 
higher the likelihood a firm will adopt practices that will further managerial self-
interests (e.g., tender offer takeovers, poison pills, and executive stock option 
repricing).   
 Political theorists, however, have paid little attention to how managerial power 
will affect adoption over time.  In prior research, powerful top managers are assumed to 
be able and willing to exercise their power any time (e.g., Palmer et al., 1987; Wade et 
al., 1990), even though researchers, like Pfeffer and Salancik (1978) have argued that 
actors’ interests and their ability to enact them are likely to change over time.  This is 
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because managerial power is jointly determined by managerial, organizational, as well as 
environmental characteristics (Hambrick & Finkelstein, 1987; Pfeffer & Salancik, 1978); 
and environmental characteristics, in particular, are likely to change over time, and 
consequently, will influence managerial power and its effects on adoption (Dacin et al., 
2002; Tolbert & Zucker, 1996).  Given that the degrees of social acceptance for the three 
practices change in different ways over time, it is reasonable to predict that the effects of 
managerial power on adoption for each practice will correspondingly change in different 
ways over time. 
In the case of tender offer takeovers, as the practice becomes more socially 
accepted over time, the effect of managerial power on adoption is likely to decrease.  As 
Tolbert and Zucker (1983; 1996) explained in the process of institutionalization, early 
adoptions are strongly influenced by political forces that make organizations more or less 
open to the proposed change (March & Simon, 1958; Palmer et al., 1987).  This is 
because early in the diffusion process, the absence of any social consensus on the 
appropriateness of a new practice makes the adoption decision a highly political process.  
Powerful top managers are therefore in a better position to overcome political barriers to 
adoption and adopt practices that are likely to further their self-interests.  As such, 
managerial power will have important effects on early adoption when the practice is not 
socially accepted.  However, as tender offer takeovers acquire objective meaning of 
appropriateness over time, adoption decisions become less political and the effects of 
managerial power on adoption will decline (DiMaggio & Powell, 1983; Tolbert & 
Zucker, 1996).  Consistent with the concept of institutionalization (Tolbert & Zucker, 
1983, 1996), as tender offer takeovers become more socially accepted and an institutional 
rationale for adoption is developed over time, political barriers to adoption will decrease, 
and in turn, the need to exercise power will decline.  Consequently, this will lead to fewer 
 72
power effects as managerial power becomes less important in the adoption decision of 
socially accepted practices.    
In the case of poison pills, given that the social acceptance for the practice 
remains relatively unchanged over time, the effect of managerial power on adoption is 
likely to remain stable.  As Tolbert and Zucker (1983; 1996) explained, if a practice fails 
to become more institutionalized over time, then managerial power that determined early 
adoptions is likely to continue to predict adoption over time.  This is because in the 
absence of any emerging social consensus about the appropriateness of the practice, 
adoption decisions will remain highly political and adoption decisions will continue to be 
strongly influenced by political forces that make organizations more or less open to the 
proposed change.   
As for executive stock option repricing, as the practice becomes socially 
unacceptable over time, the effect of managerial power on adoption is likely to increase.  
Early in the diffusion cycle, when the practice is accepted (or at least, tolerated) as an 
incentive strategy towards retaining talented top managers, adoption decisions are less 
political and managerial power is less likely to be important in adoption decisions.  
However, as the practice becomes socially unacceptable over time, adoption decisions 
become more political in nature and top managers who wish to adopt the practice later in 
the diffusion cycle must rely heavily on their relative power to overcome any political 
and/or institutional opposition to the practice.  As such, the effects of managerial power 
on adoption will increase over time.  Hence, I hypothesize that, 
Hypothesis 2a / b / c (H2a/b/c): Over time, the strength of the relationship between 
managerial power and adoption (a) decreases for practices that become more 
socially accepted (e.g., tender offer takeovers), (b) is stable for practices that do not 
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change in social acceptance (e.g., poison pills), and (c) increases for practices that 
become less socially accepted (e.g. executive stock option repricing). 
Managerial Incentives – Managerial Stock Ownership 
Agency theorists see the separation of ownership and control in large, publicly-traded 
corporations as a root cause of agency problems (Berle & Means, 1932; Fama & Jensen, 
1983; Jensen & Meckling, 1976).  With little ownership in the firm, top managers cannot 
enjoy the wealth benefits of their actions and consequently, their interests are likely to 
deviate from those of shareholders.  To realign the interests of top managers with those of 
shareholders, agency theorists suggest that managerial incentives should be structured so 
that top managers can share in the long term performance of the firm.  In particular, 
higher levels of managerial stock ownership is seen as an effective mechanism that will 
realign the interests of top managers with those of shareholders (Eisenhardt, 1989; Jensen 
& Meckling, 1976).  More specifically, Murphy and Jensen (Jensen & Murphy, 1990; 
Murphy, 1999) argued that managerial stock ownership is a good indicator of managerial 
incentives and the severity of agency problems in organizations.  In their study, they 
observed that CEO’s stock ownership is likely to affect managerial self-seeking 
behaviors such that an increase in ownership level reduces the level of CEO’s perquisite 
compensation.  By allowing top managers to share in the wealth benefits of their 
decisions, stock ownership offers proper incentives and will realign the interests of top 
managers with those of shareholders.  Hence, agency theorists argued that higher levels 
of managerial stock ownership will make it less likely that top managers will adopt 
practices that are likely to be detrimental to shareholders’ interests.   
   In the case of tender offer takeovers, the relationship between managerial 
incentives and adoption has not been clearly identified or tested in prior studies.  
However, prior studies on corporate acquisitions (e.g., Amihud & Lev, 1981) suggest that 
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managerial incentives is likely to be negatively related to adoption of tender offer 
takeovers.  Amihud and Lev (1981) observed that corporate acquisitions are likely to be 
motivated by managerial motives rather than efficiency concerns that will benefit the 
organization and its shareholders.  Schnitzer (1996) observed that tender offer takeovers 
are generally more costly, less likely to be successful, and take much longer to complete 
when compared to friendly mergers.  Hence, when managerial interests are not properly 
aligned with those of shareholders’, through higher levels of stock ownership, top 
managers may be likely to engage in tender offer takeovers as a means to further their 
self-interests even if it is at the expense of shareholders.    
 In the case of poison pills, it is also argued that managerial incentives will be 
negatively related to adoption.  Poison pills are highly restrictive and effective takeover 
defenses (Malatesta & Walkling, 1988).  When adopted, they can effectively prevent 
takeover attempts and deny shareholders their rights to freely sell their shares for 
substantive returns (Davis, 1991; Dowen et al., 1994).  At the same time, poison pills 
strengthen the positions of top managers by sheltering them from the disciplinary effects 
of the external market for corporate control (Fama, 1980; Fama & Jensen, 1983; Jensen, 
1988).  Hence, unless managerial interests are aligned with those of shareholders’, 
through higher levels of stock ownership, top managers are likely to adopt poison pills 
(Davis, 1991). 
 In the case of executive stock option repricing, it is also argued that managerial 
incentives will be negatively related to adoption.  Given that “out-of-the-money” or 
“underwater” stock options are essentially worthless, it is in the self-interests of top 
managers to reprice their stock options to improve their compensations (Brenner et al., 
2000; Pollock et al., 2002).  However, when top managers are provided with proper 
 75
incentives, their interests are not likely to diverge from those of shareholders’, and they 
are less likely to adopt executive stock option repricing.  Hence, I hypothesize that, 
Hypothesis 3a / b / c (H3a/b/c/): The greater the level of managerial stock 
ownership, the lower the likelihood a firm will adopt practices that will further 
managerial self-interests (e.g., tender offer takeovers, poison pills, and executive 
stock option repricing).   
 Agency theorists, again, have paid little attention to how managerial incentives 
will affect adoption over time.  Extant studies are implicitly static.  Managerial interests 
are either aligned or not; and once aligned, top managers are expected to take actions that 
are consistent with the interests of shareholders all the time.  However, this assumption is 
not reasonable as the interests of social actors are likely to be influenced by changes in 
the institutional environment (Barley & Tolbert, 1997; Tolbert & Zucker, 1983, 1996).  
Given that the degrees of social acceptance for the three practices change in different 
ways over time, it is reasonable to expect the effects of managerial incentives on adoption 
for each practice to change in different ways over time. 
 In the case of tender offer takeovers, as the practice becomes more socially 
accepted over time, the effect of managerial incentives on adoption is likely to decrease.  
According to Tolbert and Zucker (1983, 1996), at the onset of the diffusion process, 
adoptions of the new practices are largely the result of independent organizational 
activities that make an innovation attractive for adoption.  These would include 
managerial incentives that align managerial interests with those of shareholders.  Hence, 
early on when social acceptance for tender offer takeovers is low, top managers can be 
expected to evaluate and make adoption decisions based on the degree to which their 
interests are aligned with those of shareholders.  However, as the practice becomes more 
socially accepted over time, adoption decisions are more likely to be driven by the 
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emerging positive social consensus and less likely to be influenced by the deliberate 
evaluations of managerial interests and incentives.  Consequently, adoptions in the later 
stages of the diffusion cycle are less likely to be explained by managerial stock 
ownership.     
In the case of poison pills, given that the social acceptance for the practice 
remains relatively unchanged over time, the effect of managerial incentives on adoption 
is likely to remain stable.  When the practice fails to become more socially accepted over 
time, then managerial incentives which are important in early adoption decisions are 
likely to still influence later adoptions.  This is because in the absence of any emerging 
social consensus about the appropriateness of the practice, adoption decisions will 
continue to be driven by organizational characteristics that make a practice attractive for 
adoption, including the degrees to which managerial interests are aligned to those of 
shareholders’ through managerial stock ownership.  Hence, the effects of managerial 
incentives on adoption will remain stable over time. 
As for executive stock option repricing, as the practice becomes clearly 
unacceptable over time, the effect of managerial incentives on adoption is likely to 
increase.  Early in the diffusion cycle, when the practice is accepted (or at least, tolerated) 
as an incentive strategy, adoption decisions are less likely to be driven by the independent 
activities of organizations that make the practice more or less attractive to top managers, 
including managerial incentives.  However, as the practice becomes socially unacceptable 
over time, the degree to which managerial incentives are properly aligned with those of 
shareholders will become more important in adoption decisions.  As such, the effects of 
managerial incentives on adoption will become particularly strong later on.  Hence, I 
hypothesize that, 
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Hypothesis 4a / b / c (H4a/b/c): Over time, the strength of the relationship between 
managerial incentives and adoption (a) decreases for practices that become more 
socially accepted (e.g., tender offer takeovers), (b) is stable for practices that do not 
change in social acceptance (e.g., poison pills), and (c) increases for practices that 
become less socially accepted (e.g. executive stock option repricing). 
Effects of Shareholders’ Interests on Adoption  
With the structural transformation of American corporations in the wake of the 
1980s corporate takeover wave, the influence of shareholders interests on organizational 
actions has attracted much attention (Davis & Stout, 1992; Fligstein, 1990, 1991; Useem, 
1996).  In particular, the role of institutional shareholders in corporate governance has 
featured prominently in recent studies (David et al., 1998; Davis, 1991; Davis & Greve, 
1997; Davis & Thompson, 1994; Mallette & Fowler, 1992; Palmer et al., 1993; Porac et 
al., 1999; Sundaramurthy, 2000). 
Institutional Shareholders’ Influence – Institutional Ownership 
Agency and political theorists believe that shareholders’ interests will prevail over 
managerial self-interests only when shareholders have the ability to govern managerial 
actions (Fama & Jensen, 1983; Jensen & Meckling, 1976; Palmer et al., 1987).  In 
organizational research, institutional shareholders are observed to have both the 
motivation as well as the ability to exert their influence on top managers, and thereby, 
safeguard their self-interests (David et al., 1998; Sundaramurthy, 1996).  Drawing on 
agency and power arguments, researchers posit that institutional shareholders influence, 
proxied by institutional stock ownership, will be negatively related to the adoption of 
practices that are likely to compromise shareholders’ interests (e.g., David et al., 1998; 
Davis & Thompson, 1994; Mallette & Fowler, 1992; Porac et al., 1999; Sundaramurthy, 
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2000).  This is because institutional shareholders with higher proportion of stock 
ownership will be able to exercise greater influence over top managers and prevent them 
from adopting practices that are likely to compromise shareholders’ interests.   
In the case of tender offer takeovers, institutional shareholders’ preferences has 
not been clearly identified or tested in prior studies (Davis & Stout, 1992).  However, it is 
reasonable to assume that shareholders may be less likely to prefer tender offer takeovers 
to other corporate acquisition strategies.  This is because tender offer takeovers, when 
compared to friendly mergers, are generally more costly, less likely to be successful, and 
take much longer to complete (Schnitzer, 1996).  Further, shareholders recognize that 
corporate acquisitions, including tender offer takeovers, may be driven by managerial 
self-interests rather then efficiency considerations that will advance shareholders’ wealth 
and value (Amihud & Lev, 1981).  As such, institutional shareholders are likely to be 
wary of tender offer takeovers.  Hence, it is reasonable to argue that institutional 
shareholders influence will be negatively related to the adoption of tender offer 
takeovers.   
In the case of poison pills, prior studies have argued that institutional shareholders 
influence will be negatively related to adoption.  Poison pills are highly effective 
takeover defenses and their adoptions are often seen as attempts by top managers to 
entrench their positions and further their self-interests at the expense of shareholders’ 
interests (Davis, 1991; Dowen et al., 1994; Malatesta & Walkling, 1988; Mallette & 
Fowler, 1992; Sundaramurthy, 1996).  As such, poison pills are actively opposed by 
institutional shareholders and shareholders interests groups (McGurn, 2001; Velasco, 
2002).  For example, institutional shareholders like the College Retirement Equity Fund 
have actively opposed the adoption of poisons pills (Davis, 1991).  Drawing on agency 
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arguments, researchers propose that organizations with powerful institutional 
shareholders are less likely to adopt poison pills. 
 As for executive stock option repricing, consistent with theory of power and 
politics (Perrow, 1972), institutional shareholders’ influence is likely to be negatively 
related to adoption.  Shareholders have been highly critical of executive stock option 
repricing.  They believe that repricing executive stock options merely reward top 
managers for their failures (Byrne, 1998; Martinez, 1998).  Powerful institutional 
shareholders are therefore in a better position to monitor and govern managerial actions 
and prevent the adoption of executive stock option repricing (Pollock et al., 2002).  
Hence, I hypothesize that, 
Hypothesis 5a / b / c (H5a/b/c): The greater the level of institutional shareholder 
influence, the lower the likelihood a firm will adopt practices that will further 
managerial self-interests (e.g., tender offer takeovers, poison pills, and executive 
stock option repricing).  
 Again, the ways in which institutional shareholders might affect adoption over 
time has received little attention.  In prior research, the ability of powerful institutional 
shareholders to exercise their influence and safeguard their self-interests is assumed to be 
stable over time.  This assumption is not reasonable as changes in the environment are 
likely to affect the institutional shareholders’ interests as well as their relative power with 
top managers (Hambrick & Finkelstein, 1987; Tolbert & Zucker, 1996).  Given that the 
degrees of social acceptance of the three practices change in different ways over time, it 
is reasonable to expect the effects of institutional shareholders influence on adoption to 
correspondingly change differently over time. 
 In the case of tender offer takeovers, as the practice becomes more socially 
accepted over time, the effect of institutional shareholders influence on adoption is likely 
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to decrease.  As Tolbert and Zucker (1983; 1996) explained, in the absence of any social 
consensus about the appropriateness of a practice, early adoptions are strongly influenced 
by political forces that make organizations more or less open to the proposed change 
(Cyert & March, 1963; March & Olsen, 1975; Pfeffer, 1981).  Hence, early in the 
diffusion cycle, adoption decisions are likely to be determined by the relative power 
between top managers and shareholders and powerful institutional shareholders will be in 
a better position to intervene and prevent the adoption of tender offer takeovers.  
However, as tender offer takeovers become more socially accepted and an institutional 
rationale for adoption is developed over time, the basis on which institutional 
shareholders are able to resist its adoption is likely to be weakened.  Top managers are 
able to draw on the logic of appropriateness to justify their decisions to adopt tender offer 
takeovers (March & Olsen, 1984).  As such, institutional shareholders’ influence 
becomes less important in adoption decisions over time as the practice becomes more 
socially accepted. 
In the case of poison pills, given that the social acceptance for the practice 
remains relatively unchanged over time, the effect of institutional shareholders influence 
on adoption is likely to remain stable.  As Tolbert and Zucker (1983; 1996) explained, 
when a practice fails to become more socially accepted over time, then the relative power 
of shareholder that influence early adoption is likely to continue to predict adoption over 
time.  This is because in the absence of any emerging social consensus about the 
appropriateness of the practice, adoption decisions will remain highly political.  Hence, 
the effects of institutional shareholders influence on adoption will remain stable over 
time. 
As for executive stock option repricing, as the practice becomes socially 
unacceptable over time, the effect of institutional shareholders influence on adoption is 
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likely to increase.  Early in the diffusion cycle, when the practice is accepted (or at least, 
tolerated) as an incentive strategy towards retaining talented top managers, adoption 
decisions are less political and institutional shareholders are less likely exert their 
influence on adoption decisions.  However, as social resistance to the practice grows, 
adoption decisions will become more political and institutional shareholders will have 
greater incentives to exercise their influence to resist the practice.  Further, they can rely 
on the decreasing social acceptance to muster greater opposition against the practice.  
Consequently, the effect of institutional shareholders’ influence on adoption will become 
more important over time as it become more socially unacceptable.  Hence, I hypothesize 
that, 
Hypothesis 6a / b / c (H6a/b/c): The strength of the relationship between 
institutional shareholder influence and adoption (a) decreases for practices that 
become more socially accepted (e.g., tender offer takeovers), (b) is stable for 
practices that do not change in social acceptance (e.g., poison pills), and (c) 
increases for practices that become less socially accepted (e.g. executive stock 
option repricing). 
EVOLVING EFFECTS OF CARRIERS OF INSTITUTIONAL INFLUENCE ON ADOPTION  
Institutional theory emphasizes the role of social norms and legitimacy in driving 
organizations, and the individuals in them, to adopt practices that are deemed socially 
appropriate or regarded as the routine way of doing things (DiMaggio & Powell, 1983; 
Scott, 2001).  By adopting institutionalized practices, an organization can demonstrate 
that it is adhering to socially valued norms and expectations (Meyer & Rowan, 1977; 
Scott, 2001; Tolbert & Zucker, 1983).  Building on the ideas of institutionalization and 
interorganizational networks, I develop hypotheses about how evolving degrees of social 
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acceptance over time will moderate the effects of carriers of institutional influences on 
the adoption of tender offer takeovers, poison pills, and executive stock option repricing. 
Effects of Relational Carriers on Adoption  
 Institutional theory (DiMaggio & Powell, 1983; Meyer & Rowan, 1977; Zucker, 
1977), network theory (Burt, 1987; Freeman, 1977), and the literature on diffusion of 
innovation (Coleman et al., 1966; Rogers, 2003; Ryan & Gross, 1943) have emphasized 
the role of relational carriers of social influences on adoption.  These literatures suggest 
that social information and normative values transmitted through relational ties to prior 
adopters will influence the likelihood of subsequent adoptions.   
Social Ties – Board Interlocks to Prior Adopters 
 Institutional and network theorists see the social network of interlocking 
directorates among the largest U.S. companies as an important institutional carrier of 
social information, norms, and legitimacy (Davis, 1991; Mizruchi, 1996; Scott, 2001), 
and consequently, an important determinant of adoption.  When top managers are 
required to make decisions about the adoption of a practice, they are likely to turn to 
others who have prior experience with the practice (Coleman et al., 1966).  Through such 
social interactions, top managers will acquire social information about the practice and 
form a normative understanding of its usefulness and/or appropriateness in the prevailing 
social context (Burt, 1987).  While there may be other sources of information, it is often 
the information offered by direct, strong, or embedded ties that is most likely to be 
received, trusted, and acted upon (Uzzi, 1997).  In particular, institutional and network 
researchers have focused on the formal ties among top executives established through 
corporate board interlocks.  Prior studies have shown that corporate board interlocks are 
effective channels through which the exchange of information as well as social 
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expectations are transmitted (Davis, 1991; Haunschild, 1993; Mizruchi, 1996; Westphal 
et al., 1997).  When top managers and directors of an organization are highly 
interconnected to organizations that have adopted a practice, then it is likely that the 
organization will also come to see the practice as an appropriate behavior and adopt the 
same practice for itself.   
 In the case of tender offer takeovers, it is argued that social ties to prior adopters 
will be positively related to adoption.  Tender offer takeover is a complex and 
contentious corporate acquisition strategy.  To decide on its adoption, an organization is 
likely to turn to others who have prior experience with the practice (Coleman et al., 
1966).  Relational ties to prior adopters is therefore an important source of social 
information and influence (Burt, 1987; Coleman et al., 1966; Scott, 2001).  Through 
frequent and empathic interactions with prior adopters, top managers are likely to acquire 
useful information about tender offer takeovers and learn about its social appropriateness 
among other corporate leaders (Burt, 1987).  The more an organization is exposed to 
tender offer takeovers through its board interlocks, the more likely it will learn about the 
practice and come to see it as an appropriate approach to corporate acquisition 
(Castellucci & Haunschild, 2004).  Consequently, the higher the number of prior 
adoptions by interlocked firms, the more likely a firm will also adopt the practice for 
itself.   
 In the case of poison pills, it is again argued that social ties to prior adopters will 
be positively related to adoption.  Poison pills are complicated anti-takeover defense that 
are favored by top managers but opposed by shareholders (McGurn, 2001; Velasco, 
2002).  As Davis (1991) explained, relational ties to prior adopters of poison pills create 
the opportunity for top managers to learn vicariously from the experiences of others.  
Further, the more a firm is connected to others who have adopted poison pills, the more 
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likely it will come to see the practice as an appropriate anti-takeover defense mechanism, 
and thereby, more likely to adopt the same practice.   
 In the case of executive stock option repricing, it is also argued that social ties to 
prior adopters will be positively related to adoption.  Given criticisms over the social 
legitimacy of executive stock option repricing, top managers are likely to turn to others 
who have prior experience with the practice (Coleman et al., 1966).  A firm that is highly 
connected to other firms that have repriced their stock option is likely to perceive the 
practice as socially accepted, or at least, use this as a justification for adopting the 
practice.  It is therefore likely that social ties to prior adopters will be positively related to 
the adoption of executive stock option repricing.  Hence, consistent with the arguments 
presented in earlier studies by Davis (1991) and Castellucci & Haunschild (2004), I 
hypothesized that, 
Hypothesis 7a / b / c (H7a/b/c): The greater the number of social ties to prior 
adopters, the higher the likelihood a firm will adopt the same practice (e.g., tender 
offer takeovers, poison pills, and executive stock option repricing).  
 While researchers recognize that institutional influences are likely to change over 
time (Barley & Tolbert, 1997; Tolbert & Zucker, 1983, 1996), prior research has paid 
little attention to this possibility (for exceptions, see Castellucci & Haunschild, 2004; 
Young et al., 2001).  Implicit in the ideas on institutionalization is that carriers of 
institutional isomorphism should become increasingly influential predictors of adoption 
over time when a practice becomes progressively legitimated and institutionalized 
(Tolbert & Zucker, 1983, 1996).  Early in the diffusion process, the absence of any social 
consensus regarding a practice makes social ties less effective as conduits of social 
influence.  When the practice is not socially accepted, social actors are not likely to 
openly talk about it.  Further, prior adoptions by social ties will contradict the prevailing 
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social attitude and firms are not likely to attend to and rely on these actions in their 
adoption decisions.  However, when social acceptance for the practice increases, prior 
adoptions by social ties will validate the emerging social attitude and the force of the 
social influence carried by these actions will be strengthen.  As the practice is more 
openly discussed among social actors, social information becomes more salient, more 
effectively communicated, and more likely to be relied upon by others in their adoption 
decisions.  Given that the degrees of social acceptance for the three practices change in 
different ways over time, it is likely that the effects of social ties on adoption for each 
practice will correspondingly change in different ways over time. 
In the case of tender offer takeovers, as the practice becomes more socially 
accepted over time, the effect of social ties to prior adopters on adoption is likely to 
increase.  As Tolbert and Zucker (1996, p. 181) explained, while organizations may draw 
on the information obtained through their social ties and imitate the behaviors of firms 
they are connected to in the early stages of diffusion, there will be “little sense of the 
necessity of this among organizational decision-makers, since there is no consensus on 
the general utility of the innovation”.  It is only when tender offer takeovers have become 
more socially accepted as an appropriate strategy to corporate acquisitions over time that 
social ties to prior adopters are likely to serve as effective conduits for social information 
and influence.  This is because prior adoptions by interlocked firms will validate the 
social consensus regarding the practice and the force of the social influence carried by 
these actions will be strengthened.  Further, when the practice becomes more socially 
accepted, it will be more openly discussed among top managers and directors.  This will 
make the practice and its related information more salient and more likely to be 
effectively communicated through the board interlock network.  Organizations are 
therefore more likely to attend to and rely on the social information and influences 
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communicated through their social ties.  As such, social ties to prior adopters will become 
more important in adoption decisions of tender offer takeovers over time. 
In the case of poison pills, given that the social acceptance for the practice 
remains relatively unchanged over time, the effect of social ties to prior adopters on 
adoption is likely to remain stable.  In the absence of any consensus regarding the social 
acceptance of the practice, the effectiveness of social ties to prior adopters as conduits of 
social information and influence will not change.  Consequently, the effects of social ties 
on adoption will remain stable over time. 
As for executive stock option repricing, as the practice becomes socially 
unacceptable over time, the effect of social ties to prior adopters on adoption is likely to 
decrease.  Early in the diffusion cycle, when the practice is accepted (or at least, 
tolerated) as an incentive strategy, adoption decisions are more likely to be influenced by 
the prior adoption of social ties because top managers and directors are more likely to 
openly talk about the practice.  This will make the practice and its related information 
more salient and more likely to be effectively communicated through the board interlock 
network.  As such, prior adoptions by interlocked firms are more likely to convey social 
information and influence that will subsequently affect adoption. However, as the 
practice becomes more socially unacceptable over time, top managers and directors are 
less likely to openly talk about the practice.  The practice become less salient within the 
social network and information about it is less effectively communicated since such prior 
adoptions by interlocked firms will contradict the existing social attitude.  As such, 
organizations are less likely to rely on the information communicated through these 
actions.  In the face of decreasing social acceptance, prior adoptions by social ties will 
not carry much, if any, social influence. Consequently, social ties to prior adopters 
become less important in adoption decisions over time.  Hence, I hypothesize that, 
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Hypothesis 8a / b / c (H8a/b/c): The strength of the relationship between social ties 
to prior adopters and adoption (a) increases for practices that become more socially 
accepted (e.g., tender offer takeovers), (b) is stable for practices that do not change 
in social acceptance (e.g., poison pills), and (c) decreases for practices that become 
less socially accepted (e.g. executive stock option repricing). 
Effects of Symbolic Carriers on Adoption  
Research defined within institutional and network theory has also emphasized the 
role of symbolic carriers of institutional isomorphism on adoption (Burt, 1987; Davis, 
1991; DiMaggio & Powell, 1983).  As Scott (2003, p. 882) explained, symbolic carriers 
of institutional isomorphism include “various types of symbolic schemata into which 
meaningful information is coded and conveyed.”  These literatures suggest that symbolic 
understanding of social information, carried by the actions of other actors in the absence 
of relational ties, will also influence the likelihood of adoption.  More specifically, they 
argue that the greater a firm’s exposure to institutional pressures carried through the 
symbolic actions of others, the more likely the firm will adopt the same practices because 
the practice have become recognized as socially appropriate or the routine way of do 
things within the social system (DiMaggio & Powell, 1983; Strang & Meyer, 1993).   
Prestigious Endorsement 
 Institutional isomorphism has also been shown to be carried by prestigious 
endorsement that occurs when high-status, well-respected, and successful organizations 
adopt a practice.  DiMaggio and Powell (1983) argued that in situations of uncertainty, 
organizations are likely to imitate the behaviors of organizations that they perceived to be 
more prestigious, legitimate, and successful (Burns & Wholey, 1993; Davis & Greve, 
1997).  The adoption of a practice by a prestigious firm offers a legitimating account or 
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endorsement for the practice and this is likely to contribute to its diffusion across a social 
system (Coleman et al., 1966; Loh & Venkatraman, 1992; Rogers, 2003; Strang & 
Meyer, 1993).  Through these actions, an organization develops an understanding about 
the perceived usefulness and/or social appropriateness of organizational practices, and in 
turn, makes its own decisions to adopt based on these socially-constructed 
understandings.  Prior adoptions by prestigious firms are likely to affect adoption because 
prestigious firms that have adopted a practice may actively endorse the practice as part of 
their effort to manage impressions and enhance their social status. Also, less prestigious 
firms are likely to be influenced by the prior actions of prestigious firms because they try 
to emulate these firms in the hope of achieving the same level of prestige as these high-
status firms (Burns & Wholey, 1993).  Hence, prior adoptions by prestigious firms are 
likely to communicate to other firms that a practice is normatively appropriate, or at least 
socially acceptable, and this is likely to increase the likelihood that other firms will also 
adopt the same practices for themselves.   
 In the case of tender offer takeovers, it is argued that prestigious endorsement will 
be positively related to adoption.  Initially regarded as a deviant and illegitimate approach 
to corporate acquisition, the adoption of tender offer takeovers by prestigious firms can 
provide an important endorsement for this acquisition strategy.  By observing the 
incidence of tender offer takeovers engaged by prestigious firms, an organization can 
learn about the appropriateness of this practice as perceived by corporate elites in the 
U.S. economy.  The historical account of hostile takeovers presented by Hirsch (1986) 
provides some support for this argument.  When large and established firms in the oil and 
tobacco industry began to adopt hostile takeovers in the late 1970s, other companies in 
the established business community started to adopt the practice for themselves.  Hence, 
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as the number of tender offer takeovers adopted by prestigious firms increase, other 
organizations may be more likely to adopt the practice for themselves.   
 In the case of poison pills, it is also argued that prestigious endorsement will be 
positively related to adoption.  No prior studies have directly examined the influence of 
prestigious endorsement on the adoption of poison pills.  However, as Davis (1991) 
suggested, organizations will try to learn vicariously from the experiences of others when 
they need to make decisions under uncertainty.  Further, as DiMaggio and Powell (1983) 
argued, organizations are likely to look towards the behaviors of organizations that they 
perceived to be more prestigious.  Given the potential agency issues surrounding poison 
pills, organizations are likely to look at the prior actions of prestigious firms to gain 
greater understanding about practice.  Hence, the adoptions of poison pills by prestigious 
firms are likely to communicate important social information and influences, and 
consequently, encourage other firms to adopt the practice for themselves.   
 In the case of executive stock option repricing, it is again argued that prestigious 
endorsement will be positively related to adoption, even though no prior studies have 
examined its effect on adoption.  Executive stock option repricing is a controversial 
practice that is shrouded with agency issues.  Organizations that are concerned with its 
appropriateness will likely turn to the actions of other firms for reference.  In particular, 
the actions undertaken by prestigious firms are likely to attract attention in situations of 
uncertainty (DiMaggio & Powell, 1983).  Hence, it is reasonable to expect a firm to be 
more likely to adopt executive stock option repricings when prestigious firms have 
already adopted the practice.  Hence, I hypothesize that, 
Hypothesis 9a / b / c (H9a/b/c): The greater the level of prestigious endorsement, 
the higher the likelihood a firm will adopt the same practice (e.g., tender offer 
takeovers, poison pills, and executive stock option repricing).  
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The temporal effects of prestigious endorsement on adoption are again not well 
articulated, even though researchers recognize that the effects of carriers of institutional 
influences, like prestigious endorsements, are likely to change over time (Barley & 
Tolbert, 1997; Tolbert & Zucker, 1983, 1996).  As explained earlier, carriers of 
institutional isomorphism are likely to become increasingly important predictors of 
adoption over time as a practice becomes progressively legitimated and institutionalized 
(Tolbert & Zucker, 1983, 1996).  When social consensus concerning the appropriateness 
of a practice emerges, prior adoptions by prestigious others are likely to become more 
effective conduits of social influences and thereby exert greater influence on adoption.  
This is because early adoptions by prestigious firms, while contributing to the 
institutionalization process, are not likely to carry much social influence on the adoption 
behaviors of other firms in the absence of any consensus about the social acceptance of 
the practice.  While researchers have observed that the adoption of a new practice by 
prestigious firms may endorse the practice and contribute to its diffusion within a social 
system (Coleman et al., 1966; Loh & Venkatraman, 1992; Strang & Meyer, 1993), there 
is little sense in imitating the actions of these firms when the practice has not yet attained 
wide social acceptance (Tolbert & Zucker, 1996).  This is because firms with lower status 
are likely to be more dependent on their environment for critical resources and are 
therefore less willing and/or able to imitate the actions of prestigious firms when these 
actions are not social accepted by their key constituents.  However, when a practice 
becomes more socially accepted, the prior actions of prestigious firms will serve to 
validate and endorse a practice and lower status firms will become more responsive to the 
actions of these firms, as they aspire to attain the same level of prestige, and can use such 
prior adoptions to support their own adoptions (Burns & Wholey, 1993; Fombrun & 
Shanley, 1990).  Hence, low status firms are more likely to attend to and emulate the 
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adoption behaviors of prestigious firms as the practice becomes more socially accepted.  
Given that the degrees of social acceptance for the three practices change in different 
ways over time, it is reasonable to expect the effects of prestigious endorsement on 
adoption for each practice to correspondingly change in different ways over time. 
In the case of tender offer takeovers, as the practice becomes more socially 
accepted over time, the effect of prestigious endorsement on adoption is likely to 
increase.  Early in the diffusion cycle when social acceptance is low, prior adoptions by 
prestigious others are not likely to carry much social influence as these actions contradict 
the prevailing social attitude.  As such, other firms are less likely to attend to and rely 
upon these actions in their adoption decisions since their constituents are likely to object 
to the practice.  Firms with lower status will therefore be less willing or able to imitate 
the prior adoption of prestigious firms when the practice is not socially accepted.  
However, as the practice begins to develop some degree of social acceptance, then social 
influence communicated by the prior adoptions of prestigious firms will become stronger 
since they validate and reaffirm the emerging social consensus.  Consequently, prior 
adoptions by prestigious firms are more likely to be attended to and rely upon by other 
lower status firms in their adoption decisions.  This is because when there is a general 
consensus that the practice is appropriate, prior adoptions by prestigious firms validates 
the emerging social consensus and the force of the social influence carried by these 
actions will be strengthened.  Hence, the social influence carried by prestigious 
endorsement is argued to build up over time, concomitant with increasing social 
acceptance of the practice, and will positively influence adoption over time. 
In the case of poison pills, given that the social acceptance for the practice 
remains relatively unchanged over time, the effects of prestigious endorsement on 
adoption are likely to remain stable.  In the absence of any consensus regarding the social 
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acceptance of the practice, the effectiveness of prior adoptions by prestigious firms as 
conduits of social information and influence will not change.  Consequently, the effects 
of prestigious endorsement on adoption will remain stable over time. 
As for executive stock option repricing, as social acceptance of the practice 
decreases over time, the effects of prestigious endorsement on adoption will decrease.  
Early in the diffusion cycle, when the practice is accepted (or at least tolerated) as an 
incentive strategy, adoptions are more likely to be influenced by the prior adoption of 
prestigious firms since these actions serve to validate the prevailing social attitude 
towards the practice.  However, as the practice becomes less socially accepted over time, 
prior adoptions by prestigious firms will become less effective conduits of social 
information and influence.  This is because these prior adoptions will appear to contradict 
the emerging negative social attitude towards the practice and organizations will be less 
likely to rely on the information communicated by these actions.   This is because firms 
with lower status may be less willing and able to imitate the actions of such large, 
successful firms when the practice is not socially accepted and regarded as illegitimate.  
In the face of decreasing social acceptance, prior adoptions by prestigious firm may not 
carry much, if any, social influence. Consequently, prior adoptions by prestigious firm 
will become less important in adoption decisions over time.  Hence, I hypothesize that, 
Hypothesis 10a / b / c (H10a/b/c): The strength of the relationship between 
prestigious endorsements and adoption (a) increases for practices that become 
more socially accepted (e.g., tender offer takeovers), (b) is stable for practices that 
do not change in social acceptance (e.g., poison pills), and (c) decreases for 
practices that become less socially accepted (e.g. executive stock option repricing). 
In this chapter, I have developed dynamic hypotheses about the effects of interests 
and carriers of institutional influences on adoption across three practices that have 
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become varyingly diffused and socially accepted over time.  In the following chapter, I 




CHAPTER FOUR:  RESEARCH METHODOLOGY AND RESULTS 
In this chapter, I describe the research design and methods used in this study and 
present the results of my analyses.  First, I explain the sampling technique used and 
describe the samples for each practice.  Second, I describe the data sources from which 
information on the three practices and the sampled firms are collected.  Third, I describe 
the measures for my dependent, independent, and control variables.  Fourth, I explain the 
statistical methods used to test the hypotheses.  Last, I describe and explain the results of 
my analyses. 
SAMPLING TECHNIQUE AND SAMPLE 
In this study, I examine the adoption of tender offer takeovers, poison pills, and 
executive stock option repricing using three separate samples drawn from the lists of 
Fortune 500 Largest U.S. Industrials (F500) between 1980 and 2004.  This time period is 
chosen because it covers the important stages of the diffusion process for each of the 
practices and provides the best available data on them.  The sample frame consists of the 
population of F500 companies listed between 1980 and 2004, but excludes all companies 
that are not publicly traded.  This is because neither the theoretical arguments presented 
nor the practices examined in this study apply to such firms.  Non-publicly traded firms 
include agricultural cooperatives, such as Mid-America Dairyman, as well as wholly 
owned foreign subsidiaries, such as Lever Brothers, and joint ventures, such as Dow 
Corning.   
I used the following technique to create each of the samples in this study.  For 
tender offer takeovers, I randomly selected 150 adopting companies from all adopting 
F500 companies between 1980 and 2004.  I also randomly selected 150 non-adopting 
companies from all non-adopting F500 companies over this time period.  The time period 
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is chosen for two reasons.  First, this is the period in which the hostile approach to 
corporate acquisition diffused and became generally accepted by the largest U.S. 
companies (Castellucci & Haunschild, 2004; Hirsch, 1986).  Second, this period offers 
the best available database on corporate acquisitions.   
For poison pills, I used the same sampling technique to randomly select 150 
adopting companies and 150 non-adopting companies between 1984 and 2004.  Again, 
this time period is chosen because it is the period in which poison pills were first 
introduced into and subsequently diffused across the population of the largest U.S 
companies (Davis, 1991) and it also provides the best available database on poison pills.  
For executive stock option repricing, given the small number of repricing events by F500 
companies, I selected all 50 adopting companies and randomly selected 70 non-adopting 
companies between 1992 and 2000.  This time period corresponds to when executive 
stock option repricing began to proliferate under normal business conditions (Brenner et 
al., 2000) and offers the best available database on repricing.  Over each of the respective 
observation windows, annual data is collected for each firm from the time it enters the 
sample until it leaves, because either an adoption event has occurred or when it is right-
censored (i.e., there is no adoption event up to when a firm ceases to exist or until the end 
of the observation window). 
DATA SOURCES 
Several data sources were used to collect information on the practices and the 
companies in the samples.  I describe each of the data sources in the following sections. 
Tender Offer Takeovers  
Data on tender offer takeovers are collected from the Securities Data Corporation 
(SDC) database on Mergers and Acquisitions.  The SDC database contains tender offer 
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takeover attempts from 1978 to date.  In this study, I record all instances in which a 
tender offer takeover is made regardless of whether the takeover attempt is successful or 
not; or whether the takeover attempt is accepted by the target’s management (i.e., 
unsolicited but friendly) or rejected by the target’s management (i.e., unsolicited and 
hostile) from 1980 to 2004.  I include all these events because my theory is about why a 
firm chooses to undertake an unsolicited approach to corporate acquisitions when other 
acquisition strategies are available, and not about whether such an approach is accepted 
or rejected by the target firm’s management2 or if it is successful or not. 
Earlier research has observed that the SDC data on corporate acquisitions until 
1985 is not complete (Castellucci & Haunschild, 2004).  To construct a more accurate 
database of tender offer takeovers, I also included data on tender offer takeovers from the 
Austin Tender Offer Statistics (ATOS), a database containing annual listing of all tender 
offers takeovers that was published from 1971 to 1986.  The information in both SDC 
and ATOS are compiled primarily from corporate filings to the Securities and Exchange 
Commission (SEC) and corporate annual reports.  The ATOS database also contains 
information compiled from various sources including Moody’s, Standard & Poor’s, Dun 
& Bradstreet’s, Funk & Scott’s and the Wall Street Journal.  Together, the SDC and 
ATOS databases provided a comprehensive record of tender offer takeovers made over 
the period of observation. 
Poison Pills Takeover Defense   
Data on poison pills takeover defense are collected from the Securities Data 
Corporation (SDC) database on Corporate Governance.  The SDC database contains all 
                                                 
2 Data on whether a tender offer takeover is deemed hostile or friendly was collected and 
included as a control in a supplementary analysis. Model fit improved significantly and the results 
were unchanged except for the interaction of institutional ownership and time clock.  In this case, 
the significance level dropped from ρ≤.05 to ρ≤.01. 
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poison pills adoptions by U.S. firms from 1983 to date.  In this study, I record all cases of 
poison pills adoption from 1984 to 2004.  The information in SDC is compiled primarily 
from corporate filings to the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) and corporate 
annual reports.  The information from the SDC database for earlier time periods (1984-
1989) are checked against the poison pills data used by Davis and his colleagues (Davis, 
1991; Davis & Greve, 1997).  Their data, from 1984-1989, was provided by the 
Corporate Governance Service of the Investor Responsibility Research Center (IRRC), a 
non-for-profit institution that monitors and reports on issues of interests to the investor 
community.  
Executive Stock Option Repricing  
Data on executive stock option repricing are collected from the Standard and 
Poor’s (S&P’s) database on Executive Compensation (EXECUCOMP).  The 
EXECUCOMP database reports annual compensation data for the top five officers in a 
sample of 1500 firms, including those companies in the S&P 500, the S&P MidCap 400, 
and the S&P SmallCap 600.  The database contains information on executive stock 
option repricing from 1992 to date.  The information in EXECUCOMP is compiled from 
corporate filings to the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC).  In this study, I 
record all instances in which a F500 firm repriced its executives’ stock options from 1992 
to 2000.  While executive stock option repricing did occur in early time periods (i.e. prior 
to 1990) (Gilson & Vetsuypens, 1993; Saly, 1994), prior research suggests that these are 
dissimilar in nature to subsequent repricing events that occurred during the 1990s 
(Brenner et al., 2000) and are therefore not included in my study.  More specifically, 
repricing events before 1990 were mostly adopted under situations of dire financial 
distress (i.e., bankruptcies) or major economic jolts (i.e., stock market crash), while 
repricing after 1990 were mostly adopted under normal business conditions.  Further, 
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because companies were not required to report executive stock option repricing before 
1992, no systematic, reliable data is available and data on repricing is collected only from 
1992 to 2000.   
Company Information 
Financial data for the F500 companies are collected from COMPUSTAT.  
Specific data sources for the other variables are described together with their respective 
measures. 
MEASUREMENT OF VARIABLES 
In the following sections, I describe the measures for the dependent variable, 
independent variables, and control variables.  A summary of these variables, their 
measures, and their respective sources are presented in Table 2.  Further, I include a 
summary of the variables associated with each practice in Table 3. 
Dependent Variable 
Organizational Adoption  
In this study, the term organizational adoption refers to a focal firm’s first 
decision to use an organizational practice within the respective periods of observation.  
Adoption is treated as a unique, discrete event and it is recorded using a dichotomous 
variable.  It records whether or not a practice is adopted during each annual spell over the 
window of observation.  When a practice is adopted in a given annual spell, the variable 
is recorded as 1.  Otherwise, it is recorded as 0.  In my analysis, only the first adoption of 
a practice is taken into account and no repeated events are included.  This is because the 
first adoption represents a distinct transition from one state (i.e., non-adopter) into 
another (i.e., adopter) and is conceptually of interest to this study.  Subsequent re-
adoptions of a practice, wherever possible, do not represent this distinct transition and are 
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not included in this study.  However, data on subsequent adoptions of tender offer 




Following the literature on corporate governance, I use a number of indicators to 
measure managerial power relative to the board of directors (Pollock et al., 2002; Wade 
et al., 1990; Westphal & Zajac, 1994), focusing on the relative power of the CEO.  I use 
the following measures: (1) CEO tenure; (2) CEO and board chair duality, (3) number of 
outside directors appointed after the CEO, and (4) proportion of inside to outside 
directors on the board.  While multiple indicators of managerial power are preferred, I 
also combined the individual indicators to create a composite measure of CEO power 
using the summed of their z-scores.  This is simply a data reduction technique used to 
aggregate the indicators and to facilitate the analysis of the data given the limited number 
of adoption events for some of my practices (especially, in the case of executive stock 
option repricing).  The composition method of summed z-scores is used because these 
multiple indicators are generally recognized as formative indicator—measures that 
“jointly influence the composite latent construct, and meaning emanates from the 
measures to the construct in the sense that the full meaning of the composite latent 
construct is derived from its measures”—rather than reflective indicators (Bollen & 
Long, 1993; MacCallum & Browne, 1993; MacKenzie, Podsakoff, & Jarvis, 2005, p. 
712).  As formative indicators, they are not assumed to be caused or determined by the 
construct and they are not assumed to required to be correlated (Bollen & Long, 1993). A 
potential limitation of using summed z-scores is that it assumes equal weightings for each 
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indicator of CEO power. However, given no theoretical basis for alternate weightings, the 
method used is appropriate.  Further, prior research has shown that equal weighting of 
indicators may produce results that are similar to more complex weighting schemes 
(Schmidt & Kaplan, 1971; Stanley & Wang, 1970). I use the composite measure in my 
primary analysis reported herein.  However, in secondary analyses, I also include the four 
indicators individually for tender offer takeovers and poison pills. 
CEO Tenure.   Prior studies suggest a positive relationship between CEO tenure 
and the power CEOs have over the board of directors (e.g., Finkelstein & Hambrick, 
1989; Ocasio, 1994).  It is argued that as CEO tenure increases, CEOs are able to acquire 
personal power by: (1) gaining expert knowledge of the firm’s resources and processes  
(Singh & Harianto, 1989), and (2) populating the board with loyal supporters 
(Fredrickson, Hambrick, & Baumrin, 1988). CEO tenure is measured as the number of 
years the CEO has served at the beginning of each year.  
CEO and Board Chair Duality.  CEOs who also serve as chair of the board of 
directors are argued to have greater status and influence among board members.  By 
serving as CEO and chair, these CEOs can hamper the board’s ability to independently 
monitor and control the actions of top management (Beatty & Zajac, 1994).  CEO/Board 
chair duality is recorded using a dichotomous variable.  When a CEO also serves as the 
chair of the board of directors, the variable is recorded as 1.  Otherwise, it is recorded as 
0.      
Outside Director Appointments after the CEO.  Researchers who emphasize 
agency theory have argued that the more outside directors appointed to the board by a 
CEO, the greater the power and influence enjoyed by the CEO (Sundaramurthy, 1996; 
Wade et al., 1990; Westphal & Zajac, 1994).  As Westphal and Zajac (1995) observed 
that influential CEOs are able to nominate and appoint outside directors who are likely to 
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be sympathetic to their preferences and concerns.  Further, these outside directors are 
likely to feel obliged to the CEO for their appointment and are likely to show loyalty or 
deference to him/her (Sundaramurthy, 1996; Wade et al., 1990). Outside director 
appointments after the CEO is measured as the number of outside directors appointed 
after the CEO at the beginning of each year. 
Proportion of Inside Directors.   Agency theorists argue that outside directors are 
more likely to undertake independent and effective monitoring and control of top 
management (Beatty & Zajac, 1994; Jensen & Meckling, 1976) while inside directors, as 
top executives, are likely to be concerned with their own managerial self-interest.  It is 
therefore argued that the higher the proportion of inside directors on the board, the more 
powerful top management will be vis-à-vis outside directors, and the less independent 
and effective the board will be (Sundaramurthy, 1996; Wade et al., 1990).  Proportion of 
inside directors is measured as the number of inside directors divided by the total number 
of directors on the board at the beginning of each year.  The above measures are collected 
from companies’ proxy statements. 
Managerial Incentives – Managerial Stock Ownership 
Agency theorists identify managerial ownership as an important incentive 
structure to manage agency problem (Jensen & Meckling, 1976).  In my study, I examine 
the level of CEO stock ownership in the firm.  This is measured as the proportion of 
outstanding voting shares owned by the CEO in the previous year.  I did not include 
executive stock options in my measure of ownership.  Researchers have observed that 
while stock options can serve as managerial incentives, their influence on managerial 
interests and actions may be different from those of actual stock ownership (Sanders, 
2001).  Data on managerial ownership is collected from companies’ proxy statements. 
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Institutional Shareholders’ Influence – Institutional Ownership 
The influence of institutional shareholders’ interests is proxied by the level of 
institutional stock ownership.  Consistent with prior studies, institutional stock ownership 
is measured by the proportion of outstanding voting shares owned by institutional 
shareholders (Davis, 1991; Kosnik, 1987; Sundaramurthy, 1996).  Institutional 
shareholders will include investment companies, pension funds, banks, and insurance 
companies (Davis, 1991; Parrino, Sias, & Starks, 2003).  Data on institutional stock 
ownership are collected from the Thomson Financial database. 
Social Ties – Number of Prior Adoption by Interlocked Firms 
Consistent with prior research (e.g., Davis, 1991; Davis & Greve, 1997; 
Haunschild & Beckman, 1998), social ties are measured by the number of prior adoptions 
by interlocked firms.  To collect data on this measure, I first compile data on board 
interlocks of the F500 companies using the company’s proxy statements.  Given that 
prior research has observed that board interlocks tend to be highly stable (Mariolis & 
Jones, 1982) and following prior studies (Beckman & Haunschild, 2002; Haunschild, 
1993), I collect board interlocks data in intervals of five years starting from 1980 to 2000 
(i.e., 1980, 1985, 1990, 1995, and 2000).   
Both inside and outside directors are included when constructing a firm’s board 
interlocks.  Inside directors are executives of a firm who also serve on the board of 
directors.  When an inside director serves on the board of other companies, he or she 
forms sent ties to these interlocked firms.  Outside directors are executives of another 
firm who serve on the board of the focal firm.  These outside directors create received 
ties between the focal firm and their own firm as well as indirect ties to other firms on 
which they also serve as directors. 
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As Haunschild and Beckman (1998) explained, interlocking directorates of sent 
and received ties created by inside and outside directors are likely to be carriers of 
information and social influence.  Inside directors who sit on the board of another firm 
(i.e., sent ties) may learn about a practice from that firm, and consequently, influence the 
adoption behavior in their own firm (Haunschild, 1993).  Outside directors, through their 
received ties, may also influence the adoption behavior of a focal firm by bringing their 
prior knowledge, experience, and preference about a practice from their own firm into the 
focal firm (Davis, 1991).  Further, outside directors may also learn vicariously from the 
experiences of other firms on which they also serve as directors, and thereby influence 
the focal firm’s behavior through these ties (Palmer et al., 1995; Palmer et al., 1993).  To 
allow for the possible influence of all social ties, I collect data on sent and received ties 
and analyze their effects collectively as well as separately.  Number of prior adoptions by 
interlocked firms is measured as the number of adoptions by interlocked firms in the prior 
3 years. For test of robustness, I also measured the number of adoptions by interlocked 
firms in the prior year. 
This measure of social ties emphasizes the mimetic behaviors commonly 
examined in prior literature (Davis, 1991; Haunschild, 1993).  However, in a recent 
study, Westphal and his colleagues argued and found support for second-order mimetic 
behavior, which they defined as the “imitation of the propensity for tied-to firms to 
imitate their competitors” (2001, p. 737).  Their results further suggest that the first-order 
imitation (i.e., the simple imitation of specific actions of tied-to firms) commonly 
observed in earlier studies may actually mask second-order imitation effects.  This study 
does not examine second-order imitation and I recognize the possibility that any effects 
of social ties observed in this study may include second-order imitation effects. 
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Prestigious Endorsement  
Prior adoptions by prestigious firms may influence other firms to adopt the same 
practice for themselves.  Prestigious endorsement is measured as the number of prior 
adoptions by prestigious F500 firms.  I used two indicators of prestige that have been 
widely used in prior studies: (1) firm size, and (2) firm performance (Haunschild & 
Miner, 1997; Haveman, 1993a; Kraatz & Zajac, 1996).  Prior studies have shown that the 
actions of large firms tend to attract attention and be imitated by other firms (Haunschild 
& Miner, 1997; Haveman, 1993a).  I therefore record the number of prior adoptions by 
the largest F500 companies (i.e., top quartile of sales revenue) in the prior 3 years.  
Second, Fombrun and Shanley (1990) observed that successful, high performing firms 
are frequently the most admired firms.  These high performing firms enjoy high levels of 
prestige and their actions are frequently imitated by other firms (Haunschild & Miner, 
1997; Haveman, 1993a).  Hence, I record the number of prior adoptions by the most 
profitable F500 companies (i.e., top quartile of return on assets) in the prior three years.  
For test of robustness, I also measure the number of adoptions in the prior one year by the 
largest as well as most profitable F500 companies.  Annual lists of the largest and the 
most profitable F500 companies are created from data obtained from COMPUSTAT. 
Moderator Variable 
Degree of Social Acceptance Over Time – Time Clock 
To examine the moderating effects of the degree of social acceptance over time, I 
create a continuous time clock for each practice.  Historical accounts and evaluations of 
the practices by Hirsch (1986), Castellucci and Haunschild (2004), and careful 
examination of the practices in this study suggest that the time clock offers a reasonably 
good proxy for the changing degree of social acceptance over time for each practice. This 
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is because the degrees of social acceptance for each practice demonstrated consistent 
trends over time.  As noted earlier, in the case of tender offer takeovers, the degree of 
social acceptance increased over time.  With for poison pills, however, the degree of 
social acceptance remains relatively unchanged over time.  In the case of executive stock 
option repricing, the degree of social acceptance actually decreased over time.  Further, 
the time clock method is consistent with prior studies that examined the ideas of 
institutionalization (e.g., Westphal & Zajac, 1994).  The time clock measure takes on a 
value of one (1) in the first year of observation and increments by one (1) for each 
subsequent year.  Specifically, for tender offer takeovers, time clock ranges from 1, when 
adoption occurred in 1980, to 25, when adoption occurred in 2004.  For poison pills, time 
clock will range from 1, when adoption occurred in 1984, to 21, when adoption occurred 
in 2004.  Lastly, for executive stock option repricing, time clock will range from 1, when 
adoption occurred in 1992, to 9, when adoption occurred in 2000.  By creating individual 
time clocks for each practice, I am able to model separately the different temporal trends 
of the degrees of social acceptance for each practice.  In the case of tender offer 
takeovers, the incrementing time clock is used to model increasing degrees of social 
acceptance over time.  As for executive stock option repricing, the incrementing time 
clock is reverse-coded and models decreasing degrees of social acceptance over time.  
This study expands on prior research by considering that the degrees of social acceptance 
for a practice does not inevitably increase over time but can also remain stable or even 




Prior studies have recognized the important influence of firm size on the 
likelihood of adoption (e.g., Blau, 1970; Blau & Schoenherr, 1971; Child, 1973; 
Haveman, 1993b; Kalleberg & Van Buren, 1996; Rogers, 2003).  Two competing 
propositions have been made.  On the one hand, researchers, who associate large 
organizations with greater structural inertia, have proposed that firm size is negatively 
related to adoption (e.g., Delacroix & Swaminathan, 1991). On the other hand, 
researchers, who associate large organizations with greater slack resources and absorptive 
capacity (Cohen & Levinthal, 1990), have proposed that firm size is positively related to 
adoption (e.g., Bantel & Jackson, 1989; Mahler & Rogers, 1999).  Integrating these 
propositions, Haveman (1993b) observed that firm size exhibited an inverted-U shape 
relationship with entry into new market segments.  Given the significance of firm size on 
the adoption of various practices, I control for its effect in my study.  I use alternate 
measures of firm size.  First, firm size is recorded annually as the gross sales revenue in 
the previous year.  Second, firm size is recorded annually as the number of employees in 
the previous year.  As both measures are highly skewed, the log transformation of each 
measure is used in my analysis. 
Firm Age 
Population ecologists have emphasized the relationship between firm age and 
structural inertia (Hannan & Freeman, 1989).  Prior research has shown that firm age 
reduces a firms’ ability to learn, change its strategy and behaviors, and consequently, 
decreases its likelihood of survival (e.g., Amburgey, Kelly, & Barnett, 1993; Baum & 
Mezias, 1992; Delacroix & Swaminathan, 1991; Fligstein, 1985).  Given that firm age is 
 107
likely to influence the adoption of organizations, I control for its effect in my study.  Firm 
age is measured as the number of years since a company’s original date of incorporation.  
Data on date of incorporation is obtained from Mergent Online and Hoovers. 
Firm Performance 
Adoptions are frequently seen as responses to a firm’s prior performance.  In 
particular, poor performance is argued to initiate change as top managers try to respond 
to the decline in performance by engaging in problemistic search (Cyert & March, 1963; 
March & Simon, 1958).  Consistent with prior studies, I control for the effects of prior 
performance on adoption by using two alternate measures of firm performance (Davis, 
1991; Westphal & Zajac, 1994).  First, firm performance is recorded annually as the 
return on assets (ROA).  Return on assets measures the firm’s operating performance for 
the year and is calculated as the net profit after tax, divided by the value of the firm’s 
assets.  Second, firm performance is recorded annually as the total market return in the 
previous year.  Total market return measures the value accruing to shareholders during a 
year and is a market-based measure of firm performance.  It is calculated as the capital 
gains in the share over a year (i.e., the change in share price) plus dividends paid during a 
year, divided by the value of the share at the beginning of the year (Davis, 1991).  Both 
measures are industry-adjusted at the two-digit Standard Industry Classification (SIC) to 
account for industry-specific effects.  Annual data on total market return and ROA is 
collected from the COMPUSTAT database. 
Firm Interlock Centrality 
Network theorists have emphasized the importance of network centrality on 
organizational actions (Mizruchi, 1996).  In particular, researchers have examined the 
influence of degree centrality on adoption (Davis, 1991; Davis & Greve, 1997; 
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Haunschild & Beckman, 1998; Rao & Sivakumar, 1999).  A firm with higher degree 
centrality has more board interlock ties with other firms.  These central firms are able to 
enjoy great access to information flows within the network (Useem, 1984).  Further, as 
Davis (1991, p. 592) explained, centrality also “indicates a firm’s status and the degree to 
which it is integrated into the corporate elites” and consequently, its susceptibility to 
social influence.  Hence, a firm’s degree centrality is likely to influence adoption and is 
included as a control variable.  Mariolis and Jones (1982) observed that the degree 
centrality of firms was not only highly stable over time but the most reliable measure of 
network centrality.  Hence, following prior studies, I compute centrality as the sum of all 
nonduplicated ties that a focal firm’s board has with all other firms (Davis, 1991; 
Haunschild, 1993; Rao & Sivakumar, 1999).  As degree centrality is highly skewed, I use 
the log transformation of degree centrality in my analysis (Davis, 1991). 
Firm Long-Term Debt Structure 
Prior literature has related firm’s long-term debt structure to the adoption of 
acquisition-related practices including tender offer takeovers and poison pills 
(Haunschild, 1993; Mallette & Fowler, 1992).  According to the free cash flow theory 
(Jensen, 1987), firms with low debt and high cash flows are more likely to engage in 
mergers and acquisitions.  Further, a firm’s capital structure will also determine its 
attractiveness as a takeover target and consequently, influence its decision to adopt anti-
takeover defenses.  I measure long-term debt structure as the ration of long-term debt to 
common equity. 
Stock Market Performance 
Prior research has shown that the adoption of acquisition-related activities 
(Haunschild, 1993; Haunschild & Beckman, 1998) and executive stock option repricing 
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(Pollock et al., 2002) are likely to be affected by broad macroeconomic influences.  To 
account for these effects on adoption, I control for stock market performance between 
1980 and 2004.  I use the mid-year Dow Jones Industrial Average (DJIA), one of the 
most established stock market indices, to measure stock market performance.  
The key control variables described above are applied to all three practices.  In 
addition to these, I include an additional control variable for tender offer takeovers.  
Following prior research on corporate acquisitions (Haunschild, 1993; Haunschild & 
Beckman, 1998), I control for the focal firm’s acquisition experience in the prior three 
years.  This is because firms with lots of experience in corporate mergers and acquisitions 
may also be more likely to engage in tender offer takeovers because they may have 
greater knowledge and ability to engage in these sorts of activities. 
ESTIMATION METHOD 
Event history analysis is used to test the hypotheses on adoption (Allison, 1984; 
Yamaguchi, 1991).  Event history analysis is the appropriate estimation method when the 
data are longitudinal and the phenomenon of interest is a discrete event.  In event history 
analysis, the dependent variable is an unobserved instantaneous rate of transition from 
one state to another.  As Davis (1991) has observed, an important issue in event history 
analysis is the question of time dependence in transition rates.  While parametric 
approaches to modeling time dependence are available (see Tuma & Hannan, 1984), their 
patterns of time dependence do not fit those of the three organizational practices in my 
study.  This is because parametric models either assume that transition rates are changing 
monotonically (e.g., Gompertz or Makeham) or initially increase then decrease over time 
(e.g., log-normal or log-logistic).  However, given that the patterns of time dependence 
for the three practices are more complex than those assumed in parametric models (i.e., 
they tend to increase then decrease, then increase and decrease again), non-parametric, 
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proportional hazards model provides a more suitable approach.  In proportional hazards 
model, the transition rate is separated into two components; one that varies over time for 
every actor in the population, and the other that varies with the characteristics of the 
individual actors (Cox, 1972).  The Cox proportional hazards model is given by the 
following equation: 
    h(t) = q(t)exp[bX(t)], 
where h(t) is the hazard rate of adoption at time t, q(t) is the unspecified time dependence 
function, X(t) is a vector of covariates, and b is the corresponding vector of coefficients.  
The log-linear model implies that a one-unit change in X leads to a change in the hazard 
rate by exp(b). 
As Westphal and Zajac (1994) have noted, two potential limitations of the Cox 
proportional hazard model exist.  First, the Cox model only uses information about the 
relative order of event time and not the specific timing of events.  This means that the 
parameters estimates are less efficient.  However, the loss of efficiency is typically small 
for large samples.  Given the size of my samples, the use of Cox proportional hazard 
model should not significantly affect my analysis.  Second, the Cox model will lead to 
biases in parameter estimates when there are many left-censored observations—events 
that have occurred prior to the observation period.  In my three research settings, left-
censoring exists in the case of tender offer takeovers and executive stock option 
repricing.  However, analysis of historical data suggests that the instances of left-
censored observations are few in all the contexts and any biases in parameter estimates 
should be minimal. 
 Data are organized by firm-year and updated annually over the respective 
windows of observation,  beginning when a firm first enters the sample and continuing 
until an adoption event has occurs or when the firm is right-censored (i.e., either because 
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they cease to exist or until the end of the observation window).  All independent variables 
are either recorded at the beginning of each year or lagged.  For lagged variables, 
different time lags of either one or three years are used in my analyses.  Finally, given 
that specific dates for tender offer takeovers and poison pills adoptions are available, 
continuous proportional hazards model  is used to test the hypotheses (Cox, 1972; 
Yamaguchi, 1991).  In the case of executive stock option repricing, the specific dates of 
repricing are not available.  Hence, discrete proportional hazards model is used to test the 
hypotheses on executive stock option repricing (Cox, 1972; Yamaguchi, 1991).  All 
statistical analyses are implemented using the STATA statistical package. 
RESULTS  
Tables 4, 5, and 6 present the descriptive statistics and correlations of the 
variables for tender offer takeovers, poison pills, and executive stock option repricing 
respectively.  Due to missing data, several firms were dropped from each sample.  For 
tender offer takeovers, the final sample consists of 294 F500 firms, with 146 adopting 
firms and 148 non-adopting firms between 1980 and 2004.  Four firms were dropped 
from the initial sample of adopting firms and two firms were dropped from the initial 
sample of non-adopting firms.  As for poison pills, the final sample consists of 286 F500 
firms, with 145 adopting firms and 141 non-adopting firms between 1984 and 2004.  
Here, five firms were dropped from the initial sample of adopting firms and nine firms 
were dropped from the initial sample of non-adopting firms.  Lastly, for executive stock 
option repricing, the final sample consists of 114 F500 firms, with 48 adopting firms and 
66 non-adopting firms between 1992 and 2000.  Two firms were dropped from the initial 
sample of adopting and four firms were dropped from the initial sample of non-adopting 
firms.  
 112
The three practices generally have high correlations among the same set of 
variables.  In particular, high positive correlations exist between firm size and centrality, 
as well as among time clock, stock market performance, prior adoptions by large firms, 
and prior adoptions by profitable firms.  Further, high correlations also exist between the 
main effects and their respective interactions.  Following prior research (e.g., Haunschild 
& Miner, 1997),  I centered the main effects before computing the interaction terms.  
Further, to understand if multicollinearity is likely to present problems in my analysis, I 
conducted multicollinearity diagnosis using the variance inflation factor (VIF) for each of 
the practices.  In the case of tender offer takeover, VIFs among the independent variables 
were well below the minimum value of 10 and no further actions were taken.  However, 
in the case of both poison pills and executive stock option repricing, the VIFs for time 
clock, stock market performance, prior adoptions by large firms, and prior adoptions by 
profitable firms were reasonably high (although still below the minimum value of 10).  
To address this multicollinearity, I follow prior research (Rhee & Haunschild, 2006; Sine, 
Haveman, & Tolbert, 2005; Sine, Shane, & Di Gregrorio, 2003) and orthogonalized these 
high correlated variables using a modified Gram-Schmidt procedure implement in 
STATA through the orthog command.  This procedure partials out the common variance 
among the variables and constructs orthonormal variables.   Further, in the case of 
executive stock option repricing, because high correlations persist among prior adoptions 
by large firms, prior adoptions by profitable firms, and their interactions, I do not include 
these two measures of prestigious endorsement into the same model but instead include 
the separate measures of prestigious endorsement in different models.  
     Tables 7, 8, and 9 present the results of the event history analysis for the rate 
of adoption of tender offer takeovers, poison pills, and executive stock option repricing 
respectively.  In each separate analysis, Model 1 presents the base model that includes the 
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control variables.  Model 2 examines the hypothesized effects for the main independent 
variables and Model 3 presents the full model that adds the hypothesized interaction 
effects.  For tender offer takeovers, the results in Model 1, Table 7 show that large firms 
are more likely to engage in tender offer takeovers, while profitable firms are only 
marginally more likely to do so.  Further, strong stock market performance encourages 
firms to engage in tender offer takeovers.  However, over time, firms are marginally less 
likely to engage in tender offer takeovers.  As for poison pills, strong stock market 
performance encourages firms to poison pills as a takeover defense.  However, firms are 
less likely to adopt the practice over time as the significant time clock indicates.  In the 
case of executive stock option repricing (see Model 1 in Table 9), younger and highly 
leveraged firms are more likely to reprice their executive’s stock options.  The results 
remain relatively unchanged when alternate measures of firm size and performance are 
used.  Results for the hypothesized main and interaction effects for the key independent 
variables are presented in the following sections. 
Managerial Power  
Political and agency theorists have argued for a positive relationship between 
managerial power and the adoption of practices that are likely to further managerial self-
interests.  Using the composite measure of CEO power (i.e., the sum of z-scores of the 
four individual measures), the results from the separate analyses of the three practices 
provide no support for this relationship (see Model 2 in Tables 7, 8, and 9).  As the non-
significant results in Model 2 of Tables 8 and 9 show, even for practices that are clearly 
in the self-interest of managers (i.e., poison pills and executive stock option repricing) 
there is no evidence that powerful CEOs are more likely to engage in these practices.  
The results remained largely unchanged when individual indicators of CEO power are 
used instead of the composite measure.  These non-significant results are consistent with 
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some prior studies on poison pills (Mallette & Fowler, 1992; Sundaramurthy, 1996) and 
executive stock option repricing (Brenner et al., 2000; Pollock et al., 2002).  Hence, 
Hypothesis 1a, 1b, and 1c, which argued that the greater the level of managerial power, 
the higher the likelihood firms will engage in tender offer takeovers, adopt poison pills, 
and reprice executive stock options respectively, are not supported in this analysis.   
Hypothesis 2a/b/c predict that the effects of managerial power on the rate of 
adoption will (a) decrease for tender offer takeovers, (b) remain stable for poison pills, 
and (c) increase for executive stock option repricing over time.  The results for each 
practice are presented in Model 3 in Tables 7, 8, and 9.  As can be seen in Model 3, Table 
7, there is no support that the effect of managerial power on adoption decrease over time 
as tender offer takeovers became more socially accepted.  Figure 5a plots the interaction 
of managerial power with the degrees of social acceptance over time for tender offer 
takeovers.  The graph shows that the effect of managerial power on adoption between 
low social acceptance periods and high acceptance periods remains essentially unchanged 
(i.e., the slopes are relatively parallel).  Hypothesis 2a is therefore not supported.  In the 
case of poison pills, however, the results support the prediction that the effect of 
managerial power on adoption remains stable over time as the practice’s social 
acceptance remains relatively unchanged.  As Model 3 in Table 8 shows, the interaction 
term of managerial power and the time clock is not significant.  The parallel slopes in 
Figure 5b show that the effect of managerial power on adoption is essentially unchanged 
over time.  In support of Hypothesis 2c, Model 3 in Table 9 shows that the effect of 
managerial power on adoption significantly increased over time as the practice becomes 
less socially accepted.  As seen in Figure 5c, when executive stock option repricing was 
accepted (or at least tolerated) as an incentive strategy early in the diffusion cycle, the 
level of managerial power did not affect the likelihood of adoption.  However, over time, 
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as the practice becomes more socially unacceptable, the effect of managerial power on 
adoption increased such that more powerful CEOs were more likely to reprice executive 
stock options than less powerful CEOs.  In sum, Hypothesis 2a is not supported, but 
Hypothesis 2b and 2c are supported.  In the case of poison pills and executive stock 
option repricing (but not tender offer takeovers), the effect of managerial power on 
adoption changed (or remained stable) over time depending on how the degree of social 
acceptance for each practice evolves. 
Managerial Incentives – Managerial Stock Ownership  
There is no support for agency theory’s assertion of a negative relationship 
between managerial incentives, through CEO stock ownership, and the adoption of 
practices consistent with managerial self-interest.  As shown in Model 2 in Tables 7, 8, 
and 9 the effects of CEO stock ownership on the likelihood of adoption the three 
practices are not significant, even though the effects for poison pills and executive stock 
option repricing are in the direction predicted.  The non-significant result for executive 
stock option repricing is consistent with prior research (Brenner et al., 2000).  However, 
the null result for poison pills is inconsistent with prior studies which tend to find a 
negative relationship between managerial ownership and adoption (Davis, 1991; Davis & 
Greve, 1997; Malatesta & Walkling, 1988; Mallette & Fowler, 1992; Sundaramurthy, 
1996).  A possible explanation for this difference is that most prior studies examined the 
adoption of poison pills between 1984 and 1989.  By extending the time period to 2004, 
this study captures possible differences in the effects over time and this may account for 
the null result (the interaction graph in Figure 6b offers some support for this).  Hence, 
Hypothesis 3a, 3b, and 3c, which argued that the greater the level of managerial stock 
ownership, the lower the likelihood firms will engage in tender offer takeovers, adopt 
poison pills, and reprice executive stock options, are not supported in this analysis.  
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Providing managerial incentives, through higher stock ownership, do not appear to 
realign managerial interest with those of shareholders and has little effect on the adoption 
of practices that may be detrimental to shareholders’ interests.   
Hypothesis 4a/b/c predict that the effects of managerial incentives, through CEO 
stock ownership, on the rate of adoption will (a) decrease for tender offer takeovers, (b) 
remain stable for poison pills, and (c) increase for executive stock option repricing over 
time.  As Model 3 in Table 7 shows, there is no support that the effect of managerial 
incentives on adoption decrease over time as tender offer takeovers became more socially 
accepted.  Figure 6a shows that while there is a slight weakening of the effects over time 
as predicted, the effect of managerial incentives on adoption between low social 
acceptance periods and high acceptance periods remains essentially unchanged (i.e., the 
slopes are relatively parallel).  Hence, Hypothesis 4a is not supported.  However, in the 
case of poison pills, the results do support the hypothesis that the effect of managerial 
incentive on adoption remains stable over time when its social acceptance remains 
relatively unchanged.  As shown in Model 3, Table 8, the interaction term of managerial 
incentives and the time clock is not significant.  The parallel slopes in Figure 6b illustrate 
that the effect of managerial incentives on adoption was essentially unchanged over time.  
As for executive stock option repricing, the results in Model 3, Table 9, support the 
prediction that the effect of managerial incentives on adoption increased over time as the 
practice became less socially accepted.  Early in the diffusion cycle, CEO stock 
ownership has little effect on the adoption of repricing.  However, as the practice 
becomes less socially accepted over time, managerial incentives become more important 
and CEOs with proper incentives (i.e., higher levels of stock ownership) are less likely to 
adopt executive stock option repricing, a practice frowned upon by shareholders.  This 
effect can be seen in Figure 6c where the slope is relatively flat for periods when social 
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acceptance is higher (i.e., early time periods) and much steeper for periods when social 
acceptance is lower (i.e., late time periods).  In sum, Hypothesis 4a is not supported, but 
Hypothesis 4b and 4c are supported.  In the case of poison pills and executive stock 
option repricing (but not tender offer takeovers), the effect of managerial incentives on 
adoption changed (or remained stable) over time depending on how the degree of social 
acceptance for each practice evolves. 
Institutional Shareholders’ Influence – Institutional Ownership  
While the role of institutional shareholders have garnered much attention in recent 
studies (Davis & Thompson, 1994; Sundaramurthy, 1996), this study finds no support for 
the idea that greater levels of institutional ownership, and consequently, greater 
institutional shareholders’ influence, will decrease the adoption of practices that may be 
detrimental to the interests of shareholders (as noted earlier, the three practices are likely 
to be detrimental to institutional shareholders’ interests).  As shown in Model 2 in Tables 
7 and 9, while the direction of the effect of institutional shareholdings on the adoption for 
tender offer takeovers and executive stock option repricing are negative as predicted, 
their effects are not significant.  In the case of poison pills, consistent with prior studies 
(Davis, 1991; Davis & Greve, 1997; Mallette & Fowler, 1992) and contrary to 
Hypothesis 5b, higher levels of institutional ownership did not discourage adoption but in 
fact, significantly increase the likelihood of adopting poison pills.  As researchers have 
commented, this result suggests that institutional ownership may also be an indicator of 
the degree of agency present in the firms and top managers in these firms may be more 
likely to adopt poison pills to strengthen their own position vis-à-vis those of 
shareholders.  Hence, Hypothesis 5a, 5b, and 5c, which argued that the greater the level 
of institutional shareholder influence, the lower the likelihood firms will engage in tender 
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offer takeovers, adopt poison pills, and reprice executive stock options respectively, are 
not supported in this analysis.   
Hypothesis 6a/b/c predict that the effects of institutional shareholders influence, 
through institutional ownership, on the rate of adoption will (a) decrease for tender offer 
takeovers, (b) remain stable for poison pills, and (c) increase for executive stock option 
repricing over time.  Separate analyses of the three practices support these predictions 
(See Model 3 in Tables 7, 8, and 9).  As Model 3 in Table 7 shows, the effect of 
institutional ownership on adoption decreases over time as tender offer takeovers become 
more socially accepted.  From Figure 7a, we see that when tender offer takeovers were 
less socially accepted early in the diffusion cycle, high levels of institutional ownership 
have a relatively strong negative effect on the likelihood adoption (i.e., the slope is 
relatively steep).  However, as the practice becomes more socially accepted as an 
appropriate strategy to corporate acquisition over time, the effect of institutional 
ownership on adoption weakens significantly (i.e., the slope is relatively flat).  Hence, 
Hypothesis 6a is supported.  As for poison pills, the non-significant result is as predicted 
but it does not support the prediction that the effect of institutional ownership on adoption 
remains stable over time as the practice’s social acceptance remains relatively unchanged.  
As shown in Model 3, Table 8, the interaction term of institutional ownership and the 
time clock is not significant.  However, Figure 7b shows that the effect of institutional 
ownership on adoption does not remain unchanged over time but instead differs between 
early and late time periods.  Hypothesis 6b is therefore not supported.  In support of 
Hypothesis 6c, the results in Model 3, Table 9, support the prediction that the effect of 
institutional ownership on adoption increased over time as executive stock option 
repricing becomes less socially accepted.  As we can see in Figure 7c, early in the 
diffusion cycle, when the practice was more socially accepted, the levels of institutional 
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ownership have little effect on repricing (i.e., the slope is relatively flat).  However, as the 
practice becomes less socially accepted over time, firms with higher levels of institutional 
ownership are less likely to adopt executive stock option repricing, indicating greater 
concerns with and influence by institutional shareholders over such socially unacceptable 
practices.  In sum, Hypothesis 6a and 6c are supported and 6b is not supported.  For 
tender offer takeovers and executive stock option repricing, the effect of institutional 
shareholders influence, through institutional ownership3, on adoption changed over time 
depending on how the degree of social acceptance for each practice evolves. 
Social Ties – Prior Adoptions by Interlock Firms 
Analyses for the effect of social ties on adoption are conducted for tender offer 
takeovers and poison pills only.  This is because for executive stock option repricing, data 
limitation prevented the implementation of event history analysis (i.e., there was no 
variance in the variable for all adopters in the sample).  The results for the remaining two 
practices support the arguments that social influence carried though social ties is likely to 
affect adoption (see Model 2 in Tables 7 and 8).  Analyses are conducted using data that 
included all interlocks ties (i.e., sent and received ties).  As shown in Model 2, Table 7, 
prior tender offer takeovers by interlocked firms are positively and significantly related to 
current tender offer takeovers by sampled firms.  As for poison pills, Model 2 in Table 8 
shows that prior adoptions by interlocked firms are positively and marginally related to 
current adoptions by sampled firms.  This is consistent with results in prior studies 
(Castellucci & Haunschild, 2004; Davis, 1991; Davis & Greve, 1997).  Hence, 
                                                 
3 Some researchers (Parrino, Sias, & Starks, 2003; David et al., 1998) have suggested that certain 
types of institutional shareholders (i.e., those with only an investment, and not a business 
relationship with their portfolio companies, such as mutual funds, public pension funds, 
foundations, endowments, and trusts) are more likely to resist managerial pressure, exercise their 
influence, and engage in active governance whenever their interests are at stake.  To examine this, 
I ran supplementary analyses using ownership data for these “pressure-resistant” institutional 
shareholders, and the results were unchanged. 
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Hypothesis 7a and 7b, which argued that the greater the number of social ties to prior 
adopters, the higher the likelihood firms will engage in tender offer takeovers and adopt 
poison pills respectively, are supported in this analysis, while Hypothesis 7c is not tested 
because of data limitations indicated above.   
Hypothesis 8a/b/c predict that the effects of social ties, through prior adoptions by 
interlocked firms, on the rate of adoption will (a) increase for tender offer takeovers, (b) 
remain stable for poison pills, and (c) decrease for executive stock option repricing over 
time.  As explained above, the interaction effect for executive stock option repricing over 
time is not analyzed because of data limitations. In the remaining analyses for tender 
offer takeovers and poison pills (See Model 3 in Table 7 and 8), the results support the 
hypotheses.  As Model 3 in Table 7 shows, the effect of prior tender offer takeovers by 
interlocked firms on current tender offer takeovers by sampled firms increased over time 
as the practice becomes more socially accepted.  In Figure 8a, we see that when the 
practice was less socially accepted earlier on, prior adoptions by interlocked firms have 
little effect on adoption (i.e.,  the slope is relatively flat).  However, as the practice 
becomes more socially accepted, prior adoptions by interlocked firms became more 
influential and significantly increase the likelihood that sampled firms will also engage in 
tender offer takeovers.  Hence, Hypothesis 8a is supported.  As for poison pills, the 
results in Model 3, Table 8 show that the effect of prior adoptions by interlocked firms on 
current adoption by sampled firms remains stable over time as its social acceptance 
remains relatively unchanged.  As Figure 8b shows, the parallel slopes illustrate that the 
effect of prior adoptions by interlocked firms on adoption remains essentially unchanged.  
In sum, Hypothesis 8a and 8b are supported.  In the case of tender offer takeovers and 
poison pills (but not executive stock option repricing), the effect of social ties on 
adoption changed (or remained stable) over time depending on how the degree of social 
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acceptance for each practice evolves.  Further analyses were also conducted using distinct 
categories of interlock ties (i.e., sent and received ties).  The result for sent ties is not 
significant, while the result for received ties is significant and similar to the results 
reported above. 
Prestigious Endorsement 
To evaluate the effects of prior adoptions by prestigious firms, two common 
indicators of prestige were used: (1) prior adoptions by large firms, and (2) prior 
adoptions by profitable firms.  In the case tender offer takeovers and poison pills, both 
variables are included in the same model in their respective analyses.  In the case of 
executive stock option repricing, because the two variables are highly correlated, they are 
not included in the same model but are analyzed in separate models4. While prior studies 
have argued that prior adoptions by prestigious firms will provide an endorsement effect 
for a practice and encourage other firms to subsequently adopt the same practice, results 
from the separate analyses for the three practices offer no support for this idea.  As Model 
2 in Tables 7, 8, and 9 show, prior adoptions by large firms for each of the practice did 
not significantly influence current adoption by sampled firms, even though the direction 
of the effect is positive as predicted.  Further, in the case of prior adoptions by profitable 
firms, the effects are again not significant in any of the three practices.  In the case of 
poison pills and executive stock option repricing, the effect of prior adoptions by 
profitable firms on adoption is in the opposite direction.  Hence, Hypothesis 9a, 9b, and 
9c, which argued that the greater the level of prestigious endorsement, the higher the 
likelihood firms will engage in tender offer takeovers, adopt poison pills, and reprice 
executive stock options respectively, are not supported in this analysis.  The results in this 
                                                 
4 Results of the analysis for prior adoptions by profitable firms are not presented in Table 9 but 
are available from the author.  
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study show that prior adoptions of large firms or profitable firms do not appear to endorse 
a practice and carried little or no social influence on the subsequent adoption decisions of 
other firms.   
Hypothesis 10a/b/c predict that the effects of prestigious endorsement, indicated 
by the prior adoptions of large firms or profitable firms, on the rate of adoption will (a) 
increase for tender offer takeovers, (b) remain stable for poison pills, and (c) decrease for 
executive stock option repricing over time.  The results for each practice are presented in 
Model 3 in Tables 7, 8, and 9.  In the case of tender offer takeovers, Model 3 in Table 7 
shows that there is no support that the effect of prior tender offer takeovers by prestigious 
firms on current tender offer takeovers by sampled firms increases over time as the 
practice becomes more socially accepted.  In fact, the temporal relationships between 
prior adoptions by large firms or profitable firms are somewhat complex.  As shown in 
the interaction graphs for tender offer takeovers in Figure 9a and 11a, the two indicators 
of prestigious endorsement have opposite effects on adoption over time.  Prior adoptions 
by large firms have a positive effect on current adoption early on when the practice is less 
socially accepted.  In contrast, prior adoptions by profitable firms have a negative effect 
on current adoption early on.  Hence, Hypothesis 10a is not supported.  As for poison 
pills, the analysis produced mixed results (see Model 3 in Table 8).  For prior adoptions 
by large firms, while the interaction effect is not significant as predicted, the effect of 
prestigious endorsement on adoption does not appear to remain stable over time when the 
practice’s social acceptance remains relatively unchanged (as the diverging slopes in 
Figure 9b show).  However, in the case of prior adoptions by profitable firms, the 
interaction effect is not significant as predicted.  As shown in Figure 10b, the effect of 
prestigious endorsement on adoption remains relatively stable between the early and late 
time periods.  Hypothesis 10b is only partially supported.  As for executive stock option 
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repricing, the results again reflect the complex temporal relationships between prestigious 
endorsement by large firms or profitable firms on adoption.  Model 3 in Table 9 presents 
the results for prestigious endorsement by large firms and, contrary to prediction, the 
effect of prior adoptions by large firms on current adoptions by sampled firms did not 
decrease over time as the practice becomes less socially accepted.   In sum, Hypothesis 
10a and 10c are not supported, while Hypothesis 10b is only partially supported. The 
results, however, do suggest complex temporal relationships between prestigious 
endorsement by large firms or profitable firms on subsequent adoption that is contingent 
on how the respective degrees of social acceptance for each practice evolves and further 
investigation will be needed. 
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CHAPTER FIVE:  DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSIONS 
The central proposition of this study argues that the effects of different actors’ 
interests and different carriers of institutional influences on adoption will change over 
time depending on changes in the degree of social acceptance for a practice.  Taken 
together, the results from the separate analyses of the three practices provide some 
support for this proposition.  This study provides some evidence that the effects of top 
managers’ and institutional shareholders’ interests as well as social influences carried by 
the prior actions of social ties and prestigious firms on adoption decreased, remained 
stable, or increased over time depending on how the degrees of social acceptance for each 
practice evolved.  The overall pattern of results offers interesting implications to our 
current understanding of the role of actors’ interests and carriers of institutional 
influences in organizational adoption. 
EFFECTS OF INTERESTS 
Theories on agency and power and politics have presented strong arguments for why 
managerial power, managerial incentives, and institutional shareholders’ influence will 
affect adoption of practices that will further managerial self-interests.  The results in this 
study offer no support for these predictions even for practices that present clear agency 
problems, such as poison pills and executive stock option repricing.  There are several 
explanations for these null results.  The non-significant results for most of the main 
effects may suggest that arguments for agency and power on adoption may be somewhat 
overgeneralized when the role of institutional influences are ignored in prior studies.  As 
Granovetter (1985; 1992) explained, organizational actors are embedded in structures of 
social relationships and it is unrealistic to assume that social actors, in particular, top 
managers can pursue their self-interests relatively unencumbered by social commitments 
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and obligations.  Another reason is that as researchers have observed  (Pfeffer & 
Salancik, 1978; Rogers, 2003; Strang & Soule, 1998; Tolbert & Zucker, 1983, 1996) and 
I have argued throughout this study, the effects of interests on adoption are not likely to 
be stable over time.  Consequently, it is difficult to find significant results for the main 
effects of interests on adoption over an extended time period when their effects are likely 
to changes.  
 However, by examining the effects of interests on adoption over time, this study 
offers greater insights about the effects of managerial power, managerial incentives, and 
institutional shareholders on adoption.  The results suggest that as a practice becomes 
more socially unacceptable and the agency problem becomes more clearly defined (i.e., 
when top managers’ interest is clearly different from shareholders’ interest with regards 
to a practice), the effects of managerial power, managerial incentives, and institutional 
shareholders on adoption becomes more significant and more consistent with the 
predictions of theories of agency and power.  This is most evident in the case of 
executive stock option repricing.  When the practice is initially accepted (or at least 
tolerated) as an incentive strategy to retain talented top managers early on, the interests of 
top managers and institutional shareholders have little effects on its adoption.  However, 
as executive stock option repricing becomes socially unacceptable over time, the role of 
interests on adoption becomes more significant, such that firms with powerful top 
managers, poor managerial incentive structures, and weak institutional shareholders are 
more likely to adopt executive stock option repricing.  In contrast, for tender offer 
takeovers, when top managers’ and institutional shareholders’ interests are less divergent, 
we find less evidence of agency at play, as evident by the non-significant results for 
managerial power and incentives.  Hence, the important question in adoption is not 
whether agency and power matters but rather when they are likely to matter most.  This 
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study reveals that the effects of managerial power, managerial incentives, and 
institutional shareholders influence on adoption are most significant in situations when 
managerial self-interests clearly diverge from those of shareholders and when agency 
problems are most evident as decreasing social acceptance of executive stock option 
repricing over time illustrates.  This conclusion is also supported by the results in Pollock 
et al. (2002).  While they found no significant results for the main effects of 
organizational power and politics on repricing, like this study, they did find that when the 
negative spread of options increased and top managers will not benefit from their options, 
power and politics become more significant predictors of repricing.  Specifically, 
powerful CEOs are more likely to reprice, while CEOs with proper incentives and firms 
with stronger institutional shareholders’ influence are less likely to reprice when the 
negative spread increased. 
Another interesting conclusion suggested by the pattern of results is that 
institutional shareholders interests and their influence on adoption are likely to be 
affected by prevailing social attitude towards a practice.  In the case of tender offer 
takeovers, while institutional shareholders of acquiring firms tend to frown upon and 
actively resist tender offer takeovers early in the diffusion cycle when social acceptance 
is low, they become less resistant to the practice when it becomes more socially accepted 
over time.  Further, when executive stock option repricing is accepted (or at least 
tolerated) as an incentive strategy early on, institutional shareholders did not actively 
object to or resist the practice.  However, as the practice becomes socially unacceptable 
over time, institutional shareholders began to actively resist the practice.  These results 
illustrate how institutional shareholders’ interests and influence tend to map onto 
prevailing social attitudes about the social acceptance of a practice.  Hence, institutional 
shareholders can be seen to influence, as well as be influenced by, the social attitude 
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regarding different practices.  In contrast, the results suggest that top managers’ interests 
and influence tend to map less well onto prevailing social attitudes and top managers will 
adopt practices to further their own self-interest whenever their self-interests are clearly 
defined and when they are able to do so.  What this study illustrates is that when this will 
occur depends on the prevailing social attitudes about a practice as it will affect the 
actor’s interests and their ability to further them. 
EFFECTS OF CARRIERS OF INSTITUTIONAL INFLUENCE 
Institutional theory argues that social information and influences, transmitted through 
different institutional carriers, will affect adoption.  The results in this study offer some 
support for this prediction.  In particular, relational carriers of social influences, 
represented by social ties to prior adopters, are found to be an effective conduit of social 
information and influence.  On the other hand, symbolic carriers, represented by the prior 
adoptions of prestigious firms, are less effective conduits and carry little social influence 
on others.  There are several plausible reasons for the non-significant results of symbolic 
carriers.  First, the effectiveness of symbolic carriers of social influences may be greater 
in contexts where a practice is fully institutionalized (i.e., taken-for-granted as 
appropriate and necessary).  In contexts where social values and norms are less well-
established (as are the practices in this study), then more direct and intimate modes of 
communication may be necessary to convey social information and influence and 
consequently, affect adoption (Davis, 1991; Haunschild & Beckman, 1998).  Second, the 
effectiveness of symbolic carriers may be greater in social setting where reference groups 
are much more narrowly defined and social actors are more similar in nature.  Prior 
studies, situated within specific industries, have found evidence of prestigious 
endorsement (Burns & Wholey, 1993; Haveman, 1993a; Loh & Venkatraman, 1992).  
However, by focusing on the population of the largest U.S. companies (i.e., F500 
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companies), this study examines the social influences that may prevail within a fairly 
broad social category.  In this broad social setting, the effectiveness of symbolic carriers 
may consequently be relatively low.  As such, this study represents a more conservative 
test of the effect of symbolic carriers of institutional influences on adoption and may 
account for the non-significant results observed. 
 Further, by examining the effects of different carriers of institutional 
influences on adoption over time, the results offer some interesting and surprising 
observations for the role of social ties and prestigious endorsement in adoption.  The 
significant interaction effects for tender offer takeovers and poison pills illustrate how the 
effect of social ties on adoption changed (or remained stable) over time depending on 
how the degree of social acceptance for each practice evolves.  As social acceptance for 
tender offer takeovers increased over time, the effect social ties on adoption strengthened.  
However, when the degree of social acceptance for poison pills remained relatively 
unchanged over time, then the effect of social ties on adoption remained stable.  The 
effectiveness of social ties as a carrier of institutional influences strengthened as a 
positive social consensus for the practice emerged.  The interaction effects of prestigious 
endorsement carried by the actions of large or profitable firms also revealed some 
surprising results even though they are not significant.  First, while prior studies have 
general considered firm size and profitability as indicators of prestige and predicted 
similar responses to and outcomes for them, this study shows that firms may regard and 
respond to the prior actions of large firms and profitable firms differently.  Second, the 
temporal effects of prestigious endorsement across the three practices appear more 
complex than predicted in this study.  The interactions graphs show that the effects of 
prior adoptions by large or profitable firms often flip over time instead of the simple 
increasing, decreasing, or stable trend predicted in this study.  This suggests that social 
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actors may receive and respond to the social information communicated through the 
symbolic actions of others in a different manner depending on the prevailing social 
attitude regarding a particular practice.  Organizational theory will definitely profit from 
future research on these unexpected findings. 
LIMITATIONS AND DIRECTIONS FOR FUTURE RESEARCH 
The design of my study presents several limitations as well as directions for future 
research.  First, I am not able to directly measure the degrees of social acceptance over 
time in this study.  Instead, I use time clocks to proxy the trends in changes in social 
acceptance over time.  This method is consistent with prior studies that examined the idea 
of institutionalization (e.g., Westphal & Zajac, 1994).  While historical accounts, 
evaluations of the practices in prior studies (Castellucci & Haunschild, 2004; Davis, 
1991; Hirsch, 1986), and a careful assessment of the diffusion of each practice in this 
study suggest that a time clock is a reasonably good proxy, it will be useful in future 
studies to develop a more direct measure of degrees of social acceptance.  The framework 
presented by Castellucci and Haunschild (2004) offers a good basis to develop such a 
measure.   
However, a fundamental question with the concept of social acceptance still 
exists—socially accepted by whom?  While this study strives to observe a general social 
consensus among key stakeholders, it may be difficult to obtain a general measure of 
social acceptance.  Instead, a practice may become more or less socially accepted by 
different stakeholder groups.  This issue is both a limitation of this study as well as the 
broad literature on institutional theory where a general institutional logic is always 
presumed to exist (even though it frequently reflects only the logic of the financial 
community).  In the attempt to develop a more precise measure of social acceptance in 
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the future it may be useful to identify key social constituents and develop different 
measures of social acceptance for each.  
Second, in the case of poison pills, I predicted null effects for the interactions of 
the respective predictor variables and the degrees of social acceptance over time and 
offered the argument that unchanging degrees of social acceptance is the explanation for 
these non-results.  While the explanation is plausible, non-results are not the best 
evidence to support my predictions.  Other alternative explanations, not examined herein, 
may be responsible for these non-results.  However, while non-results may be ambiguous 
within the individual context of poison pills, when taken together with the results for the 
other two practices, the different pattern of results across the three practices offer greater 
confidence in the arguments set forth for the predicted null effects for poison pills. 
Third, it is important to recognize that the practices examined in this study include 
those that can be adopted repeatedly (e.g. tender offer takeovers and executive stock 
option repricing) as well as those that can be adopted only once (e.g. poison pills).  In this 
study, I examined adoption of the three practices as a discrete transition in states between 
that of a non-adopter and an adopter.  This method may overlook conceptual differences 
between the two types of practices.  To address this limitation, I have collected initial 
data on subsequent, repeated adoptions and will analyze this in the future.  
Fourth, it is also important to acknowledge the issues surrounding the small 
number of executive stock option repricing events among the population of the largest 
U.S. companies.  Given the small sample size, models used in the analyses are 
necessarily simplified.  Also, limited variance in the data resulting from the small sample 
prevented the analysis of the effects of social ties to prior adopters.  As such, the results 
relating to executive stock option repricing should be regarded as exploratory.  Future 
research should strive to replicate the results by expanding the sample and including 
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more repricing events, or studying a practice that has similarly become less socially 
accepted over time but with greater number of events within a population. 
Fifth, this study focused exclusively on the adoption behaviors of the largest U.S. 
companies.  Because of differences in important characteristics between large and small 
companies, the results in this study may not generalize to small and medium-sized 
companies.  It will be useful in future studies to investigate if the effects of actors’ 
interests and carriers of institutional influences on adoption observed in this study will 
generalize to the population of small and medium-sized companies.  Further, because 
large firms tend to adopt practices at later stages of a diffusion cycle (DiMaggio & 
Powell, 1983; Leblebici et al., 1991), I do not investigate adoptions from the very onset 
of an innovation.  By studying smaller companies, future studies can also investigate if 
the results in this study will generalize to adoptions that occur very early in the diffusion 
cycle when an innovation is first introduced 
Lastly, while I try to include the interests of different actors’ as well as the social 
influences carried by different institutional carriers, I have excluded others because they 
are not relevant to the practices in this study or because of data limitation.  Given that 
different actors and different carriers of social influence are likely to be affected in 
different ways by the evolving social attitude of a practice as this study has illustrated, it 
will be useful in future studies to identify and examine the impact of other stakeholders 
(e.g., employees and other interest groups) as well as other carriers of social influence 
(e.g., prior actions of similar or structurally equivalent others) on adoption. 
CONTRIBUTIONS OF THE RESEARCH 
This study makes several important theoretical and empirical contributions.  By 
examining how the effects of interests and carriers of institutional influences on adoption 
change over time, depending on the degree to which a practice becomes socially 
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accepted, this study offers a more nuanced and dynamic model of organizational adoption 
than previous studies.  While Tolbert and Zucker’s (1983; 1996) ideas on the process of 
institutionalization offer a nice and simple model of the effects of interests and carriers of 
institutional influences on adoption over time, the findings in this study, together with the 
mixed results in prior studies, demonstrate that the effects of interests and carriers of 
institutional influences on adoption over time is more complex than previously theorized.  
This study offers a more comprehensive understanding of how actors’ interests and 
carriers of institutional influences will affect adoption over time as social attitudes 
towards a practice changes.   
 Further, by developing and empirically testing the temporal effects of interests 
and carriers of institutional influences on adoption, this study offers important insights to 
our current understanding of agency, power, and social networks.  Prior studies defined 
within these perspectives have been relatively static, even though the effects of actors’ 
interests (Pfeffer & Salancik, 1978) and institutional carriers of social influences on 
adoption (Tolbert, 1985; Tolbert & Zucker, 1996) are often recognized to change over 
time.  By examining how actors’ interests and their ability to enact those interests are 
affected by evolving social attitude towards a practice over time, this study illustrates 
when and under what conditions the interests of different actors will prevail.  This study 
shows that the interests of organizational actors and their ability to enact them are likely 
to be influenced by evolving social attitude.   Similarly, by examining how different 
carriers of institutional influences will affect the adoption of practices that become 
varyingly diffused and socially accepted, this study demonstrates how the effectiveness 
of different carriers of social influences changes as prevailing social attitude towards a 
practice changes.  This study shows that relational carriers may be more effective 
conduits of social influence than symbolic carriers when social norms and values are not 
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fully well-established (i.e., fully institutionalized).  Further, their effectiveness tends to 
depend on the prevailing degrees of social acceptance of a practice.  The results in this 
study therefore offer a dynamic perspective to our current understanding of agency, 
power, and social networks.   
Lastly, the comparative research design in this study allows us to not only test the 
generalizability of key theoretical assertions but also provide more precise specifications 
about the determinants of adoption across different practices.  This is particularly 
important for the literature on adoption and diffusion (Strang & Soule, 1998).  Prior 
studies that have examined central concepts of adoption and diffusion in different 
research settings have frequently produced mixed results.  This has made the 
accumulation of knowledge about adoption difficult.  By studying the adoption of 
different practices by the population of the largest U.S. companies, this study allows us to 
make stronger conclusions about the different determinants of adoption and gain deeper 
understanding of how the interests of different organizational actors will interplay with 
the social influences carried by different institutional carriers to determine adoption over 
time. 
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Table 1: Table of Hypotheses. 
TOT –  Tender Offer Takeover 
PP  –  Poison Pills 
ESOR  –  Executive Stock Option Repricing 
 






H1a/b/c TOT / PP / ESOR +  
H2a TOT  - Decreasing 
H2b PP  null Stable 
Managerial Power  
H2c ESOR + Increasing 
H3a/b/c TOT / PP / ESOR -  
H4a TOT  + Decreasing 
H4b PP  null Stable 
Managerial Incentive – 
Managerial Stock 
Ownership  
H4c ESOR - Increasing 
H5a/b/c TOT / PP / ESOR -  
H6a TOT  + Decreasing 





H6c ESOR - Increasing 
Institutions 
H7a/b/c TOT / PP / ESOR +  
H8a TOT  + Increasing 
H8b PP  null Stable 
Social Ties – Prior 
Adoptions by 
Interlocked Firms 
H8c ESOR - Decreasing 
H9a/b/c TOT / PP / ESOR +  
H10a TOT  + Increasing 
H10b PP  null Stable 
Prestigious 
Endorsement – Prior 
Adoptions by Large 
Firms or Profitable 
Firms H10c ESOR - Decreasing 
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Table 2: Variables, Measures, and Sources. 
Note: All variables are time-varying and updated annually unless otherwise stated. 
 





   







indicating whether a 
practice was adopted (1 = 
Yes, 0 = No).  
 






(II) Poison Pills 
 
 









Securities Data Corporation 
(SDC) Platinum (Mergers & 
Acquisitions), Austin Tender Offer 
Statistics (ATOS) 
 
Securities Data Corporation 
(SDC) Platinum (Corporate 
Governance)   
 










Managerial Power  
   







(A) CEO Tenure – count 
of the number of 
years the CEO has 
served at the 
beginning of each 
year. 
 
(B) CEO/Board Chair 
Duality – 
Dichotomous variable 
indicating whether a 
CEO is also the board 
chair (1 = Yes, 0 = 
No). 
 
(C) Number of Outside 
Directors Appointed 
After CEO – count of 
the number of outside 
directors appointed 
after the CEO at the 
beginning of each 
year. 
 
(D) Proportion of Inside 
Directors – 
proportion of inside 
directors on the board 
of directors at the 













CEO Stock Ownership –
proportion of outstanding 
voting shares owned by 
















Proportion of outstanding 
voting shares owned by 
institutional shareholders 
in the previous year. 
 
 





Number of Prior 
Adoptions by Interlocked 
Firms – count of the 
number of prior adoptions 
by interlock firms created 
through sent and received 
ties among the F500 firms 
in the previous 3 years. 
 
Interlock data will be 
collected at time intervals 
of 5 years (i.e., 1980, 
1985, 1990, 1995, 2000, 
and 2004). Prior adoption 
data will be collected 




Company Proxy Statements 
 
Securities Data Corporation 
(SDC) Platinum (Mergers & 
Acquisitions), Austin Tender Offer 
Statistics (ATOS) 
 
Securities Data Corporation 
(SDC) Platinum (Corporate 
Governance)   
 











(A) Prior Adoptions by 
the Largest F500 
Firms – count of the 
number of prior 
adoptions by the top 
quartile of the largest 
F500 firms in terms 
of revenue at the 
beginning of each 
year. 
 
(B) Prior Adoptions by 
High Performance 
F500 Firms – count 
of the number of 
prior adoptions by the 
top quartile of the 
most profitable F500 
firms at the beginning 






Securities Data Corporation 
(SDC)Platinum (Mergers & 
Acquisitions), Austin Tender Offer 
Statistics (ATOS) 
 
Securities Data Corporation 
(SDC)Platinum (Corporate 
Governance)   
 






VARIABLE MEASURE SOURCE 
Moderator Variable 
 





Annual clock measuring 
the time of adoption from 
the first year of 
observation for each of 
the three organizational 
practices. 
 
(I) Tender Offer 
Takeovers (1980-2004) 
      
(II) Poison Pills                    
(1984-2004) 
 
(III)  Executive Stock 

















(A) Gross Sales 
Revenue – log of 
gross sale revenue 
in the previous 
year. 
 
(B) Number of 
Employees – log of 
count of the number 














Count of the number of 
years since a company’s 
original date of 
incorporation at the 
beginning of each year. 
 
 
Mergent Online, Hoovers 
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Return on Asset – net 
profit after tax divided by 
the value of the firm’s 
assets in the previous year 
adjusted for industry 













Sum of all nonduplicated 
ties that a focal firm’s 
board maintains with all 
other firms. 
 
Interlock centrality will 
be collected at time 
intervals of 5 years (i.e., 









Mid-year Dow Jones 
Industrial Average (Dow 






Table 3: Summary of Models. 
Dependent Variable Tender Offer 
Takeover 
Poison Pills Executive Stock 
Option Repricing
Independent Variables 
Managerial Power  
 







Prestigious Endorsement  
  
Time Clock  
 
Managerial Power X Time Clock 
 




Ownership X Time Clock 
 
Social Ties X Time Clock 
 








Firm Performance – Industry-
adjusted ROA  
 




Stock Market Performance -Dow 
Jones Industrial Average 
 






































































































































Table 4: Descriptive Statistics and Correlations for Tender Offer Takeovers 
(N=3994) *. 
Mean S.D. Min. Max. 1 2
1 Adoption (0=no, 1=yes) 0.037 0.188 0 1
2 Firm size (Employee) 28.764 47.935 0.027 748 .064
3 Firm age 51.470 30.741 1 195 .017 .053
4 Firm performance (Industry-adjusted ROA) -0.035 0.233 -5.547 0.831 .041 .126
5 Firm LT debt 0.215 0.185 0 1.748 -.009 -.066
6 Centrality (Degree) 21.167 14.557 1 105 .062 .372
7 Acquisition Experience (prior 3 yrs) 2.610 4.516 0 93 .037 .088
8 Stock Market Performance (DJIA) 4262.487 3344.544 812 10972 .026 .029
9 Time clock 12.221 6.660 2 25 .013 .002
10 CEO Power  (z-scores) -1.12E-08 2.429 -5.528 11.527 -.022 -.013
11 CEO ownership 0.042 0.103 0 0.756 -.022 -.128
12 Institutional ownership 0.483 0.204 0.001 0.989 .023 .118
13 Prior adoptions by interlocked firms (prior 3 years) 0.860 1.507 0 14 .066 .072
14 Prior adoptions by large firms (prior 3 years) 17.356 7.791 0 31 .027 .037
15 Prior adoptions by profitable firms (prior 3 years) 8.601 6.074 0 21 .023 .027
16 CEO Power x time clock -2.528 15.891 -105.618 80.312 .000 -.016
17 CEO ownership x time clock -0.051 0.597 -5.835 3.349 -.001 .035
18 Institutional ownership x time clock 0.440 1.367 -5.800 6.532 .024 -.017
19 Prior adoptions by interlocked firms x time clock 0.464 10.101 -91.881 115.476 .068 .081
20 Prior adoptions by large firms x time clock 23.116 57.044 -39.094 146.959 -.014 .086
21 Prior adoptions by profitable firms x time clock 34.643 38.457 -18.308 121.093 .010 .090
3 4 5 6 7 8
4 Firm performance (Industry-adjusted ROA) .104
5 Firm LT debt -.005 -.057
6 Centrality (Degree) .190 .204 -.016
7 Acquisition Experience (prior 3 yrs) -.035 .084 .049 .093
8 Stock Market Performance (DJIA) .098 .075 .137 -.063 .229
9 Time clock .096 .083 .138 -.082 .239 .928
10 CEO Power  (z-scores) -.129 -.039 -.045 -.061 .008 -.157
11 CEO ownership -.254 -.245 .093 -.250 -.047 -.089
12 Institutional ownership .068 .231 -.073 .173 .126 .300
13 Prior adoptions by interlocked firms (prior 3 years) .065 .046 -.022 .121 .060 .050
14 Prior adoptions by large firms (prior 3 years) .060 .030 .056 -.023 .154 .509
15 Prior adoptions by profitable firms (prior 3 years) .091 .066 .129 -.051 .227 .936
16 CEO Power x time clock -.035 .021 -.053 -.007 .021 -.112
17 CEO ownership x time clock .022 .196 .009 .114 .042 -.091
18 Institutional ownership x time clock -.058 -.091 .070 -.085 -.020 .145
19 Prior adoptions by interlocked firms x time clock .046 -.027 .037 .027 -.009 .024
20 Prior adoptions by large firms x time clock .045 .003 .022 -.002 -.025 .354
21 Prior adoptions by profitable firms x time clock .063 .017 .048 .002 .037 .570





9 10 11 12 13 14
10 CEO Power  (z-scores) -.156
11 CEO ownership -.074 .268
12 Institutional ownership .323 -.121 -.311
13 Prior adoptions by interlocked firms (prior 3 years) .046 .009 -.029 .146
14 Prior adoptions by large firms (prior 3 years) .446 -.061 -.057 .196 .126
15 Prior adoptions by profitable firms (prior 3 years) .857 -.137 -.072 .278 .081 .630
16 CEO Power x time clock -.095 -.045 -.027 .029 -.004 -.090
17 CEO ownership x time clock -.080 -.030 -.375 .092 .021 -.069
18 Institutional ownership x time clock .077 .024 .077 .044 -.023 .043
19 Prior adoptions by interlocked firms x time clock -.013 -.006 .017 -.019 .090 -.032
20 Prior adoptions by large firms x time clock .143 -.081 -.054 .028 -.036 .197
21 Prior adoptions by profitable firms x time clock .314 -.106 -.080 .094 -.002 .341
15 16 17 18 19 20
16 CEO Power x time clock -.103
17 CEO ownership x time clock -.088 .253
18 Institutional ownership x time clock .113 -.171 -.297
19 Prior adoptions by interlocked firms x time clock .013 .030 -.028 .157
20 Prior adoptions by large firms x time clock .295 -.132 -.088 .324 .150
21 Prior adoptions by profitable firms x time clock .526 -.148 -.096 .320 .123 .892
Variable
Variable
* Correlations greater than .03 are significant at the .05 level  
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Table 5: Descriptive Statistics and Correlations for Poison Pills (N=3241) *. 
Mean S.D. Min. Max. 1 2
1 Adoption (0=no, 1=yes) 0.045 0.207 0 1
2 Firm size (Employee) 40.227 88.355 0.115 877 -.040
3 Firm age 52.908 33.077 1 164 .000 .113
4 Firm performance (Industry-adjusted ROA) -0.059 0.441 -18.608 0.831 .018 .082
5 Firm LT debt 0.220 0.188 0 1.748 -.004 -.081
6 Centrality (Degree) 19.876 12.350 1 77 .022 .242
7 Stock Market Performance (DJIA) 5193.703 3287.842 1335 10972 .018 .080
8 Time clock 10.618 5.511 2 21 -.029 .077
9 CEO Power  (z-scores) -2.62E-08 2.364 -5.669 7.787 -.031 -.017
10 CEO ownership 0.054 0.120 0 0.985 -.037 -.122
11 Institutional ownership 0.478 0.215 5.91E-07 0.985 .070 .099
12 Prior adoptions by interlocked firms (prior 3 years) 0.906 2.026 0 19 .053 .132
13 Prior adoptions by large firms (prior 3 years) 11.135 13.507 0 44 .034 -.025
14 Prior adoptions by profitable firms (prior 3 years) 10.232 11.868 0 35 .007 -.025
15 CEO Power x time clock -1.248 13.368 -56.285 75.100 .020 .020
16 CEO ownership x time clock -0.045 0.642 -6.730 5.937 .040 .006
17 Institutional ownership x time clock 0.315 1.169 -4.964 4.954 -.048 .062
18 Prior adoptions by interlocked firms x time clock -2.317 10.111 -101.776 38.126 -.067 -.110
19 Prior adoptions by large firms x time clock -2.930 4.438 -11.707 6.472 -.039 -.023
20 Prior adoptions by profitable firms x time clock 0.730 5.322 -6.441 14.046 .090 -.027
3 4 5 6 7 8
4 Firm performance (Industry-adjusted ROA) .086
5 Firm LT debt .071 -.033
6 Centrality (Degree) .292 .150 .015
7 Stock Market Performance (DJIA) .086 .027 .048 .027
8 Time clock .085 .028 .055 .006 .928
9 CEO Power  (z-scores) -.143 -.034 -.075 -.155 -.095 -.096
10 CEO ownership -.227 -.181 .012 -.333 -.074 -.069
11 Institutional ownership .018 .180 -.071 .177 .263 .266
12 Prior adoptions by interlocked firms (prior 3 years) .114 .058 -.045 .335 -.190 -.208
13 Prior adoptions by large firms (prior 3 years) -.036 -.039 -.022 -.019 -.484 -.532
14 Prior adoptions by profitable firms (prior 3 years) -.038 -.035 -.004 -.035 -.446 -.441
15 CEO Power x time clock -.004 .052 -.038 .038 -.056 -.055
16 CEO ownership x time clock .032 .087 -.092 .106 -.046 -.044
17 Institutional ownership x time clock .000 -.040 .083 -.060 .119 .105
18 Prior adoptions by interlocked firms x time clock -.074 -.043 .038 -.268 -.055 -.055
19 Prior adoptions by large firms x time clock -.018 .015 -.002 .007 -.117 -.086
20 Prior adoptions by profitable firms x time clock -.030 .005 -.048 .032 -.278 -.466





9 10 11 12 13 14
10 CEO ownership .363
11 Institutional ownership -.064 -.306
12 Prior adoptions by interlocked firms (prior 3 years) -.029 -.116 .026
13 Prior adoptions by large firms (prior 3 years) .052 .045 -.154 .432
14 Prior adoptions by profitable firms (prior 3 years) .048 .046 -.154 .409 .924
15 CEO Power x time clock .039 -.037 .029 .037 .006 .016
16 CEO ownership x time clock -.039 -.277 .060 .089 -.001 .003
17 Institutional ownership x time clock .031 .060 .083 -.081 -.021 -.048
18 Prior adoptions by interlocked firms x time clock .042 .095 -.088 -.664 -.302 -.271
19 Prior adoptions by large firms x time clock .007 -.002 -.026 -.340 -.740 -.627
20 Prior adoptions by profitable firms x time clock .031 .011 -.078 .020 .125 -.179
15 16 17 18 19
16 CEO ownership x time clock .352
17 Institutional ownership x time clock -.100 -.318
18 Prior adoptions by interlocked firms x time clock -.052 -.104 .082
19 Prior adoptions by large firms x time clock .037 .029 -.054 .422
20 Prior adoptions by profitable firms x time clock .007 .014 -.023 .041 -.020
Variable
Variable
* Correlations greater than .035 are significant at the .05 level  
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Table 6: Descriptive Statistics and Correlations for Executive Stock Option 
Repricing (N=769) *. 
Mean S.D. Min. Max. 1 2
1 Adoption (0=no, 1=yes) 0.062 0.242 0 1
2 Firm size (Employee) 26.409 37.471 0.209 260 -.098
3 Firm age 49.199 29.959 2 121 -.121 .050
4 Firm performance (Industry-adjusted ROA) -0.003 0.115 -0.848 0.766 -.033 .168
5 Firm LT debt 0.230 0.197 0 1.692 .102 -.099
6 Centrality (Degree) 19.114 12.664 1 59 -.101 .391
7 Stock Market Performance (DJIA) 5923.466 2793.106 2911.67 10972 .022 .219
8 Time clock 4.511 2.485 1 9 .038 .213
9 CEO Power  (z-scores) -0.242 2.243 -5.482 5.139 .056 -.133
10 CEO ownership 0.055 0.099 0 .603 .025 -.166
11 Institutional ownership 0.498 0.195 0.007 0.966 -.043 .181
12 Prior adoptions by large firms (prior 3 years) 1.593 1.719 0 5 .027 .188
13 CEO Power x time clock -0.337 2.208 -12.038 6.761 .068 -.043
14 CEO ownership x time clock -0.004 0.090 -0.594 1.171 -.016 -.014
15 Institutional ownership x time clock 0.059 0.183 -0.577 1.105 -.076 .028
16 Prior adoptions by large firms x time clock -6.12E-09 0.861 -1.466 1.974 -.085 .037
3 4 5 6 7 8
4 Firm performance (Industry-adjusted ROA) .078
5 Firm LT debt -.063 -.193
6 Centrality (Degree) .267 .193 -.025
7 Stock Market Performance (DJIA) .136 -.015 .072 .018
8 Time clock .136 -.013 .052 .185 .969
9 CEO Power  (z-scores) -.237 -.057 -.045 -.236 -.255 -.264
10 CEO ownership -.282 -.144 .070 -.309 -.095 -.100
11 Institutional ownership .119 .072 -.094 .230 .459 .463
12 Prior adoptions by large firms (prior 3 years) .122 -.019 .071 .156 .911 .845
13 CEO Power x time clock -.008 -.025 .053 .008 -.077 -.101
14 CEO ownership x time clock .060 .032 -.047 .089 -.006 -.009
15 Institutional ownership x time clock .008 -.027 -.010 .008 -.003 .058
16 Prior adoptions by large firms x time clock -.006 .022 -.008 -.051 -.127 -.126
9 10 11 12 13 14
10 CEO ownership .334
11 Institutional ownership -.174 -.263
12 Prior adoptions by large firms (prior 3 years) -.215 -.085 .364
13 CEO Power x time clock .003 -.036 -.031 .010
14 CEO ownership x time clock -.041 -.243 .047 .011 .332
15 Institutional ownership x time clock -.024 .043 .007 -.129 -.199 -.263
16 Prior adoptions by large firms x time clock .011 .012 -.141 -.082 -.265 -.109
15
16 Prior adoptions by large firms x time clock .290
Variable
Variable





Table 7: Event History Analysis Predicting Rate of Tender Offer Takeovers 
Adoption (N=3700) *. 
Independent Variables
Firm size (Employees) 0.272 ••• 0.270 ••• 0.243 ••
(0.077) (0.078) (0.079)
Firm age 6.43E-04 1.22E-04 -9.30E-05
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003)
Firm performance (Industry-adjusted ROA) 1.488 † 1.646 † 1.887 •
(0.899) (0.898) (0.915)
Firm LT debt -0.181 -0.275 -0.379
(0.532) (0.540) (0.560)
Centrality 0.147 0.143 0.188
(0.135) (0.138) (0.140)
Acquisition Experience (prior 3 yrs) 0.005 0.006 0.008
(0.014) (0.014) (0.013)
Stock market performance (DJIA) 2.32E-04 • 4.13E-04 • 3.04E-04
1.03E-04 1.76E-04 2.18E-04
Time clock -0.1095 † -0.1291 • -0.105
(0.061) (0.064) (0.078)
CEO power -0.060 -0.064 †
(0.037) (0.037)
CEO ownership 0.650 0.458
(1.049) (1.156)
Institutional ownership -0.570 -0.637
(0.491) (0.502)
Prior adoptions by interlocked firms (prior 3 years) 0.115 ••• 0.068
(0.041) (0.050)
Prior adoptions by large firms (prior 3 years) 0.010 6.32E-03
(0.026) (0.029)
Prior adoptions by profitable firms (prior 3 years) -0.096 -0.090
(0.077) (0.078)
CEO power x time clock -0.001
(0.006)
CEO ownership x time clock -0.055
(0.202)
Institutional ownership x time clock 0.154 •
(0.077)
Prior adoptions by interlocked firms x time clock 0.014 •
(0.007)
Prior adoptions by large firms x time clock -0.003
(0.007)
Prior adoptions by profitable firms x time clock 0.007
(0.012)
Chi-square 41.77 ••• 53.32 ••• 65.87 •••
† ρ ≤ .1; • ρ ≤ .05; •• ρ ≤ .01; ••• ρ ≤ .001; two-tailed tests.
* Standard errors are in parentheses.
Model
1 2  3
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Table 8: Event History Analysis Predicting Rate of Poison Pills Adoption 
(N=2954)*. 
Independent Variables
Firm size (Employees) -0.079 -0.127 † -0.125 †
(0.067) (0.069) (0.070)
Firm age 6.21E-04 1.41E-03 1.56E-03
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003)
Firm performance (Industry-adjusted ROA) 0.586 0.211 0.221
(0.492) (0.469) (0.474)
Firm LT debt -0.098 0.038 0.170
(0.475) (0.477) (0.482)
Centrality 0.194 0.009 -0.019
(0.129) (0.142) (0.142)
Stock market performance (DJIA) 5.33E-04 ••• 5.20E-04 ••• 5.51E-04 •••
9.25E-05 9.79E-05 1.31E-04
Time clock -0.284 ••• -0.268 ••• -0.254 •
(0.066) (0.075) (0.117)
CEO power -0.058 -0.053
(0.040) (0.040)
CEO ownership -0.624 -0.615
(1.120) (1.169)
Institutional ownership 1.830 ••• 1.807 •••
(0.458) (0.455)
Prior adoptions by interlocked firms (prior 3 years) 0.068 † 0.006
(0.038) (0.072)
Prior adoptions by large firms (prior 3 years) 0.041 0.383
(0.166) (0.502)
Prior adoptions by profitable firms (prior 3 years) -0.004 -0.118
(0.149) (0.270)
CEO power x time clock 8.78E-05
(0.007)
CEO ownership x time clock 0.202
(0.201)
Institutional ownership x time clock -0.098
(0.076)
Prior adoptions by interlocked firms x time clock -0.013
(0.013)
Prior adoptions by large firms x time clock 0.074
(0.100)
Prior adoptions by profitable firms x time clock -0.017
(0.061)
Chi-square 40.83 ••• 66.32 ••• 72.01 •••
Model
 1  2  3
† ρ ≤ .1; • ρ ≤ .05; •• ρ ≤ .01; ••• ρ ≤ .001; two-tailed tests.




Table 9: Event History Analysis Predicting Rate of Executive Stock Option 
Repricing Adoption (N=655)*. 
Independent Variables
Firm size (Employees) -0.157 -0.152 -0.168
(0.132) (0.133) (0.137)
Firm age -0.017 •• -0.017 •• -0.019 ••
(0.006) (0.006) (0.007)
Firm performance (Industry-adjusted ROA) 0.622 0.457 0.349
(1.328) (1.314) (1.339)
Firm LT debt 1.317 • 1.474 • 1.333 •
(0.590) (0.664) (0.670)
Centrality -0.211 -0.243 -0.216
(0.205) (0.218) (0.222)
Stock market performance (DJIA) 0.368 0.326 -0.471
(0.329) (0.328) (0.969)
Time clock -0.183 -0.128 -1.578
(0.402) (0.417) (1.533)
CEO power 0.098 0.126
(0.079) (0.083)
CEO ownership -2.905 -4.358 †
(1.902) (2.312)
Institutional ownership -1.118 -1.361
(0.938) (0.958)
Prior adoptions by large firms (prior 3 years) 0.148 -0.300
(0.441) (0.694)
CEO power x time clock 0.214 •
(0.102)
CEO ownership x time clock -5.162 •
(2.634)
Institutional ownership x time clock -2.782 •
(1.247)
Prior adoptions by large firms x time clock -2.296
(2.682)
Chi-square 24.11 ••• 28.35 •• 39.54 •••
† ρ ≤ .1; • ρ ≤ .05; •• ρ ≤ .01; ••• ρ ≤ .001; two-tailed tests.
* Standard errors are in parentheses.
Model
 1  2  3
 






















Figure 2: Frequency of F500 Tender Offer Takeovers from 1980 to 2004. 
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Figure 3: Cumulative F500 Tender Offer Takeovers from 1980 to 2004. 































Figure 4: Frequency of F500 Poison Pills from 1984 to 2004. 
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Figure 5: Cumulative F500 Poison Pills from 1984 to 2004. 
 


































Figure 6: Frequency of F500 Executive Stock Option Repricing from 1992 to 2000. 
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Figure 7: Cumulative F500 Executive Stock Option Repricing from 1992 to 2000. 































Figure 8: Interaction Graphs for Managerial Power. 
a: Tender Offer Takeovers
b: Poison Pills
c: Executive Stock Option Repricing •
† ρ ≤ .1; • ρ ≤ .05; •• ρ ≤ .01; ••• ρ ≤ .01






































































Figure 9: Interaction Graphs for Managerial Incentives. 
(Interaction graphs are plotted using respective means ± 1 S.D.)
late-low acceptance
late-low acceptance






























































† ρ ≤ .1; • ρ ≤ .05; •• ρ ≤ .01; ••• ρ ≤ .01
a: Tender Offer Takeovers
b: Poison Pills
c: Executive Stock Option Repricing •
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Figure 10: Interaction Graphs for Institutional Shareholders’ Influence. 



































































† ρ ≤ .1; • ρ ≤ .05; •• ρ ≤ .01; ••• ρ ≤ .01
a: Tender Offer Takeovers
b: Poison Pills
c: Executive Stock Option Repricing •
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Figure 11: Interaction Graphs for Social Ties. 
Dropped because of data limitation.
(Interaction graphs are plotted using respective means ± 1 S.D.)
late-high acceptance
late-high acceptance










































† ρ ≤ .1; • ρ ≤ .05; •• ρ ≤ .01; ••• ρ ≤ .01
a: Tender Offer Takeovers
b: Poison Pills
c: Executive Stock Option Repricing •
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Figure 12: Interaction Graphs for Prestigious Endorsement - Size. 






































































† ρ ≤ .1; • ρ ≤ .05; •• ρ ≤ .01; ••• ρ ≤ .01
a: Tender Offer Takeovers
b: Poison Pills
c: Executive Stock Option Repricing •
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Figure 13: Interaction Graphs for Prestigious Endorsement - Profitability. 








































































† ρ ≤ .1; • ρ ≤ .05; •• ρ ≤ .01; ••• ρ ≤ .01
a: Tender Offer Takeovers
b: Poison Pills
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